

WINTER, 1959-60

RELIGION

IN THE

A Christian Quarterly

OF OPINION AND DISCUSSION

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Editorial

THE TENSELY SERIOUS discussion of the Trinity in this issue is relieved at one point with the observation: "While one may be in danger of losing his soul by denying it, he is in danger of losing his wits in trying to understand it."

The intellectual difficulties attending this doctrine receive sharp expression in the no-holds-barred debate between Richardson and Welch. The former sees the basic issue in the tension between divine absoluteness and relatedness, a problem inadequately stated in the "ambiguous symbolism" of Father and Son and only aggravated by the introduction of the notion of a fecund Absolute. Instead of imposing an arbitrary threeness upon God we should admit frankly that we are dealing here with two paradoxical and dialectical concepts which cannot be united. To Dr. Welch, on the contrary, this metaphysical problem is altogether secondary. The Trinity stands essentially for the threefoldness of God's unique act of self-revelation by which he actually makes himself known to us. This revelation requires a complete reformulation of our ordinary ways of thinking about God, hence the tensions.

Fortunately salvation does not depend upon the ability to understand a doctrine which a theologian can describe only as "essential paradox." Yet all the writers agree with Dr. Richardson that "we are here dealing not with a mere intellectual abstraction, but with the very foundations of Christian piety." Dr. Farmer points out that the Church's faith in Christ as God, the impelling force behind the doctrine, is the best safeguard of a specifically Christian monotheism. Dr. Heikkinen unveils the "triadic" structure of the Old and the New Testaments when they are viewed in the light of their own organic unity. Bishop Harmon supplies a needed emphasis on the personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit, without which the Church's faith would be "binitarian" rather than trinitarian. Dr. Ranson recalls F. D. Maurice's attempt to provide all social life with a trinitarian undergirding.

The doctrine of the Trinity is the whole gospel in epitome. As Barth insists, it is the Church's answer to the life-and-death question of the genuineness of God's revelation in Christ. Thought forms have changed, but faith in Jesus Christ as "very God of very God," whose abiding presence is made real through the Holy Spirit, is as essential to the Church today as to the Nicene Fathers. The present symposium serves to focus thought on what is vital and distinctive in the Christian message.

T. A. K.

The Doctrine of the Trinity

I. The Ontological Trinity: Father and Son

CYRIL C. RICHARDSON

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT doctrine of the Trinity is the ontological one; and the question of its validity must be discussed from the point of view of the basic issue with which it wrestled. That issue is formulated in such terms as these: that God is at once "Unoriginate Source" and "Self-expression." For these ideas the symbols "Father" and "Son" were used. It is to this problem that I shall address myself in this article, confining my treatment to the first two terms of the Trinity, and enlarging upon the point which has been most criticized in my recent book, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*. All trinitarian doctrine hangs upon the initial distinction that we try to make between the Father and the Son. The nature of the third term of the Trinity, which we do not have space to develop here, depends on the answer to this prior question.

It may be observed in passing, before we plunge into our inquiry, that trinities formulated as the basis of the different ways in which we know God, or the different ways in which we classify his varied relations with the world, do not reach to the heart of the problem with which the classical doctrine of the Trinity tried to deal. Nor, again, does the concern which lies behind the "Social Trinity" penetrate the basic issue. These more superficial trinities, to be sure, have their own difficulties, and I have treated them in my book, Chapters 5 and 7. But it is with the fundamental problem which provoked the classical doctrine of the Trinity that I should like to deal here.

What exactly are we trying to contrast when we speak of God as "Unoriginate Source" and as "Self-expression"? What are we trying to say about the nature of God when we speak of him as both Father and Son of the Trinity? We are positing two principles in the divine—one by which God's aseity is affirmed, and another by which God acts and expresses himself. God acts; yet in this acting he does not exhaust his Being. He is not so involved with the world that he ceases to be God, that the limita-

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tions placed upon him by human freedom and the duality of himself with his creation, rob him of his final Lordship and Omnipotence. He is "unoriginate"—he is only "from himself," dependent upon no one; and this quality of his absolute and transcendent nature by which he is truly God is not compromised by the risk of freedom, the going out toward "nonbeing," which love and creativity entail. That is what we are trying to talk about in this first distinction; and it involves one of the primary problems of the Christian doctrine of God. How can he be *really* God, with the infinite power of being, if he stands over-against his creatures and is involved in the struggle with nonbeing and sin?

Now it seems to me a very unsatisfactory way of speaking of this basic issue if we use the terms Father and Son.

- (1) The symbols in their biblical heritage are altogether confusing for this.
- (2) The error (derived from Middle Platonism) of the fecundity of the Absolute is involved. The result is that God's relation to nonbeing is inadequately expressed.
- (3) A confusion in Christology is implied, insofar as the human aspect of Jesus' relation to his heavenly Father is confounded with the trinitarian terms of "Son" and "Father."¹

Let us take up the first two of these objections in turn.

THE BIBLICAL TERMS

The biblical terms Father and Son are used in two basic connections. The primary one contrasts the living God, active and related to his world, with the children whom he creates and to whom he grants a special vocation. Israel is his "son," whom in the wilderness he bore, and as a father carries his child on his shoulders. Or again, Israel's king (Ps. 2:7) is his son, whom he begets the day the king responds to his call and truly accepts his vocation. In the teaching of Jesus this relation of God to his children is given frequent and deep expression. The heavenly Father's intimate care and concern for his children is the very essence of Jesus' teaching about God.

The second way in which the Father-Son relation appears in Scripture concerns the unique relation of Jesus to God. This theme we cannot pursue here; but it would be difficult to deny that Jesus' own sense of his relation to God was *in essence* the same as that which he coveted for all his hearers. What, moreover, he experienced with new intensity and with especial

¹ This point cannot be treated here, but has been discussed in my article, "The Trinity and the Enhypostasia," in the *Canadian Journal of Theology*, 5, 1959, pp. 73-78.

fervor and clarity, was the same type of relation with God which prophets and psalmists had already foreshadowed.

Now to use the terms Father and Son, within the general biblical sense, of trinitarian relationships, appears misleading in the extreme. For in essence they contrast God with his chosen creatures. For that reason they are highly inappropriate to contrast metaphysical principles in the divine. If we are trying to talk about the problem of the Unoriginate and his Self-expression, they would only be appropriate if the latter were derived from the former. And even in that case the terms would be highly metaphorical. But it is questionable to suppose the one principle is derived from the other (a point I shall question in the next paragraph), and to suppose further that these principles are like persons and can love each other.

THE FECUNDITY OF THE ABSOLUTE

Behind the idea that God as the unoriginate source *begets* his self-expression in the Word, lies the Middle Platonic doctrine of the fecundity of the Absolute. This notion has become so much a part of the Christian consciousness that even to question it appears to many an unintelligible exercise. Yet it seems to me to rest upon an unstable logical foundation and to issue in a doctrine of God which is unsatisfactory.

Let us keep clearly in mind precisely what we are trying to talk about. We are not yet discussing a Christological problem; nor speaking about appropriate ways of symbolizing that God is love. These issues we cannot treat here. We are concerned *only* with the basic metaphysical problem of the relation of God to motion, creativity, expression, and nonbeing. This was a problem especially posed for Christianity by Greek thinking and it *cannot be evaded*. It runs through Christian thought all the way from early Christian writers to Barth and Tillich; and it is already foreshadowed by II Isaiah, the intertestamental literature, Philo, and parts of the New Testament. The attempt to deny its importance, or to imagine that the doctrine of the Trinity has nothing to do with it, is to fly in the face of the whole history of Christian thought, and to abandon the attempt to frame a coherent and intelligible theology. The return to so-called "Biblical theology," important as it is, is often at fault in failing honestly and seriously to wrestle with problems which parts of the Bible at any rate already have raised.

Our problem, then, is to ask the question how God is related to nonbeing. That is the essence of the issue, though it can be expressed in many different ways. Aulén, for instance (to take a typical example),

says: "To Christian faith God appears both as the sovereign God exalted above all strife and change, and as the loving and divine will which in history is engaged in a struggle against opposing forces."² But how can he be *above* all strife, and yet involved *in* struggle? How is it possible to think of God as really God—absolute, unlimited, omnipotent, omniscient, above time and flux—and yet as involved in creation, the risk of freedom, the peril of nonbeing, and the struggle of history? This, I contend, is the *real* issue behind the distinction of God as "Unoriginate" and as "Self-expression": of God and his Logos or Word.

Already in Philo and the New Testament (especially Col. 1:15ff., and Hebrews) the answer is given from the structure of Middle Platonism—viz., that the Absolute *begets* the Related. God in his absolute and transcendent glory begets his Son or Word by whom he creates, sustains and redeems. By his Word he makes himself known—appears from the veil of his self-sufficient glory. By his Word he enters the arena of creativity, suffering and love. By his Word he becomes what in his aseity he is not, viz., *limited* by his creative act. To use Barth's expression, he makes himself God "a second time." He takes on the "form of something He Himself is not," in manifesting himself to his creation.³

There is, here, a fundamental point of logic. Are we right in saying that God in his aseity *begets* his Word—that God in his relations is *derived* from God in his absolute nature? This appears to me to be a false way of stating the problem, because it assumes (with Plato and Plotinus) that the Absolute "overflows" and moves itself to the act of creation by its own superabundance. But this is surely an unsatisfactory notion. How can the Absolute "overflow" boundaries which it does not have; how can there be anything "over," as if there were a defect in the simple and self-sufficient essence of God? The logical implication of this is to press back the dilemma of the Absolute and the related already into the first term, so that the related is itself *implicit* in the Absolute. Instead of solving the problem, this notion offers an inadequate statement of it, and hides the real problem in the supposed solution. The fact is that the Absolute and the related are paradoxical and dialectical concepts, and cannot be unified by making the latter implicit in the former.

Long ago Parmenides saw this issue, and while he drew a wrong conclusion from what he saw, he nonetheless grasped part of the truth. He posed the question in terms of the One and the Many; while these terms

² Aulén, G., *The Faith of the Christian Church*, The Muhlenberg Press, 1948, p. 143.

³ Barth, K., *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, Pt. I, p. 363.

are arithmetical, the basic issue is the same. He saw they stood in eternal contradiction to each other, and we cannot *derive* the Many from the One. If we do, the One is no longer the One, but already (by implication) the Many. As a consequence he denied the existence of the Many. Here undoubtedly he was wrong. The Many exist, just as much as does the One. The world is not an insubstantial shadow (as it is in much of Indian thought), but the real world of God's creation, of man's sin, and of the divine victory. What is needed is a *paradoxical or dialectical affirmation* of both the One and the Many, as the necessary precondition of thinking.

I well realize that dealing with such metaphysical abstractions may (on the surface) appear remote from the concerns of Christian faith. But I cannot seriously enough urge that this problem has always been a *basic* one in trinitarian theology, and we have neither right nor wisdom if we seek to avoid it. It is not, to be sure, the *only* problem in trinitarian doctrine. Indeed, one of the great weaknesses of trinitarian formulations is that they confuse different problems, and try to add them all up into one, neat threefold pattern. But there can be no question that trinitarianism, in its classic formulation, was (among other things) struggling with this problem of the Absolute and the related. To claim that such problems do not belong to Christian theology—that the issue of God's nature in itself and in its relation to the world is an inappropriate question—is simply to abandon the serious theological enterprise altogether.

The consequences of this doctrine of the fecundity of the Absolute on Christian theology have been extremely serious. They have left an unresolved and unacknowledged contradiction in the doctrine of God. Let us look at it in two representative thinkers—Aquinas and Tillich. Then let us see how, in its turn, the Process Theology has tried to solve the question.

THE PROBLEM IN AQUINAS AND TILlich

It is a commonplace to say that Aquinas so defines the *actus purus* that (logically) God can neither create the world nor love. There can be no potentiality in God. Hence he can have no real relation to his world, even if he could create it! "As God is outside the whole order of creation . . . in God there is no real relation to creatures."⁴ Illustration: an animal is related to a column, but the column has no real relation to the animal for it is the animal, not the column, which *changes*.⁵ The *actus purus* is ever at rest, and hence motion, becoming, realization are all impossible

⁴ *Summa Theologica*, 1a. Q. 13.a.7.

⁵ *Ibid.*

for God. His aseity demands his completeness; his self-fulfillment lies entirely in himself, and is a state already perfect, to which nothing can be added.

Now it is purely superficial to say this is the Greek side of Aquinas' thought and we, who believe in the dynamic and living God of the Scriptures, will have nothing to do with it. The fact is that we cannot avoid the idea which Aquinas has put forward. It is the implication of God's transcendent glory, of his being really *God*. If he is not the *actus purus* (or whatever term we may prefer to speak of the absolute nature of God), he is no longer the true God. Whether we use such terms as "He who is," or "infinite subjectivity," or "absolute will" or any other similar expression, always the concept of the Absolute, the denial of all finitude, threat, change, and deviation of purpose, is involved. If God can be threatened by nonbeing, if he is so involved in his creation that the victory over sin is not *already* his, then he is not God. If we fail to apply absolute categories to God, our faith has no stable and certain object. We begin to believe in a God who has not yet become truly God.

But how, with such a belief in God as *actus purus*, can we *also* believe he creates, loves, judges and redeems? How can the Eternal be involved in time—the God of absolute power and glory be limited by his creation?

Aquinas answers this by his doctrine of the Trinity, in which he ascribes to God the very qualities he has denied. He understands the divine life in terms both of motion and of love. In the Trinity, he holds, there is an *ad intra* procession where the act remains within the agent, which he contrasts with *ad extra* motion where an act tends toward external matter.⁶ By this subtlety he attempts to describe motionless motion! For he is trying to invent a category of motion which will not completely contradict the *actus purus*. Again, he says of the procession of the Son, "Whatever proceeds [from another] . . . the more perfectly it proceeds, the more perfectly it is one with the Source whence it proceeds. . . . The Divine Word is of necessity one with the Source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity."⁷ But the question at once arises, why should there be any motion or procession, in the first place? Why should God love himself or his Word, or think of himself, and so on? If the aim is to state the complete union of God with himself, then should not the whole notion of procession be abandoned? Why not just say (as Plotinus did), God is the One, above the duality of thought and motion?

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1a.27.a.1.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Aquinas cannot do this for two reasons. On the one hand, he inherited the trinitarian doctrine with its divine inner relations, but on the other, his doctrine is a real attempt to express the dynamic character of the Living God. Ascribing motion to the divine life is to acknowledge that God is not a God who does nothing, can do nothing, and in whom pure form has swallowed up the dynamics of life itself.

The difficulty in Aquinas, however, is that he seeks to avoid the express contradiction in his position. By talking of *ad intra* motion in the divine as if it were not motion at all, but could in some way be harmonized with the doctrine of the *actus purus*, he lays himself open to the criticism that his final view of God really excludes the dynamic, biblical factor. Moreover, in inheriting the idea of the begetting, he cannot state the real paradox of the divine life with clarity. For to do justice to the two necessary ideas we must hold, we must state that God *is* absolute, and yet (at the same time) *is* dynamically related to his world. This is a paradox. Yet it is an essential one. Only thus can we guard the truth that God is *really* God, and yet do justice to the activity and limitation of God in creation and redemption. Neither of these truths can we sacrifice. They are the bedrock of Christian faith, the very beginning of the theological enterprise. And we cannot meaningfully derive one principle from the other. For to do so involves compromising the first term. If God as absolute is already *implicitly* in relation, he is not really absolute. Either we destroy the validity of the first term if we talk of the fecundity of the Absolute; or else we read back the essential paradox into the first term, thus making the second term unnecessary. We simply have to say that God is absolute *and* related; that he eternally and absolutely transcends nonbeing and yet is involved in nonbeing.

This last is, indeed, what Tillich explicitly states, but without seeing the nature of the paradox in which he is involved. He writes, "God as being itself transcends nonbeing absolutely."⁸ This is as clear a statement of the *actus purus* as one could wish. But he goes on, "God as created life includes the finite and with it, nonbeing."⁹ This implies all the dynamic biblical pictures of the Living God, active in history and creation. But he tries to relate these two contradictory assertions regarding nonbeing by his doctrine of the divine life as "the ground of all abundance."¹⁰ This is Plato's fecundity of the Absolute once again. The problem is not really

⁸ Tillich, P., *Systematic Theology*, I, Chicago University Press, 1951, p. 270.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 251.

solved. Rather it is inadequately stated. One of the major criticisms brought against Tillich's doctrine of God is this question of the place of nonbeing in the Divine Ground. He seems to be saying it is absent from God (he "absolutely" transcends it)—and yet it is *in* God (as "created life"). Consequently, critics have charged him with inconsistency.

Such criticisms are (I feel) misdirected. The Process theologians dislike his first statement; the classical theologians take issue with the second. I think, however, Tillich is basically right. Where I feel he is open to criticism is that he does not recognize the nature of the paradox, and he tries to compose it by the fecundity of the Absolute. We *do* have to say both things, and we *do* have to acknowledge they are paradoxical. There is no logical way of overcoming the contradiction. It has to be flatly asserted as the very first principle of Christian theology. To fail to do so is to end up either with the God who can do nothing (the *actus purus* by itself), or with a God who is not really God, but is eternally threatened by nonbeing.

It must never be forgotten that we are here dealing not with a mere intellectual abstraction, *but with the very foundations of Christian piety*. If we cannot apply the absolute categories to God, and say in our prayers with all seriousness that he is omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and so forth, we should soon cease praying. If God were threatened by nonbeing, if he did not himself have the absolute power of being, he would no longer be God. A God who is only in process, who has not quite become (and indeed may not *ever* become) God, simply cannot be one who claims our final devotion. We should live nervously in the world, bound by the anxiety that ultimate meaning may turn out to be meaninglessness, and that nothingness may eventually triumph over being, that sin may swallow up love. In short, not having yet saved himself, God could not be our Savior.

On the other hand, we have *also* to state the other side of the paradox. Our serious Christian life *does* depend upon our conviction that God is radically involved in his world; that he is limited by the risk of freedom, at war with the forces of evil; that he loves and suffers to redeem his wayward creation. The dynamic biblical categories are just as essential as the absolute ones. If we were only to say, "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world," and not *also* to say, "God has stooped from his heaven and there is a great deal wrong with the world," we should be derelict in our duty, deaf to the cries of suffering, and living in a fool's paradise. The paradox of God's being reaches to the very well-springs of our Christian life and devotion. It is a paradox we shall never solve. Here we stand at the confines of human thought. But it is a paradox we

must espouse, not cloaking it, or pretending it is not there, or imagining we have solved it by the faulty notion of the Absolute.

THE PROCESS THEOLOGY

The Process theology has tried to wrestle with this basic problem in the terms that God is both absolute and relative, but absolute only in *some* respects, while relative in others. It is certainly to the credit of this theology that the difficulties of the classical thinking have been exposed. When, for instance, Charles Hartshorne asks (with reference to Aquinas' notion that God has no real relation to creatures): "Which is superior, a self-moving organism, or a fixed inorganic aggregate of crystals? Which is God more like, a superstone or a superorganic individual?"¹¹ he sees the essential point. The *actus purus* (by itself) is not the Living God.

But the Process theology does not give a satisfactory answer to our problem. The assumption that God is absolute *only in certain respects* is meaningless. If we say God is absolute *only* in his fixity of purpose or in his love, but is qualified in power and wisdom, then we in principle deny that he is absolute in the former respects. For if his fixity of purpose did not have the *infinite power of being* to sustain it, it would be threatened in its very nature. If God lacked power, wisdom or any other absolute, then the ones we do apply to him could be conquered and are not really absolute. If God is in process of becoming God, then nonbeing is really prior to being, and this surely is impossible. Moreover, he is not really God. He is a part of a process greater than he is, and one which may eventually be victorious over him. No, we have to state the paradox of God's nature—absolute and related. But we cannot say absolute only in *some* respects, for this is really to deny he is absolute in *any*.

CONCLUSION

We conclude, then, with the assertion that insofar as the trinitarian pattern is speaking of the absolute-related nature of God, it does it inadequately. It uses inappropriate terms (as Father and Son) for this; it fails to see the necessary paradox which is involved, and it rests upon a faulty notion of the fecundity of the Absolute, which it borrowed from Middle Platonism. To contend that God is first Unoriginate Source and then Self-expression or "Son" derived from this, is to fail to state the basic principles of the divine nature with either clarity or cogency.

¹¹ Hartshorne, C., and Reese, W. L., *Philosophers Speak of God*, University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 131.

2. Mystery and Truth

A Preface to Trinitarian Theology

CLAUDE WELCH

IS GOD REALLY *made known* in Jesus Christ? This is the prime question for a contemporary view of trinitarian doctrine, and it has been posed anew (though not intentionally in that form) in Cyril Richardson's recent book, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*.

I

Dr. Richardson's central thesis, enunciated in the first chapter and repeated throughout, can be stated simply: The trinitarian conception (or conceptions) is an inadequate attempt to deal with the fundamental religious paradox of God as at once absolute and related.¹

In most general terms, the difficulty with the doctrine of the Trinity is the insistence on threeness. Distinctions in God must assuredly be made, but "these are of various kinds and do not lend themselves to a neat, trinitarian pattern."² We can speak of two "modes of being," or of antinomies, or of distinctions involving an indefinite number of terms, but not of any essential threeness. More specifically, the crucial distinction is between God as absolute and God as related, and this is in fact the operative principle of the whole trinitarian development. "Father and Son are distinguished in order to guard the absolute character and transcendent glory of God on the one hand, and to affirm on the other that the created world is *his*, and not an emanation from him . . . or the work of an inferior God (as in Gnosticism). God is *beyond* and yet he is *related*; that is the essence of the distinction between Father and Son."³ Where this principle of distinction has been abandoned, as in the assertion of the identity of operation of the "persons" and in the doctrine of appropriations, no meaningful basis for distinction remains. Further, all attempts to distinguish

¹ Cf. e.g. pp. 15, 26, 69, 148.

² P. 13, cf. 146ff.

³ P. 23.

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between the Son and the Spirit break down, for both are essentially representative of only one side of the paradox, God in relation.

Everything hangs, therefore, on the difference between the Father and the Son. Yet neither in the biblical witness nor in the theological development do those terms adequately express the antinomy of God as beyond yet present. There is ambiguity at the outset, for the concept of the Father already embraces the two aspects (or modes) of transcendence and relatedness; hence the attempt to represent God-as-acting by the term Son (or Son and Spirit) only results in unnecessary duplication and confusion.⁴

Also, the distinction of the Son from the Father was developed by way of the middle-Platonic notion that God acts by mediators, that the absolutely transcendent one can be related to the world only through intermediaries, here specifically the Logos. But that conception in turn involved the assumptions (1) that the Father as the "source" of the Son is somehow more truly God, a notion which in spite of the rejection of subordinationism was never wholly overcome in trinitarian theology, and (2) that the "acting" principle can be *derived* from the Absolute (the "begetting" of the Son, which equals the Platonic idea of the fecundity of the Absolute).⁵ We have here both a compromise of the ultimate character of God's being-in-relation, and a denial of the essential *paradox* of beyondness and relatedness.⁶

Why, then, the development and persistence of trinitarian doctrine? Because the term "Son," originally designating Jesus the man in his special vocation and dependence on God, was "riveted on the Church."⁷ The early Fathers, with their uncritical view of Scripture, had to deal with terms fixed in the tradition (and with the tradition as if it were a unity).⁸ It is true, an eternal distinction in God had to be affirmed, but the effort to signify it by the term "Son" ought to have been abandoned. Yet that was impossible, and the word remained to cause serious confusion.

In sum, the paradox of God as absolute and God as related is the base line from which we are to judge the trinitarian conception. The doctrine of the Trinity both obscures this central antinomy by the idea of threefoldness and misrepresents the proper paradox in its portrayal of the relation of Father and Son.

⁴ Cf. pp. 30, 32.

⁵ Cf. pp. 58f.

⁶ Pp. 34f., 59.

⁷ P. 42.

⁸ Cf. pp. 16, 55.

II

Certainly we must be grateful to Richardson for his willingness to put the question in radical form. He rightly sees that our first problem is not whether this analogy or that is preferable, but whether any sense at all can be made out of the trinitarian affirmation.

But one is immediately struck by the pattern of paradox to which Richardson is committed. This is variously called "essential paradox," "antinomy," and "contradiction" (even "necessary contradiction"), and is applied dominantly to God as absolute and related, transcendent and acting, beyond and present, self-sufficient and loving (thence also to God as joy and suffering, rest and motion, eternal yet in time, one yet involved in the many, veiled and unveiled).⁹ In all of these pairs, Richardson seems to be saying, the "relationship" exemplified is one of logical contradiction, which he judges not to be a relationship at all. Thus "it is impossible to bring the notions of absoluteness and relatedness into any kind of relation, precisely because the terms themselves preclude this."¹⁰ And in a subsequent elaboration Richardson affirms, with Parmenides against Plato, that "the Many *cannot* be derived from the One, the Relative from the Absolute. To do so, is to compromise the first term of a paradox. If the Many is implicit in the One, the One is no longer the One. If God's Absolute nature is the source of his relatedness, the Absolute is no longer Absolute. These notions can only be expressed paradoxically."¹¹ Every attempt to avoid the paradox leads either to unacknowledged flat contradictions or to meaningless categories.

I leave aside here the question whether all these pairs of affirmations about God can be so easily lumped together, though I find serious confusion at that point. More important is Richardson's notion that the scheme of "essential paradox" is alone appropriate to the discussion of God as absolute and related, etc. This is to say that the transcendence of God means the *absence* of God, that absoluteness means *unrelatedness* (even *nonbeing*: "As absolute, God is not being, but transcends being. He is the abyss, the void, and so forth. Only by such expressions can one denote that positive aspect of God whereby he transcends all that is relative"¹²).

But what on earth (or in heaven) is the warrant for making this conception of "absolute beyondness" normative for Christian thought? By

⁹ Cf. p. 146.

¹⁰ P. 38.

¹¹ "The Trinity and the Enhypostasia," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, V (1959), 2, p. 75.

¹² P. 25n.

what line of reasoning does it follow that the biblical idea of the God of self-sufficient glory simply contradicts the idea of God as acting? Richardson refers vaguely to philosophical as well as religious grounds,¹³ but the former turn out to be only the reiterated assertion that the concept of absoluteness contradicts the idea of relatedness. Such a view can be foisted on Christian thought only by reducing its theology to a certain type of Logos tradition, in which God is indeed the abstract Absolute, who cannot as such be related to the world, but only via intermediaries—and this view, as we shall later note, was rejected with the condemnation of Arianism. And it is certainly *not* the biblical concept of the divine transcendence.

What Richardson is really saying is that, contrary to the judgment of most Christian thinkers, the only *meaningful* concept of transcendence is the "absolutely beyond," the opposite of relatedness. But why is this the case? Apart from the simple (though oft repeated) assertion that this is just what the "Absolute" means, we find only the suggestion that logic demands it. What logic? The logic which recognizes that the Absolute and the related are contradictory terms. The argument is patently circular. It is suspended in mid-air, and only a Poof! is needed to bring it tumbling down. I find, in fact, no place where Richardson argues the matter in its own terms, or really even expounds it, but such seems to be the "logic" of his position.

In short, Richardson offers us only an arbitrary assertion that Christian affirmations must be recognized as involving flat contradictions. The question of what transcendence, etc., has meant or might mean is simply begged in the interest of an obsession with "paradox." And instead of the "subtleties" of trinitarian doctrine, which Richardson sets down as unnecessary obfuscation, we are offered an almost explicit *credo quia absurdum*. It may be that Christian faith often leads finally to "paradox" (or better, mystery), but that is hardly a justification for making sheer contradiction a methodological principle for delineating the proper form of theological statement!

III

All this, however, is ancillary. We come closer to the heart of the matter by asking whether Richardson has not thoroughly misstated the trinitarian problem when he identifies it with absoluteness and relatedness. The manifold difficulties in the way of such an identification are apparent from Richardson's own discussion. The biblical concept of the Father

¹³ P. 21.

denotes *both* transcendence and nearness in action.¹⁴ Likewise the Holy Spirit is both beyond and within.¹⁵ And should we not add that as soon as one affirms the Son (Word) to be God, this term also *includes* both aspects? Thus Richardson is driven to admit repeatedly that e.g., "the Hebraic inheritance of God's direct intervention does not fit" the notion of God as the Absolute who acts only through intermediaries,¹⁶ and that the New Testament writers are "far from consistent" in distinguishing Father and Son as God absolute and God related.¹⁷ Consequently trinitarian thinking has been continually beset by "ambiguity."

Ought we not to suspect rather that something is amiss with this identification, that in fact the New Testament distinction of Father and Son is *not* the distinction of God unrelated and God related? One is perhaps able to give that thesis a ring of plausibility by a wholly Philonic interpretation of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel.¹⁸ But if anything is clear from the whole scriptural evidence, it is that the biblical tradition is to be most sharply *contrasted* with the view of God as an abstract Absolute. And this indeed Richardson finally admits: "The attempt to understand the Father and the Son of the Trinity in terms of the Greek Absolute or of God's final transcendence over against his relatedness, could never be satisfactory to a theology oriented toward the Scriptures."¹⁹ Does that not give the whole case away?

Further, what of the numerous elements of developed trinitarian doctrine which explicitly reject the distribution of "absoluteness" and "relatedness" etc. among the "persons" of the Trinity: e.g. the Cappadocian insistence on the identity of activity of Father, Son and Spirit, the doctrine of coinherence of the "persons," and the concept of appropriations? All these Richardson recognizes, but puts down as aspects of other forms of trinitarian doctrine (trinity of love, of action, or of revelation) in which the only meaningful distinction has been largely abandoned in favor of unnecessary and ultimately meaningless "subtleties."²⁰

Once again, is it not the basic premise of this argument which is at fault? I put the matter badly. Richardson is right in asserting that the trinitarian conception is not an adequate expression for the "paradox" of

¹⁴ Cf. pp. 24, 32, 38, 71, 143.

¹⁵ Cf. pp. 53f.

¹⁶ P. 32.

¹⁷ P. 24.

¹⁸ Cf. pp. 30ff.

¹⁹ P. 71.

²⁰ Cf. p. 42 and chs. 5-8 generally.

God as "absolutely beyond" and yet "related." But he is right for the wrong reasons—wrong because he has posed the "paradox" arbitrarily in a form contrary to Christian witness, and wrong because the doctrine of the Trinity is *not* centrally an attempt to answer the question how God can be related to the world!

I readily allow that some powerful strains of the development do reflect the pattern Richardson sees as basic. Especially in some of the Logos theologies was the trinitarian problem identified with the relating of God to the world, the Father conceived as an abstract Absolute, and the Son identified with the principle of mediation. This pattern was also reflected in attempts to escape patripassianism and in conceptions of the impassibility of God.²¹ I further gladly agree that the fear of patripassianism has created ambiguity and confusion in Christian theology, including trinitarian formulations. And Richardson is right in pointing to the difficulties of the notion that the Son is nearer to suffering than the Father, though at the same time no less truly God.

But it is not true that the trinitarian development was powered chiefly by the problem of transcendence and relatedness, or that in all the early theology this was the basic distinction between the Father and Son. That was not true of the biblical witness. It was not true, e.g., of Irenaeus or of Origen (cf. both his trinitarian conception and his interpretation of the perfection of God). And certainly the modalists and monarchians have a witness to make here. What Richardson takes as central was indeed what had to be *rejected* in the Logos theologies. This was the line of thought which had its logical fruition in Arianism. The subordination of the Son, in Arianism, was the corollary of that false conception of God, according to which the ultimate being could not as such be related to the world and therefore required a "mediator" who was something less than true God. And the rejection of Arianism, as is quite clear in Athanasius, was grounded in a major way in the insistence that the Father is not only "transcendence" but equally present and active in creation. This was not simply a "toning down," under the biblical influence, of a heretofore dominant line of contrast between Father and Son, as Richardson alleges;²² it was a decisive victory of the biblical and Christian view over a major perversion thereof. And this was reaffirmed after Nicea by the Cappadocians, by Hilary, by Augustine, and indeed by the whole Western tradition of trinitarian theology.

²¹ Cf. pp. 60, 122.

²² P. 66.

IV

I conclude, then, that Richardson is gravely confused about the basic character of the trinitarian development. But we have not yet exposed the root of the confusion. How is it possible to conclude that the theologians, who were after all men of intelligence and integrity, could have so foolishly failed to see that the problem is not of three modes of existence but of two (absoluteness and relatedness)? How could they have been led into so much "confusion," "ambiguity," and "unnecessary subtlety"? Was it simply that they were bound by tradition and an uncritical view of Scripture, from which we are free?

The answer, I suggest, is quite clear. Richardson has, in the interest of posing the problem in which *he* is interested, the "paradox" of absoluteness and relatedness, wholly discounted the fundamental presupposition of the trinitarian enterprise—the conviction that God is newly and *uniquely known* in Jesus Christ, that the gospel of Jesus Christ is genuinely a *disclosure* of who God is. Viewed in this light, the appeal to paradox—whether that of absoluteness and relatedness or of other pairs of contraries—may be no more than one among a number of means to escape the tough challenge of having to reorient one's philosophical principles in the light of an original divine disclosure. Yet such a drastic reorientation—though not abandonment—of the reflective process is precisely the demand of divine revelation. It involves among other things an endeavor first to grasp the doctrine of the Trinity as the proper denotation of the divine Identity that is revealed. Only after that has been done can one proceed, tentatively and with great caution, to apply the trinitarian affirmation and certain metaphysical relations (such as absoluteness and relatedness) to each other.

If we allow the reality of such a basic conviction (I do not argue at the moment for its truth, but only for the integrity of those to whom this was the heart of the matter), the problem of trinitarian development takes on a quite different shape. It is theology in fidelity to the gospel as set forth in the New Testament, a gospel inseparable from the threefoldness of reference to Father, Son (or Word), and Holy Spirit. Instead of writing off the "diverse themes" in Paul's words about the Spirit and Christ as mere inconsistency and failure to think things through,²³ we may see an attempt to be faithful to the reality as apprehended, to say what really has to be said, a disclosure of what is really true about God. We do not have

²³ Cf. pp. 50ff.

to try to force the conception of the Father into the mold of the abstract Absolute, absent and unrelated, or conflate the notions of Son and Holy Spirit into simply different words for the presence of God.²⁴ Rather we see that God is who he is and is also present to his creatures as Father and as Son and as Holy Spirit. The distinction between Father, Son and Holy Spirit is not one of absence and presence, but differentiations which the church is compelled to recognize *in* his presence in reconciliation, which therefore reveal his being in a quite new way, irreducible to any other conception of the divine nature.

So also the Fathers become, not those who are basically concerned with a problem posed by Philo or middle-Platonism, and driven into ambiguity by an inflexible tradition, but those who attempt to be faithful to and to explicate the distinctive biblical witness to who God is, viz., Father, Son (Word) and Holy Spirit. They make use of various aspects of the Logos thinking—some of which prove useful and others incompatible—but in the service of an apprehension of God which is grounded wholly in the *kerygma*. That is the truth in the traditional assertion that the Trinity is a “revealed doctrine”; we cannot, to be sure, accept this in the sense that a body of information about God is as such revealed and simply handed over, but we must affirm it in the sense that the trinitarian conception is rooted exclusively in revelation.

To repeat, the real issue is whether the disclosure of God in Jesus Christ, as testified to in the New Testament, is genuinely unique and determinative for Christian thinking. If so, the trinitarian development is a meaningful enterprise. If not, then Richardson’s theory (or one of a variety of other options) is plausible, and the trinitarian pattern is only a confused attempt to express something wholly different about God. It is simply a symbol, and not a good one at that, for the conflation of certain metaphysical affirmations that have both historical and metaphysical priority over it.

V

What, then, is the basis of the trinitarian affirmation? It is not simply a matter of trinitarian formulae which appear in the New Testament (though these are significant). It is not merely explicit or implicit affirmations of the deity of Son and Holy Spirit. It is rather the whole pattern of the act of God in his revelation and reconciliation which the New Testament attests, a pattern of threefoldness which appears in varying ways but which

²⁴ Cf. pp. 110, 115f.

is inextinguishable from the witness. This one God cannot be named except in that way. He is the Father, with both the nearness and distance which that term suggests, both above and beyond as the majestic one who is the source of all and so near at hand that nothing occurs apart from his knowledge and love. He can be both together because he has a concrete focus in which he is first of all himself. He is the one present in our midst in Jesus Christ, taking on himself the limitations and frustrations of our existence, yet without ceasing to be himself (i.e. it is really God whom we meet in Jesus Christ, hence the assertion that the "Son" or "Word," who has become flesh, is "very God," "begotten not made"). Once more, he is at work within us, illuminating, enabling, effectuating, possessing, opening us up to himself, and in that presence one who is *Holy Spirit* and Lord over our spirits. No one of these can be reduced to the others, and in each instance we have to do with God himself.

Further, the threefoldness involves an irreducible order. The being and presence of God as Son or Word in Jesus Christ points "back" to the Father as the one from whom and to whom this coming is to be referred; and the Holy Spirit is identified as the Spirit of him who was in Jesus Christ. This order does not imply that God the Father is somehow more God than God the Word, etc., but rather that in the fullness of his presence God discloses himself in this structure or pattern. The distinction between Father, Son and Spirit is not properly described as varying kinds of divine action or different acts (e.g. creation, redemption, sanctification) but as a threefoldness or "structure" of God in his act of revelation-reconciliation in Jesus Christ, hence in every act.

Finally, if we cannot simply identify these three elements in the Christian confession, neither can we separate them. There is here a coinherence of Christian witness and apprehension. The acknowledgement of God the Father is, in the Christian sense, inseparable from reference to the Son and Holy Spirit; the confession of the incarnation of the Word involves affirmations about the Father and the Spirit; and the understanding of the Holy Spirit depends upon the recognition of Father and Son. Each of these alone would be not just incomplete, but distorted so as to be no longer the same conviction.

VI

I have given an altogether cursory indication of what I understand to be the basis of trinitarian theology (for further explication, I may refer to chapters 7 and 8 of my book, *In This Name*²⁵). But it may suffice for

²⁵ Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952.

the present purpose of indicating what is involved in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity: viz., the claim that just in this peculiar threeness God has really made himself known. If we speak of God's *revelation*, we cannot talk merely of threefoldness of appearance, or of the complexity of human apprehension, but must hold that here the being of God is truly *known*. These modes of God's presence, or this structure of his presence and act, do genuinely disclose who God is.

That is an amazingly bold claim. And surely one of the chief reasons for suspicion of trinitarian doctrine is that it has often purported to reflect an almost indecent knowledge of the secrets of the divine life. This is not a groundless suspicion. The claim to know God truly in Jesus Christ can easily be exaggerated and distorted into assertions of "objective" univocal truths about God. Therefore, if on the one hand we must reaffirm, against various sorts of denials, the claim to knowledge of God as triune, we have at the same time to recognize that we speak of a mystery. Every form of trinitarian doctrine is an effort to explicate that which is fundamentally mysterious and beyond adequate conceptualization.

This has been generally recognized in trinitarian theology, but the fact is thrust upon us with distinctive force for at least two reasons. (1) Since we cannot directly identify revelation with holy Scripture, the *form* of argument of much past trinitarian theologizing has to be qualified. The basis of trinitarian development was not, I think it can be shown, the notion of infallible Scripture (it was rather the reality of revelation attested by Scripture), yet some of the confidence about the subtleties of trinitarian theology was doubtless derived from that notion. Against this, we have to see the Word in the words in such a way that God remains sovereign and free in his revelation.

(2) Again, and closely related to the preceding, the effort to read off the doctrine of the Trinity directly from the New Testament witness founders on the diversity of that witness. The unity of the New Testament is a unity that can be discerned only in and through variety. If the terms Father, Son and Holy Spirit are indispensable, because they are the terms in which the threefoldness is basically suggested, they are also inadequate. Their meaning is by no means obvious. Certainly these terms are varyingly used in the New Testament. With "Son" must be placed "Word." And if the name Father has a distinctive reference to the "Father" of the "Son," it also means simply God (i.e., as Augustine especially emphasized, "Our Father" in the prayer is the "whole" Trinity).

As a recent example of the danger of claiming to know too much too

clearly, I may cite the modern attempt, particularly strong in Anglican thought, to justify a "social" interpretation of the Trinity. A major expression of this effort is Leonard Hodgson's *The Doctrine of the Trinity*,²⁶ in which it is argued that we are to understand Father, Son and Spirit as genuinely "persons" in the modern sense of the word, i.e. as personalities, centers of experience, agents, though "one" in a "unity of intensity" far beyond any unity of personalities we know. Redemption means adoption into the interior social life of the Godhead (cf. also E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian, and the Church*²⁷).

The problems for such a view are numerous. It avoids tritheism only by a quite vague notion of "unity"; it is a major divergence from the meaning of *persona* and *hypostasis* in the main line of trinitarian theology (these terms did not mean "person" in the modern sense, but "modes of being"); and it seems to run counter to the biblical witness that we are related, not to three Thous, but to one Thou (I have discussed these issues in detail in *In This Name*). But further, and this is my present point, the theory is based on an abstraction, oversimplification and unjustified literalization of the terms Father and Son.²⁸ This is the cancellation of that very mystery which the Fathers desired to affirm. The concept Word is wholly subordinated to a quite literal notion of Son. No distinction is recognized between "Son" as denoting the peculiar filial dependence of Jesus Christ (as truly man) upon his "Father," and "Son" as denoting that nothing less than the divine being is present in Jesus Christ (Richardson is quite right in pointing to this problem).²⁹ Thus the colloquies of Father and Son in the Fourth Gospel are taken as univocally descriptive of interpersonal relations in the Godhead.

The fault here is both in the misconstruction of the New Testament basis of the trinitarian conception and in the claim to know too much too directly; the mystery of the presence and being of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit is evaporated into mythology.

Such criticism does not mean that we can avoid the attempt to characterize the distinction of Father, Son and Spirit. While every such effort is undertaken in the explicit awareness that all our formulations are inadequate, they are not all equally inadequate. To speak of one God in three eternal "modes of being," or of Father, Son and Spirit as God's

²⁶ Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944.

²⁷ Longmans Green, 1955.

²⁸ One may also detect a certain tendency in this direction in Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, Vols. II/1 and IV/1, though not in I/1; and Barth rejects the "social" theory.

²⁹ Cf. pp. 39f.

ways of being God—and I am persuaded that this language is most nearly adequate both to the New Testament witness and to the dominant patterns of trinitarian theology—is not simply to say with Augustine that we use this language in order not to be silent when asked “three what?” It is a more positive claim than that. Of course, neither in this nor in the New Testament language do we escape the fragility of all speech about God. The dialectic of mystery and manifestation must be preserved throughout. The affirmation includes the confession that every formulation of this truth is transcended by the mystery here expressed. But this, if it is anything at all, is a claim to *truth*, a truth inescapable for Christian witness, and therefore a truth which is not just paradox but a real seeing into the mystery of the being of God.

A Brief Reply to Claude Welch

CYRIL C. RICHARDSON

I AM SORRY that Dr. Welch finds my book confusing. It is clear from his observations that he does not fully grasp my meaning. There is not space to reply to him point by point. In any case it is more important to suggest why he fails to see the significance of the questions I have raised. There is little point in discussing the answers, until we are clear about the questions.

(1) There are, first, linguistic issues. Dr. Welch dislikes the vocabulary of the *via negativa*; and like many Protestants he regards it as “abstract” and unbiblical. Yet surely he himself would not avoid saying God is “invisible,” “bodiless,” “above our understanding.” Indeed, this vocabulary is inescapable in theology and is not unbiblical. All our analogies with God ultimately break down, and we have to have some way of expressing this. By taking this language in an unjustified sense, he claims it implies God is “absent” as well as “abstract.” This is not at all what it means. It signifies rather that God is “above” the world, independent of it, and not threatened by it. It would be as illegitimate to deduce from Welch’s own words, “He is the Father, with both the nearness and distance which that term implies,” that the word “distance” in that sentence meant “absence.” Such misunderstandings can be rectified by trying to appreciate different types of theological language and studying how they are used and what they mean.

(2) A more serious source of confusion lies in Dr. Welch’s avoidance

of any consideration of the New Testament doctrine that the Second Person of the Trinity is the *Creator* (John 1:3; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:10). This is surprising in view of the fact that this doctrine played a cardinal role in the formulation of the classical Trinity. When it was asked, "Who is incarnate in Jesus Christ" the answer was, "The Creator of the world." This involved a distinction between the first two terms of the Trinity, which was of crucial importance throughout the whole of Greek theology and through Western thought before Augustine. What sort of a contrast was being made between the "Father" of the Trinity as the "Fountain" and "Source," and the "Son" *through* whom the Father not only redeemed but also created, as the Nicene Creed affirms? The importance of the "Absolute-related" problem (it can be expressed in many different ways, and I have no desire to limit myself to that particular way of saying it: rather is it the *idea* I am after) can only be appreciated when it is seen that the Father does not create or redeem *directly*, but through the Son. The Son actualizes the Father's intentions. By evading this issue altogether, Dr. Welch does not make clear whether he holds or rejects this New Testament doctrine; and he reaches the amazing conclusion that God's relation to the world was not a central issue in the formulation of the classical Trinity. When one considers how much the Fathers dwelt upon this point and how frequently they exegeted those particular texts in the trinitarian controversies, one's breath is almost taken away by his assertion.

Dr. Welch, on the other hand, seems to have a good deal of breath; for he emits "Poofs" in order to blow away Christian mysteries. He has difficulty in seeing that there is a logical contradiction in the Christian claim that God is at once self-sufficient in his glory and yet the Creator and Redeemer of the world. If one takes seriously that God *is* wholly independent of the world, and then goes on to make assertions that imply his dependence on the world (and every responsible theologian has done this in one way or another), contradiction is certainly involved. There are, to be sure, ways of sweeping it under the rug. One can talk ambiguously about God's freedom; one can contend that revealed mysteries are not contrary to reason. But these, and many other such devices, do not overcome the difficulty. Is it not more honest to recognize it, and to say plainly what we mean and believe? Indeed, one of the ways in which we encounter mystery is that we find ourselves driven to use apparently contradictory language in order to express the truths we hold. Furthermore, by analyzing final religious statements, we come to see that their coherence is not that of empirical assertions.

(3) Dr. Welch's neglect of the doctrine of the Son as Creator leads him into a number of surprising Patristic errors. I select two out of several examples. He refers to the Cappadocians as insisting upon "the identity of activity of Father, Son and Spirit." This is precisely what the Cappadocians (in contrast to Aquinas) did *not* teach. What they taught was the identity of essence and *diversity* of function in the Trinity. The Father is the Source, the Son the "Actualizer" in the world of the Father's intention. The doctrine of the "coinherence" is *not* aimed to say that the Son is *also* the Source and the Father the Actualizer. That would be to destroy the very distinction they intended and to make nonsense of the Cappadocian theology.

Again, Dr. Welch seems to regard this distinction of "Source" and "Actualizer" as an Arian doctrine which the church rejected! Yet it is a central theme of Athanasius, his fundamental point against Arius being that it is the *same* One God who is both Source and Actualizer (distinguished as Father and Son of the Trinity); and there are not (as Arius claimed) a god and a demigod. The Father of the Trinity is *not* (as Welch wrongly says of Athanasius) as "equally present and active in creation as the Son." That would be to destroy Athanasius' basic distinction between the Father as the "Fountain" and the Son (or Logos) as the active principle of the Godhead. He is never tired of telling Arius that because the One God is *also* the Logos, he is not the dry fountain, the riverless spring, of Arius. But this implies a basic contrast between Source and Actualizer, which has to be penetrated, and which leads at once into the kind of questions I have raised in my book.

(4) It is for these reasons that the doctrine of the Trinity which Dr. Welch himself proposes in his paragraph 5 is both bewildering and naive. It is bewildering because it is unclear in its use of the key terms; it is naive because it evades the crucial problems with which the Church has wrestled for nineteen centuries. I have made a number of criticisms of it in my book. Here I confine myself to asking some questions about it.

One would like to know, in the first place, if the distinctions of revelation, which he lists, are real, ontological distinctions in the Godhead. For instance, is the Son the Creator? Or is this New Testament and Nicene doctrine to be denied? Or is it intended to accept the Roman doctrine of the "appropriations"? If so, how can this be made coherent with the "missions"?

One would like to know, in the second place, if the terms "Son" and "Spirit" are mere metaphors for the Father's *direct* action, or if they mean

more than this. Can one, on this thesis, say the "Father" is incarnate in Jesus, and the "Father" is the internal witness in our hearts?

One would like to know, in the third place, if the "begetting" of the Son refers to the birth of Jesus or to an eternal relation in the Godhead. If it is the first, Dr. Welch's doctrine is indeed a curious one. If it is the second, he can hardly avoid coming to grips with the problems with which I have dealt.

My final observation is this. The Christian confession that God is uniquely manifest in Christ is not being disputed. What is being questioned is whether any trinitarian doctrine is implicit in it. The difficulties in which Dr. Welch is entangled fortify me in the opinions I have ventured in my book. I have tried to liberate theology from the confusions of an arbitrary threeness and an ambiguous symbolism.

A Briefer Reply to a Brief Reply

CLAUDE WELCH

THE DEBATE between Professor Richardson and myself is obviously one which could be carried on at great length—perhaps not *ad infinitum*, but, to some readers at least, *ad nauseam*, for point-by-point replies and counterreplies tend to grow ever larger. I do not intend so to extend the discussion. But it may be helpful simply to try to state the issues between us, in order that our readers may discern whether and where an issue has really been joined.

It is clear that Dr. Richardson and I differ sharply over the interpretation of basic matters in the history of Christian thought. This difference involves, in part, specific questions which could be dealt with only by extended analysis of the texts involved—an enterprise for which there is hardly space in the pages of RELIGION IN LIFE. But even these questions are related to larger and more basic problems of historical interpretation, involving the point of view of interpretation, decisions as to what figures are the most illuminating representatives of the tradition, and judgments as to the genuinely determinative elements within the structure of a given author's thought. In the face of great variety within the theological tradition, the question is: which themes and interests are to be taken as central and determinative, and which as divergent, subordinate or derivative? Here "historical" and "systematic" considerations are interrelated.

More specifically, there is no dispute whether the problem of God as

absolute and related has persistently appeared in Christian theology, or that it has been present in trinitarian theologizing, or that it is a significant problem (though Richardson has grossly oversimplified it). The question is whether this problem has been the prime interest, or moving force, of the trinitarian development. Dr. Richardson thinks so. It seems to me, on the contrary, that he has here grievously misstated the meaning of the trinitarian enterprise, that he has reversed what have been and ought to be the priorities in trinitarian theology, substituting a kind of metaphysical problem in which he is deeply interested for the judgment that in the events to which the New Testament bears witness God is known in a new and unique way—a way inseparable from the affirmation of the “threefoldness” of the divine act and being. That is indeed a claim to knowledge about the “absoluteness,” i.e. the ultimate nature, of God; it involves the assertion of “ontological distinctions.” The interest of such affirmations, however, is not that of one more exemplification of the common problem of divine absoluteness and relatedness, but that of the implications of a unique revelatory act, which requires the reformulation of all other conceptions and categories (hence many of the tensions and difficulties of classical trinitarian theology).

To see the problem in this way is, it seems to me, to make sense out of the trinitarian development. Richardson makes of it non-sense, and while he wishes to affirm a unique manifestation of God in Christ, nowhere is it apparent what this might mean.

Whether it is Dr. Richardson or I who truly stands with the Fathers and asks the questions which were centrally their questions is again a problem involving the whole history of Christian thought. But in addition to the historical problem, it must also be asked how *we* understand the question and claim put to us by the New Testament. Is the threefoldness suggested by the terms Father, Son (Word) and Spirit a pattern which we are bound to deal with and explicate, or is it merely a dispensable confusion and ambiguity? I cannot escape the former judgment (and doubtless one of our great differences is over the nature of biblical authority). And I confess that I much prefer the “ambiguous symbolism” of such terms as *personae*, subsistent relations and *Seinsweisen*, to the “clarity” and “simplicity” of “essential paradox.”

3. Monotheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity

HERBERT H. FARMER

I PROPOSE in this article to sketch a single line of thought. Basically, it is far from being a new line of thought, but to re-explore and re-present an old line of thought may be of some value. In particular, I am hopeful that the argument I shall sketch will contribute something to the answering of the question asked by Dr. Welch at the beginning of his monograph on the Trinity, the question: "Is the doctrine of the Trinity truly important and integral to the faith? If so, *how* is it integral? . . . Is the doctrine of primary or only secondary importance?"¹

I

We begin from Barth's challenging assertion that the Church doctrine of the Trinity "from the very outset is directed against . . . those who actually fail to confess the *one* God," and that by her doctrine the Church has maintained *monotheism* against the antitrinitarians. This may at first seem paradoxical, Barth argues, because to maintain monotheism has apparently been precisely the concern of the antitrinitarians. Have we, then, no more to say to the latter than that in her doctrine of the Trinity the Church has certainly tried to do justice to monotheism, not without success? No, Barth replies, that will not do, for it obscures the whole point of the doctrine of the Trinity which "was and is also and precisely Christian monotheism."² The all-important phrase for us here is "precisely *Christian* monotheism." We may compare it with Herrmann's dictum that rightly understood the doctrine of the Trinity expresses "monotheism in its final form."³ It is this understanding of the doctrine as asserting a specifically Christian, final monotheism that I wish to explore.

It is obvious that in what has just been said the term "monotheism" bears fundamentally and primarily a religious significance and not a

¹ *The Trinity in Contemporary Theology*, London: S.C.M. Press, 1953, p. 46. The book was originally published in the U.S.A. under the title *In This Name*; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952.

² Barth, K., *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936, pp. 401-404.

³ Herrmann, W., *Systematic Theology*, The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 151.

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theoretical and philosophical one. What, then, is a specifically religious monotheism? In answering this question we may take for our guide the thought of John Oman in his *The Natural and the Supernatural*.

Throughout the section Oman maintains that a man can only be said to be a monotheist, to believe in one God, in a way that is religiously of the least consequence to himself or to anybody else, to the degree in which he believes and lives by the belief, that the world and his experience of it, in spite of all their confusion and contradictoriness, are one. Monotheism, in other words, is seriously misconceived if it be approached as though it were based on a theoretically constructed, abstractly reflective world view; it is rather "a faith that overcomes the world." It follows from this that if we speak of a specifically Christian and finalized monotheism, we are really speaking compendiously and in the most fundamental possible way of the Christian experience and doctrine of reconciliation and redemption. For Oman Christian monotheism and reconciliation are correlative terms. The thought is not peculiar to Oman, but it is most impressively wrought out by him as the climax of his whole treatment of religion and of the classification of religions in the preceding chapters. Oman, to be sure, speaks only of what he calls "prophetic monotheism," drawing his main illustrations from the Old Testament and the Hebrew prophets. But he obviously includes the Christian revelation and experience as set before us in the New Testament under the general rubric of "prophetic monotheism," and bearing this in mind we may emphasize and illustrate the main points we are making and prepare the way for our argument by the following quotations:

True monotheism . . . is not a mere affirming that God is one, but is the assurance that the world is all God's by reconciliation to his meaning in it and his purpose beyond it. This is what is meant here by a religion of reconciliation . . .⁴

That the Hebrew prophets were the first true monotheists is usually esteemed their highest achievement; and, rightly understood, it sums up all that was original in their teaching. But it is not rightly understood when taken to mean that, by some happy metaphysical reasoning, they arrived at the idea of the Supernatural as one omnipotent and omniscient personality. They were monotheists in the only effective sense of being enabled to face the darkest ills of life in the assurance that God's meaning is in all and his purpose over all . . . That is to say, their monotheism and their doctrine of reconciliation are one, because only when man has found in life a meaning and a purpose for which he can believe that even the worst works for good, can he effectively say, 'There is one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all.'⁵

They were able to face physical evil as real and terrible, and moral evil as

⁴ Oman, J., *The Natural and the Supernatural*, Cambridge at the University Press, 1950, p. 447.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

calamitous and perverse, and yet say that, by his own meaning in them and his purpose beyond them, the Lord God omnipotent reigneth. This . . . was the essential victory of the prophetic monotheism. . . . Reconciliation to the whole rule of God which is, in the full sense, monotheism.⁶

Reconciliation to all life's appointments, which alone is true monotheism, because it neither identifies anything with God, nor separates anything from his meaning and purpose.⁷

Prima facie there would appear to be no connection between these statements and trinitarian doctrine. But obviously connection there must be if the meaning and justification of the assertion that the doctrine of the Trinity is the specifically Christian form of monotheism, is monotheism in its religiously final form, are to be exhibited. Our purpose is briefly to explore this connection. In order to do this we make two broad and inclusive generalizations and set them in relation with one another. One expresses a universal feature of human self-consciousness as it confronts its world, the other expresses a universal feature of the religious consciousness.

II

The first generalization has to do with the problems and tensions, the conflicts and contradictions which a deeply reconciling, i.e., an effective monotheistic faith, must overcome. Oman, in the passages just quoted and elsewhere, indicates in general terms some of such basic problems and tensions. Thus he speaks, as we have seen, of really facing physical and moral evil and yet being able to affirm without pretence that the Lord God omnipotent reigneth, of victory over the "necessary" and the "evanescent," of reconciliation to the requirements of God's righteousness and to the appointments of his sovereign will of good, and so on. His whole teaching on reconciliation (as any familiar with his massive thinking will know) is deep and comprehensive, and at the same time intensely realistic in that it insists that even the grimmest actualities must be faced with open-eyed sincerity, if the true way of victory over them is to be found. If now we generalize still farther and seek to gather up into a single, inclusive generalization the problems and tensions of man's life (taking the risk of losing the concreteness of "lived" experience in an abstract formula), we may state our first generalization in these terms: that there underlies and pervades all our human life a basic, inclusive, ever-present conflict and contradiction—the conflict and contradiction between what a contemporary

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 449, 456.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

writer has designated the "inner felt" and the "outer known."⁸ The terms are not perhaps happily chosen, but they will serve our purpose.

On the one hand, man has in his inner self-consciousness ideals, values, longings and aspirations, affections and loyalties etc., from which in the last analysis derives any sense he may have of worthwhile direction and meaning in his life. On the other hand, this intense interior feeling and valuational life finds itself, particularly as it seeks to express and fulfill itself in fully self-conscious and self-directing activity, in an envioning world which perpetually runs counter to it and with which he must struggle as best he may. There is no need to enlarge on this; it is literally *painfully* obvious to everybody, alike in its particular exemplifications and in its generalized statement; indeed, to state it seems to be to state a truism. But it is important to realize that it is distinctive of human consciousness that a generalized apprehension of the conflict does enter into and intensify its particular exemplifications. All men, we may venture to say, have in varying degree and form a "tragic sense of life," though most would never use such a phrase or understand its meaning. It runs through all the literature of mankind. The philosophers, of course, have always wrestled with the sharp duality of "inner" and "outer," of value and fact, usually under the abstract rubric of the "problem of evil"; but the point I am making is that it is a most fundamental and poignant human problem, a general human problem apprehended as such, before it is a theoretical one for the philosophers.

. . . could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!⁹

It is important from the point of view of grasping the distinctively Christian reconciliation-monotheism in its fullness and depth not to oversimplify this basic conflict by taking the terms "inner" and "outer" in a too literal spatial sense. The conflict really penetrates right into man's inward being. He finds that there also his ideals and aspirations and dreams are beset by a contradicting environment of forces deriving from within the periphery of his own being, forces which he is often apparently not able to control—powerful, insurgent instincts, hereditary proclivities, obscure compulsions, inborn bias and dimnesses of vision, etc. *Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor*. "The good that I would, I do not: but the

⁸ Huxley, J., *Essays of a Biologist*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1923, p. 7. Huxley himself throws out the hint that there may be some connection between the conflict and the doctrine of the Trinity.

⁹ Fitzgerald, E., *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*, Ed. 1, lxxiii.

evil which I would not, that I do. . . . I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind."

In thus formulating this basic conflict of human existence we have used no phrases that presuppose or imply anything to do with religion. We have been doing no more than describe the facts, facts of which the secular, nonreligious mind of our time is often most poignantly and articulately aware, as much current literature shows. But, of course, religion has always in fact entered into closest relation with the conflict between the inner felt and the outer known, between what one writer has called "*les expériences que nous faisons de la réalité cosmique et les besoins du coeur.*" Turning now to this relation, we make our second broad and inclusive generalization, which, we said, has to do with the religious consciousness.

III

Generalizations about religion are notoriously risky; nevertheless we may hazard the assertion that there runs throughout the history of religion a conflict and tension in the apprehension of God. On the one hand, there is always some apprehension of God as "distant," as the awful, mysterious, "wholly other," ultimate, absolute creative Power from which everything that is derives a dependent being. We pile on these adjectives in order if possible to convey the sense that we are not here in the realm of abstract, more or less precisely definable philosophical ideas, but rather in the realm of that *feeling* apprehension which is basic in living religion but which for the religious mind is not less an apprehension of the sheerly objective for being of the order of feeling. This is the basic apprehension of God as God, of the sheer "Godness of God," or to use Barth's phrase, "the Godhead of God."

On the other hand, there is always in living religion an apprehension of God, *not* as "distant" but as "near," as present to and concerned in the immediate, concrete realities of man's historical existence, and most of all in those realities wherein the conflict between the inner felt and the outer known is most acutely felt. God is in some sort apprehended as a present Power who succors man in the face of the urgent practical pressures and tasks of his life but who also at the same time makes an absolute claim upon him here and now in respect of worship, sacrifice and other forms of behavior. Moreover, one aspect of this nearness, this involvement in the concrete circumstances of man's life, is that under appropriate circumstances and in appropriate people, he manifests his presence within the human person itself in unusual expansions and enhancements of its powers.

The tension or conflict in the religious apprehension of God which we have thus summarily set forth—much too summarily perhaps—in the last two paragraphs might be expressed in a variety of ways. We might express it, as Otto for example does, through the antithesis of divine transcendence and divine immanence.¹⁰ Or we might borrow Tillich's antithesis between "ultimacy" and "concreteness" in the "religious concern" and in the idea of God.¹¹ Or, more appropriately to this context, we may call to our aid the developed Christian concepts of God as Spirit, i.e., as indwelling and operative within the world and more especially within the human person, and of God as Creator, i.e. as the exalted and unapproachable "Lord of all being, throned afar," and then trace adumbrations and anticipations of these concepts through the history of religion. But more important than the terms used are the facts they are intended to designate, and in particular the fact that this duality and opposition, however expressed, does represent a real and persistent tension and opposition in the religious life of mankind.

IV

We must now relate our two generalizations to one another. In the religious consciousness the opposition and tension between the "inner felt" and the "outer known" is taken up into and merges with the opposition and tension between divine immanence and divine transcendence, between concreteness and ultimacy in the idea of God, between God as Spirit and God as absolute Creator and Lord of all being. Under the impact of the ineluctable hard facts of the world order, *la réalité cosmique*, the religious mind becomes conscious, however dimly and inarticulately, of having to do with the distant, hidden God, the absolute creative power and disposer of destiny; behind the inner world of values, *les besoins du coeur*, it is conscious of having to do with the near God who is intimately concerned in human affairs and with the human spirit. The effect of this is that for the religious man the conflict and tension are greatly intensified.

The purely secular mind, if there is such a mind, cannot do anything about the conflict between the inner felt and the outer known in any fundamental way; it cannot in the end do more than submit to it and make the best of it, taking refuge perhaps in such incidental excitements and distractions as life may offer, or in the cultivation of an Epicurean *ataraxia* or a Stoical *apatheia* or a Buddhist self-detachment and self-annihilation. But when the conflict is taken up into the religious consciousness, into the living

¹⁰ Otto, R., *Mysticism East and West*, The Macmillan Company, 1932, pp. 130ff.

¹¹ Tillich, P., *Systematic Theology*, University of Chicago Press, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 211ff.

awareness of God, something *has* to be done about it; if left unresolved it becomes a quite intolerable "schism in the soul." It is intolerable because religiously the idea of God is essentially a unifying or "whole-ing" idea, and the deepest interest and drive of living religion is accordingly always toward unification, harmony, reconciliation over the whole breadth of experience both inward and outward. Translating this interest into the terms of our thought in this article, we may say, hazarding still another generalization, that all religions feel after a simultaneous and interconnected unification, on the one hand, of the inner felt with the outer known, and on the other hand, of the immanent God with the transcendent God, the near God with the distant God, God as Spirit with God as Creator. In this sense it is true to say that all religions set out to be religions of redemption and reconciliation.

It is obviously impossible here to review the various ways in which such unification and reconciliation have been sought in the history of religion. It is sufficient for our purpose to state and contrast two such ways. Looking back over the history of religion it is possible to see that these two ways are really the only two ways of rising above the crudities and irrationalities of polytheism.

One way is the way of mysticism, in the more technical sense of that much misused term. In mysticism there is in effect a surrender of what we may regard as the genuine insights of polytheism, however crudely these are expressed under the image of many gods: namely, that God is personal and that he is concerned with the concrete tasks and pressures of life. Unification is sought by withdrawal from the latter through the cultivation of entranced states of mind, the process being both sustained and interpreted by a speculative monistic and impersonalistic world view.

The extreme development of this may be seen in the Hindu doctrine of Atman-Brahman, wherein the soul and the absolute are asserted to be essentially identical; the ecstatic perception of this identity constitutes the soul's final reconciliation and peace. Atman-Brahman lore is in some ways the most thoroughgoing and uncompromising attempt in the history of religion to resolve at one and the same time the conflict between the inner felt and the outer known and the conflict between the immanent and transcendent God.

The other way is the way which has been pointed toward throughout this article, the way which is consummated in the monotheism of the biblical revelation, the monotheism which can only be adequately expressed by the use of the term "reconciliation" in the sense indicated in the quotations

from Oman. In this what we have called the genuine insights of polytheism are firmly adhered to; there is no withdrawal from the pressures and tasks of historical existence and no "impersonalizing" of God; nevertheless, polytheism is completely and passionately repudiated in a monotheism which is far indeed from being a coolly argued theoretical world view. It is rather a faith which overcomes the world whilst participating in it, a reconciliation which neither identifies the soul nor any finite thing with God, nor separates anything whatever from his wholly good and trust-worthy purpose.

V

The relation of all this to the doctrine of the Trinity and more particularly to the assertion that that doctrine is the epitome of specifically Christian monotheism as grounded in and inseparable from the specifically Christian doctrine and experience of reconciliation must now be briefly indicated. The argument has been that if monotheism is to be *religiously* a genuine monotheism it must be a profoundly reconciling monotheism; this means that it must heal that double "brokenness" in human life which religiously is one "brokenness"—the "brokenness" of the inner felt and the outer known and the "brokenness" of God apprehended as the "distant," wholly other, absolute Lord of all being and disposer of destiny, and God apprehended as "near," present, intimately concerned in human affairs and intimately present to and indwelling the human spirit—God as Creator and God as Spirit. How, then, is such a profound and comprehensive reconciling monotheism or monotheistic reconciliation to be achieved? The Christian answer is, of course, that this is no easy matter; on the contrary it is only made fully and finally possible by God's own great personal act into human history and human life, his own great act of self-revelation and self-giving in the Incarnation; or to state it from the human side, it is only achieved through faith in Christ as veritably God and yet also veritably historic and human, which faith God himself through the same great saving act in Christ and through the co-operative work of his Spirit in the soul evokes and sustains.

Fully to illumine and substantiate this would obviously require something like an exploration and exposition of the Christian experience and doctrine of reconciliation, as centered in faith in Christ, in its fullest range and depth; here it must suffice to advert with extreme brevity to one or two general points related directly to the line of thought we have followed.

First, faith in Christ as the historic divine-human Savior brings together and holds together the inner felt and outer known aspects of human

experience. By such faith, the Christian man apprehends in Christ the full and perfect realization and embodiment within the "outer" world process itself of every dim vision and motion toward the highest personal life that his inner being has ever had. By his faith he discerns the ideal fully realized and concreted amidst the inscrutabilities and ambiguities of nature, the confusion and evil of history; it is no longer just an inner dream and aspiration which nowhere finds embodiment but is "there" in concrete, historic actuality.

Second, and inseparably bound up with this, faith in God's self-revelation and self-giving in Christ heals the schism between God as transcendent and absolute Creator and Source of being and God as near and intimately concerned in human affairs. By his faith, the Christian is enabled to call the Creative Power which has brought into being and sustains this stupendous universe—*la réalité cosmique*—"Father," not in any vaguely metaphorical and sentimental sense, but in the specifically Christian, concretely delineated sense of the term as meaning the Being who is self-disclosed in Christ. God is "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," and in that pregnant phrase "ultimacy" and "concreteness" are brought and held together.

Third, and again inseparably bound up with this, there is a healing of the schism in the soul to which reference was made earlier—the *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*. The perfect human-divine life of Christ, in the sharp characterization of its concrete historicity, penetrates into the darkness and confusion of the believing man's interior being and continually gives God as Spirit new opportunities to work savingly there, bringing him to ever-renewed penitence, giving him the peace of forgiveness, and producing in him the fruits of the Spirit which are "the virtues of Christ." God as Spirit within takes of the things of Christ and shows them to him, and in so doing shows him again the face of the Absolute Power, the transcendent God, the face of "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." By being thus given a renewed and reconciled inner life, he is increasingly enabled to believe, and to have the peace of believing, that all things work together for good; that no outward event, however bitter, can separate from the love of God in Christ. Yet also it is by being increasingly given the faith that all things work together for good that he is enabled to have an ever more deeply cleansed and recreated inner life. It is all one inclusive, indiscernible, interactive process of reconciliation, within and without.

The main drift of this article may perhaps be summed up in this way.

It has always been recognized, for indeed it is evident, that the full-orbed Church doctrine of the Trinity, and the centuries of intense theological discussion in the early Church which led up to its formulation, arose fundamentally out of the Church's faith in Christ as the divine Savior. But it is superficial to suggest, as is sometimes suggested, that the Christian faith by its insistence on belief in Christ as God broke up the monotheism of the Jews, and in consequence became inevitably involved in an impossible struggle to get back to it again—hence the trinitarian debate with all its subtleties and perplexities. The deeper truth is rather the opposite of this. The idea of God was *religiously* already broken in many ways, and the Christian faith in Christ as God made it whole and keeps it whole. Barth, therefore, is right; the doctrine of the Trinity, rightly understood, *is* the assertion of a specifically Christian monotheism.

4. The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Bible

JACOB W. HEIKKINEN

THERE EXISTS A TENDENCY of mind among theologians to *use* the Bible. A disposition of this kind is apparent particularly in writings which converge on the doctrine of the Trinity. The Old Testament is eclectically employed, or eclipsed, by the New Testament; and the New Testament is forced to bear strange, unnatural burdens.

Certain critics of the trinitarian dogma find fluid symbols in their non-doctrinal state in the New Testament which were potent factors in the evolution of this dogma, but perceive no necessity for uniting them—Father, Son, Holy Spirit—into a “threeness.” Other writers, again, read the Nicene creed right into and out of the Old and New Testaments in the undisturbed confidence that anyone refusing to do likewise is a Unitarian inside a Christian cloak. For some, perhaps for very many among us, the doctrine of the Trinity presents an inscrutable intellectual dilemma in whose presence one can only bow in humility and silence. In our time a remarkable resurgence of concern for the meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity is taking place, partly in the form of a fresh evaluation of its validity, but more significantly in the analyses which perceive the relationship between the structure of revelation and trinitarian thought, recognizing a “threeness” in each act of God.

A METHODOLOGICAL ISSUE

An urgent twofold task challenges any attempt to grasp the biblical truth expressed in the trinitarian propositions (for better or for worse) of the fourth century. First, we must resist the habit of study which uses the New Testament as a storeroom for statements suitable as proofs, dogmatic formulas, or launching platforms for mathematical missiles aimed to solve the problem of the interrelationships within the Godhead. *The meaning of the whole Bible in terms of its own unifying presuppositions must be taken seriously.* Second, we encounter the epistemological problem: “How do we know what we think that we know” about the operations of God?

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In this respect more is needed than the usual definitions of "hypostasis," "persona," "substantia," etc., in their linguistic-philosophical categories.

"Father, Son, Holy Spirit" are symbols, but not dead ones, nor merely symbols.¹ These basic symbols of the New Testament project images which reflect the ultimate structure of human selfhood. Recent developments in the field of psychoanalysis, known as *Daseinsanalyse*,² illumine powerfully the world of the self in the *Umwelt* (the world around), *Mitwelt* (the with-world in which we exist with others), and *Eigenwelt* (one's own world, relationship to one's self). Related to the problem of the nature of the self stands the meaning of time and history, which are interrelated and integral to the world of the Bible. It is pointless to place the Old and the New Testaments on an Aristotelian time-line³ with the intertestamental literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls filling the interim. The problem of biblical time, often too neatly disposed of by a linguistic warfare over the meanings of *kairos* and *kronos*, involves the truth of understanding God in, over against, and for the historical process.

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

The Bible, analyzed in its wholeness, cannot be conformed to a pattern of an evolutionary doctrinal growth from experience of God in the Old Testament to the emergence of the trinitarian formulation in the New Testament, corresponding to a development from primitive polytheism to ethical monotheism. One cannot find a period in Israel's history when she did not believe that she was the chosen people of Yahweh. At the earliest periods known to us there was in existence a dialectical tension between Yahweh and his people. From Abraham to Jesus we do not have the impression of an increasingly larger number of people maturing in faith following an evolutionary curve. Quite the other way round, after the terrible disasters all hope is fixed on the Remnant and the faithful Servant.

The trinitarian formulations in the sense of the creeds of Nicea and Constantinople are not present in the New Testament. "The complicated doctrinal propositions about the metaphysics of the Trinity which were used by ecclesiastics and Hellenists would have been understood only with difficulty by the writers of the New Testament" (Ethelbert Stauffer). The ostensible reason for it is in the fact that the challenge for the kind of

¹ Attitudes toward trinitarian views have been under the dominance of a cognitive, individualistic approach which can only distort the reality and the relationships of personal life.

² See *Existence, a New Dimension in Psychology and Psychiatry*, edited by Rollo May, New York: Basic Books, 1958, p. 61.

³ The linear series of "blocks" counted as earlier and later, actually a space concept adopted for clock and calendar use.

intellectual construction manifest in the classical dogmas did not exist in the apostolic period. A satisfactory analysis of the problems in the post-apostolic and patristic periods which furnished the motifs for the trinitarian formulations is hard to find—perhaps nonexistent.

In place of the terms "Trinity" or "trinitarian" which always rivet our attention to the dogmas and fix them into a juxtaposition with the New Testament, as one book beside another, I should like to suggest for the moment the use of the word "triadic" in trying to grasp the operations of God "according to the Scriptures." Incidentally, Athanasius spoke of the "Holy Triad," and Theopolis of Antioch (180) of *trias*. "Triadic" simply denotes the confession of faith of those who are reconciled to God in Christ, that through the Spirit they have the Son, who is the Son of the Father, and that through the Son they have the Father as the Father of the Son and their Father.⁴

THE STANDPOINT

The decisive question is: How should we mark off the field of battle in order to wage the right theological war over the "triadic" activity of God witnessed to by the Bible? First and foremost, the Bible should be dealt with as a single work. The concept of a divided Bible confuses all the issues at stake. It has become almost axiomatic to view the Old and the New Testaments on the Aristotelian time-line, to sever them from one another, and to deal with them as collections of religious literature to which each one may respond according to his spiritual predilections. Or, then, the two Testaments are treated as oracles which "proof-text" one another.

For an authentic answer to the question of the operations of God set forth in the Old and New Testaments we must find our way into the apostolic circle.⁵ The apostles, proclaiming that Jesus is the Christ, stood on the ground of the Old Testament. They explored and expounded the Old Testament—the final significance of it—as the presupposition of God's acts in Christ.

The objection can be readily raised (and no law of formal logic stands in the way) that identifying ourselves with the apostolic circle commits us to an extremely narrow, partisan position. "Quite right," we should reply to a person holding this viewpoint, "narrow, indeed, it is,

⁴ The questions of progression and generation, inferiority and superiority within the Godhead, or of "contrasting the Father and the Son" (according to Professor Cyril Richardson the basic problem of trinitarian thinking) reflect a confusion in the *identification* of philosophic with biblical-apostolic conceptions.

⁵ Those scholars who speak about "changes" and "development" in the New Testament writers, particularly John and Paul, exhibit a sort of "evolutionary historicist" theory of apostolic thinking, and, to my mind, the result is a highly artificial one. Varieties of accents there are, which is quite a different thing.

almost invisible, if you choose to decide to look at life on the broad ground of general history unconcerned over the meaning of history. But as soon as you begin to deal with the meaning of history from the standpoint of the apostolic circle, this offensively narrow ground presents itself as the unique, once-for-all, event on which hinges the destiny of mankind. 'Apostolicity' carries depth of meaning far beyond that of a historical footnote."

The apostolic faith was born from the insight that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob fulfilled his promises in Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit. The Covenant, which is the master-key for the comprehension of the biblical message, was made new by the blood of Christ, and it signified the reality of a new community, the *koinonia* of the Holy Spirit. The "triadic" dimension of God's operations is everywhere present in the apostles' testimony to his mighty acts. From this angle the apostolic conceptions are precise (not confused, overlapping, undeveloped). But, when placed alongside the propositions of the Nicene creed, we run into trouble unless we break ourselves loose from certain intellectualistic temptations and allow the apostolic presupposition to direct us in recognizing God's "triadic" action in its proper context, namely, his saving *mission* on earth.

Apostolic thinking is *communal* and *missionary*, and *not cognitive* in the sense of individualistic objectification of reality. The split between subject and object—traceable to Greek metaphysical dualism and accentuated under the Renaissance inspiration in a particular way by Descartes—has had so deep an effect upon the modern Christian mind that a revolutionary effort is necessary to recover the communal way of thought of the apostolic community geared to a missionary view of the whole cosmos.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE APOSTOLIC BIBLE

The book of Acts—rather, the book of the acts of God through the apostles—opens the door to the Old Testament and to the risen Christ in the same moment. The saving acts of God are announced to the "sons of the prophets and of the covenant" (3:28). Repeatedly we hear the refrain: "The Scripture had to be fulfilled." The apostles' curiosity concerning the restoration of David's kingdom is turned into a comprehensive, "global" commission: "It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority. But you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be my witnesses . . . to the end of the earth" (1:7-8). Citing the prophet Joel, Peter spoke on Pentecost: "And in the last days it shall be, God declares, that I will pour

out⁶ my Spirit upon all flesh" (2:16-17). In Gentile territory, from the synagogue "beachhead," Paul preached: "We bring you the good news that what God promised to the fathers, this he has fulfilled to us their children by raising Jesus" (13:32).

The Ephesian encyclical, cosmic in its concepts and missionary scope, bears witness in an original way to the "apostolic consciousness" expressed in a "triadic" confession of faith: "But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who has made us both one," (Jew and Gentile) ". . . you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone . . . in whom you also are built into it for a dwelling place of God in the Spirit" (Eph. 2:13, 14a, 19b, 20, 22).

These briefly sketched citations project the dominant conceptions which formed the structure of the primitive Christian faith. There we note an incredible intensity of concentration on the elemental Old Testament themes: God's creative power, his promises, the covenant, the new people of God through repentance and forgiveness, the ecumenical mission (the New Testament, too, shows how slowly and painfully it was realized). God's actions in the Church, the Church being the mission of the living Christ, are described in a "triadic" manner: namely, God the Father—Holy Spirit—Servant, or God the Father—the Lord Jesus Christ—the Holy Spirit. The "triadic" order is not fixed in a ritualistic, dogmatic way, for what matters is the new reality, the new creation of God.

The apostolic *kerygma* and *didache* (preaching-with-teaching) knit tightly together are clarified and verified through the Old Testament. This labor of interpreting the Old Testament was not a simple matter of "proof-texting" predictions—unfortunately the view and the practice of many Christians. There was expended an enormous effort of study under a unique inspiration in the cross currents of theologies and theories in a highly complex, tense historical situation.

The background and the foreground for this labor of construction is clearly discernible in the concept of the spirit in the Old Testament. The principal Hebrew word for spirit is *ruach*, identifiable in English with breath, wind, etc. But we should show ourselves quite devoid of humanity and imagination if we were to take its meaning in some simple, static sense. *Ruach*, an extraordinarily forceful metaphor, connotes life, power, capacity,

⁶ The metaphor of pouring out of spirit is rooted in the prophets, also found in Paul, "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us" (Romans 5:5).

creativity, and thus provides a powerful symbol suggesting the depth and totality of relationships. "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" (Psalm 138:7). "The spirit of God has made me, and the breath of the Almighty gives me life" (Job 33:4). Obviously the notion of spirit derives from the idea of spirit in man. A man's spirit is manifest in his breath. Only a live man breathes. God "breathed (*yippah*) into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being" (Gen. 2:7).

God creates through the power of his spirit. Man exists as man, *humanum*, through his spirit. Spirit is the total dimension of his being. Likewise God is conceivable only in a spiritual way, for the idea of spirit underlies the thought of God himself. Spirit is not an emanation of God but his personal presence. The Spirit of Yahweh is Yahweh himself.

These ideas rooted in ancient Hebrew conceptions receive their clearest explanation from Paul: "For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For what person knows a man's thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God." (1 Cor. 2:10b-11.)

From this insight Paul interprets the Old Testament through Christ. A veil hangs over their minds who read it in terms of the legalistic tradition, symbolized by "Moses." "But when a man turns to the Lord the veil is removed. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom" (2 Cor. 3:16-17).⁷

The prophets anticipated the fulfillment of God's promises in the covenant relationship through the outpouring of Spirit as water upon a dry and thirsty land (Isa. 44:3). "A new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you" (Ezek. 36:26). This act of God serves as the clue to Jeremiah's conception of the new covenant: "Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant . . . I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord,' for they shall all know me . . . for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more" (31:31, 33b, 34).

Firmly rooted in the knowledge of God's doings in the past and facing the tragic rebelliousness of the human spirit against a free obedience

⁷ To censure Paul for "binitarianism" or inconsistency in his stating that "the Lord is the Spirit" and in the next breath "the Spirit of the Lord," reveals the error of failing to comprehend the activity of the Spirit as it was understood in the Old Testament.

and service to God, Jeremiah's faith is fixed on the new community through the power of the Spirit (he does not use "spirit," but spirit is identical with the word of the Lord) in which the external law of demand and threat is replaced by a "law within," a new inwardness, in which men shall know and obey the Lord *spontaneously*, in freedom and creativity. The Gospel of John, depicting the true worship of God, presents the image of the well within man, a "spring of water welling up to eternal life" (4:14).

Luke, the author of the Acts account of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on Pentecost, introduces Jesus' *mission* ("vocation," though so described by some New Testament scholars, is too weak a designation) with the words of Isaiah from a Servant hymn: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me . . ." (4:18f; Isa. 61:1f).

The Gospel of John, thoroughly Hebraic in the Hellenistic terminology of Palestinian Jews, is a key witness to the thought of the apostolic circle. Its "triadic" character is present in every utterance, from the beginning to the end. "For he whom God has sent utters the words of God, for it is not by measure that he gives the Spirit" (3:34). "My Father is working still, and I am working . . . the Son⁸ can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing" (5:17, 19). "The Paraclete,⁹ the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things" (14:26). The significance of the Paraclete, or Advocate, identical with the Holy Spirit, is to be understood at this point in its missionary meanings grounded in the death and resurrection of our Lord. The Spirit is operative now in all of God's actions, but the world neither sees him nor knows him (14:17). "When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth . . . He will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine . . ." (16:13-15). Isaiah fixed the hope of the fulfillment of Israel's destiny on the "shoot from the stump of Jesse" on whom rested the Spirit of the Lord . . . "the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might" (Isa. 11:1-2).

Paul's missionary labors and letters are grounded in the "apostolic consciousness" and presuppose the kerygmatic interpretation of the Old Testament, as for example in the opening statements of the Romans epistle. Paul's proclamation (mixed with intense discussion and debate) that Jesus

⁸ The term "Son" radiates many meanings which constitute a unity in the mission of our Lord. Israel was God's adopted son. Jesus' credo is best expressed as Father-Son relationship, out of which his Messianic mission grew. "Son of God" (Psalm 2:7) and "Son of Man" (Dan. 7:13) symbolize kingship and relate to the coming dominion of God.

⁹ Dead Sea Scrolls research reveals the use of this term in the Qumrân community in the context of its conflict ideology, but the original figure is in the Old Testament.

is the Christ is conceivable only within the framework of the history of salvation. "But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons. And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!'" (Gal. 4:4-6.)

The Holy Spirit, according to Paul, works with dynamism and a finality which grip the human person in the totality of his being. The Spirit wages war against the flesh (that is, everything about man in his spiritual, ethical, and physical dimensions contrary to God's will). Spirit and flesh are "opposed to each other" (Gal. 5:17).

Paul's "triadic" benediction, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship (*koinonia*) of the Holy Spirit be with you all" (2 Cor. 13:14), reveals the objective foundation for life in the Spirit. The believer participates in the Holy Spirit. His is the gift of being called to share in the community, *koinonia*, of the Holy Spirit (*tou hagiou* refers to that of which it partakes). "God is faithful, by whom you were called into the *koinonia* of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord" (1 Cor. 1:9), Paul wrote to the party-minded, quarreling Corinthians. In pleading for firmness in one spirit, Paul said to the Philippians, "So if there is any encouragement in Christ, any incentive of love, any *koinonia* of the Spirit . . . complete my joy by being of the same mind" (Phil. 2:1f).¹⁰

Being empowered and directed by the Spirit objectively involves the deepest level of subjectivity, the world of primary impulses and feelings. "The Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words. And he who searches the hearts of men knows what is the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to the will of God." (Rom. 8:26-27.)

The Book of Revelation¹¹ sets forth the "triadic" operations of God in an intensely dramatic, symbolic manner, conceived in the framework of the primitive Christian worship. The biblical time-line and sense of history is spelled out in rhythmic phrases: "I am the beginning and the end, says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come, the

¹⁰ The famous "kenosis" passage which follows should be understood in light of this dominant conception, and not as a buttress for trinitarian speculations. Paul adopts and adapts himself to Hellenistic figures, but he does not borrow their substance. His presuppositions are elsewhere.

¹¹ Hebrews and 1 Peter, likewise, although different from each other, are based on a common sub-structural "triadic" unity.

Almighty" (Rev. 1:8). The living Christ, who "died, and behold . . . alive for evermore" walks among and rules his churches, and, as their Savior-Judge-Missionary, proclaims: "I know your works . . . your tribulation . . . I know where you dwell . . . Behold I stand at the door and knock . . . He who has an ear, let him hear what the Spirit says to the churches." (Rev. 2:2, 9, 13, 29, 3:20.)

Strange as it may seem to us, at this point we may properly think of the so-called "trinitarian formula" at the end of the Gospel of Matthew, ". . . make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." The world-action here enjoined issues from the fact that Jesus is the Christ, to whom belongs all authority (*pasa exousia*) in heaven and on earth, triumphing over "all rule and authority and power and dominion."

To sum up: The Bible, understood in its apostolic sense, witnesses to God's self-communicating action, in, against, and for the world. The believer grasps God's work—Creation-Redemption-Renewal—from the soteriological standpoint, namely: The Holy, Merciful God is our Father (not by the prompting of our religious instincts which are a chaos of yearning and rebellion, but through the new creation) and we are his children, his sons through his Son, who cry "Abba! Father!" in the Spirit. This faith constitutes the "triadic" structure of the Old and the New Testaments in their organic unity.

CONTINUOUS TASKS

Hardly a greater mistake could be made than that of allowing ourselves to come to a dead-end stop at this point, transmuting the apostolicity of the Bible into a simple dogmatism, and dismissing the historical and philosophical problems which challenge the Church in its very being, i.e., in its missionary calling *in* the world, though not of it. The Bible takes history with utter seriousness and becomes intelligible in the center of its conflicting cross currents.

Our present historical situation demands a better understanding of the dialectic of the problems which were resolved in the trinitarian propositions of the fourth century in the context of the "triadic" structure of the Church's faith.

Likewise the meaning of philosophy, as a discipline for communication and as the inescapable human task to formulate the basic structural concepts of the human reality, clamors for clarification. All of us, Christian and non-Christian, share this common human reality. Many unwise critical comments have been made regarding the perverting as well as the salutary

effect of Greek metaphysics on Christian theology. The heart of the matter lies in the posing of the problem of philosophy and biblical exposition, in such a way that we give up either seeing a conflict between them, or insisting upon a synthesis.¹²

The classical trinitarian dogma, for some a cathedral inclosing the Bible, ought to be understood as a footnote to the history of the interpretation of the Bible. The trinitarian theologians did try to speak for the living content of the faith in Christ and for the unity of that faith. Their leading is a suitable one, "pending better instruction" (Karl Barth). Any re-examination of their labors—a perennial task for the Church, because "the spiritual man judges all things"—requires a restudy of the biblical message itself.

¹² The terms "divinity" and "humanity" are not of biblical origin. "Deity" plays no significant role in the New Testament, *theotetos* appears in Col. 2:9 and derives its meaning from the thought that God was in Christ. Regarding the "natures" of Christ, and the definition of "Persons" in the Trinity (Augustine and Luther had misgivings over the expression), much can be learned from the Greek dualistic conception of life, which dominated the ancient cultural world.

5. The Holy Spirit—Person and/or Presence

NOLAN B. HARMON

THE CRUX of the discussion of the Holy Spirit today, as throughout the whole Christian past, inheres in this: Is the Holy Spirit a Person (in the English, not Latin, meaning of that word)? or, is It (not He) simply the Spirit of God—"no person, but only the virtue, power, and efficient efficacy of God . . .," as Bishop John Pearson explained this view four centuries ago, "because that God the Father is a Person, and doth perform those personal actions attributed to the Holy Ghost, by that virtue, power and efficacy in Himself"?¹

Is the Holy Spirit a He, or an It? Is He one who sendeth, or one who is sent? And if he be a Person, as orthodox faith holds, who together with the Father and the Son is One God, blessed forever, how, to get the question stated in its classic, irresolvable form, can God be both Three and One at the same time?

Before going into a review of certain contemporary writings and opinions, let us note with satisfaction that church thinkers are at present strongly reopening the trinitarian discussion. The personality and being of the Holy Spirit is of course immediately involved. The trinitarian symposium in this issue of *RELIGION IN LIFE*, together with other books and writings, will, it is hoped, serve to reawaken interest in what President Henry P. Van Dusen has correctly termed "a neglected doctrine for many years."

I

Two books recently appeared dealing with this whole matter, and these I wish specifically to build upon in this article. Both volumes are from distinguished scholars in Union Theological Seminary of New York. Dr. Cyril C. Richardson has published *The Doctrine of the Trinity*,² an incisive scholarly study which he subtitles "A Clarification of what it attempts to express"; and President Henry P. Van Dusen has, some months later, brought out *Spirit, Son and Father*.³ The content of the Van Dusen

¹ Pearson, John, *An Exposition of the Creed*, London, 1659.

² Abingdon Press, 1958.

³ Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

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study is an expansion of the James A. Gray lectures delivered at Duke, and duplicated a bit later as the Carnahan lectures at Union Theological Seminary in Buenos Aires. Incidentally, this writer was in Buenos Aires early in this year and found that in that strong Seminary of South America, Dr. Van Dusen's visit, his lectures, and especially his subsequent question and answer periods were greatly appreciated.

It would be somewhat difficult to compare these two studies, as each book has its excellencies. Richardson, who is Washburn Professor of Church History and Director of graduate studies at Union, is steeped in the classics and at home anywhere in the long history of Christian thought. What he does in his book is to question *ab initio* all classic and popular trinitarian interpretations. He declares, as he begins his study, that the point of view in his writing is "not Unitarian"; that he does feel it necessary "to make distinctions in the Godhead." What he does object to is the *threeness*,⁴ as he calls it, of these distinctions, holding that the triune pattern is too pat and neat to encompass all the Godhead's hypostases, or confrontations. His view might be called binitarian rather than unitarian or trinitarian (though I doubt that he will accept my coined term), since he does posit the Son (though he finds the term inappropriate) in the Godhead. But for the Holy Spirit, he does not find any of the classic Christian definitions or descriptions quite adequate. His Holy Spirit seems at one time merely the Spirit of God as an *emanation*, such as the Old Testament knew—the *ruach Elohim*—or sometimes as a sort of "combined relatedness" of Father and Son coming to a focus in order to sanctify, bless and illumine. He ends his whole work by calling the idea of a Trinity "an artificial construct."

Dr. Van Dusen takes a different approach. His book, as the author declares, is "the modest fruit of many years of brooding, reading and reflection." In beginning his study, following a sort of off-hand idea once advanced by Archbishop Temple, Van Dusen reverses the usual trinitarian sequence and approach through Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and begins with the Holy Spirit. This is because, as he intimates, the Holy Spirit first of all guides and leads us to Christ, and then into the deeper truths of God. This reverse approach of Dr. Van Dusen—Spirit to Son to Father—is followed through the entire study, and brings to the reader many rewarding insights.

The value of *Spirit, Son and Father* to this reader was the personal warmth and intuitive understanding which the author manifests. To his own personal hope and faith, he adds his experience in the classroom, where

⁴ Richardson, C. C., *op. cit.*, p. 14.

in expounding the essentials of the Christian belief he "found the doctrine of the Holy Spirit implicated and interwoven with every other Christian truth." Van Dusen, in his final pages, does seem to identify—if that is a good word—the Holy Spirit more closely with the Son than with the Father. He never does quite come out clearly in maintaining the Holy Spirit to be a Third Person, after the classic pattern of trinitarian doctrine; he seems to make "it" an aspect or function of God himself.⁵ He repeats in one way or another as a sort of formula, St. Paul's "the Lord is the Spirit."⁶ His book, however, does breathe a warmth and an understanding which would have been felt and appreciated as much by St. Augustine's little group under the plane tree as by a present-day convert of Billy Graham. "The great work of the Holy Spirit is to point to Christ, to witness to his Lordship, and to confirm in the hearts of believers His judgment and His promises."⁷

Before going further, let it be said that possibly one reason why there has not been more writing on the Holy Spirit is the very practical fact that the Church has been so gloriously blessed always in the abiding presence and guiding influence of the divine Spirit, that it saw no point in worrying its mind as to just who he, the divine Paraclete, was or is. The great thing to every Christian is, and always has been, that God poured out his Spirit upon his people and does lead them into all truth, convicting the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment, guiding and informing the Church, setting apart ministers for its orders and offices, differentiating between the gifts given to different individuals, showing "things to come," and at all times "giving grace to help in time of need." In every age when Christian revivals have swept over vast masses, the immediate manifestation of the Holy Spirit is felt—and not only felt, but recognized. But always on such occasions there has been no attempt made, nor can there well be, to analyze what is happening. Who cares how God comes in the fullness of his power, when the glory of the divine Forgiveness, of Regeneration, of Adoption and of Sanctification is felt? "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh . . . so is every one that is born of the Spirit."

Another fact pointed out by scholars is that a strong and historically viable doctrine of the Holy Spirit as a Person did not fix itself in the mind of the Church until the third or fourth century. Here is where Cyril

⁵ Van Dusen, H. P., *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

Richardson's vast patristic erudition comes into play as he knocks down, or shows how a succession of church fathers and the councils have knocked down, all sorts of early interpretations and "traditions of men" coming before them. And Dr. Van Dusen notes: "It is a commonplace in the history of Christian thought, that long after the mind of the Church had formed its convictions concerning Christ, and had embodied these convictions in creeds, it had nothing to say about the Holy Spirit."⁸

The reason for this "neglect," I shall argue, was that the Church was so engrossed during its earlier years in the christological controversy as it attempted to explain to the clever Greek mind how Jesus Christ could be both man and God, that it had no time to put on the table for further debate the even more difficult concept of a Third Divine Person. The first, and in many respects the greatest, intellectual battle Christianity ever had was with its own mother faith, Judaism. "The Lord thy God is One God"—this was the base line and foundation stone of every item of teaching in the Old Testament. That there should be another God, one Jesus, admittedly a crucified man, was unthinkable to the monotheists of Israel among whom the little company of Christians originated. In declaring unswervingly that Jesus Christ was "God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God," so much argument was called for and so many conciliar debates, that Christians had no time and no particular interest in working out an exact formula regarding the Holy Spirit.

Besides, what was the need? Nobody, not even the most orthodox Jew, questioned that there was and always had been a *ruach Elohim*, the Spirit of the Lord who had spoken many times through the prophets and many times had been present with his people. And as for the Christian, he knew the Holy Spirit to be present with him, feeling at all times the presence of the *Consolator*, as the Latins termed him. Thus no Jew challenged, no Christian doubted, and no pagan cared. But against this concept of a *deus homo*—a God-man—Jew and pagan alike fought, one with the fury of affronted zeal, the other with the cool sophistication of philosophy.

So it was that the Christians, in formulating their creeds from the first primitive "Jesus is Lord" confession to the long drum-roll of Nicea or Chalcedon, spent their force and time in the affirmation basic to everything else; that Jesus Christ was the only begotten Son of God. Affirmations regarding the Holy Ghost, as well as those acknowledging the Holy

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins, etc., seem almost to have been tacked on at the end of that first tremendous paragraph of the big Creeds. This mark-down in emphasis, however, as we have said, was not due to the fact that there was no belief, but simply that there was no great challenge. Indeed, the part challenge has played in the formulation of creeds and articles of religion has not been sufficiently looked at by recent scholarship.

II

The real issue, we have said, now as in the past, is not whether or not there be a Holy Spirit, but who, or what, that Spirit is. That there is in reality a Divine Spirit present to guide, to comfort, and to bless is admitted by all, but books such as that by Dorothy Sayers,⁹ who writes beautifully of how the triple manifestation of God is almost "called for," do not seem to face the basic reality. Who, or what, remains the question. Is there a Spirit of holiness that is not the Holy Spirit? That God has and can and may reveal himself in many ways is admitted by all.

Adding difficulty to the discussion and putting bifocals upon faith itself, as it were, is the fact that "the very word *Spirit* itself is an ambiguous term." This statement was made by so orthodox a defender of the faith as John Pearson back in the early 1600's. And there are many instances in the Scripture where "the spirit of God" did mean the presence in spiritual power of God himself, no Third Person being directly adumbrated. The broad coverage of the word *spirit* gives a chance for the crassest Unitarian to take cover under the language of orthodoxy. "May the Holy Spirit of the living God rest upon us," I heard a minister pray once, a man whom I knew would have deprecated privately and with heat any idea that he was invoking a Third Person. He meant, and let us grant him sincerity in intent if not in language, that God's holy spirit as a divine afflatus should come to rest upon all.

Because the name *Holy Ghost*, as the Authorized Version translates it, cannot be so easily contrued as an emanation or influence, and has become crystallized into a true proper noun, simple orthodox people have looked with more favor upon using the name *Holy Ghost* than *Holy Spirit*. This may be no more than a reflection of the fundamentalist biblicism that insists on wanting "St. James' Bible, not Thomas Nelson's Bible." But there may be something a little deeper here. The English name *Holy Ghost* does give less "play" for ambiguity than does the Latin, *Spiritus*.

I recall a debate over the use of these names in the Methodist Com-

⁹ Sayers, D., *The Mind of the Maker*, Meridian Books, 1956.

mission on Worship when that group was revising the Ritual of that Church at the time of Methodist reunion in 1939. I remember particularly that the musicians on the Commission all joined in voting for *Holy Ghost* rather than *Holy Spirit* because the word *Ghost* had one syllable instead of two (spir-it), and so fitted in better with the *Gloria* and the musical benedictions and graces! Against *Holy Ghost* it was argued that the word "ghost" had connotations queer and bizarre to children; that the Latin *sanctus spiritus* had been in all the old "uses" which Cranmer drew upon for the Prayer Book; that there was no intent to deny the personality of the Holy Spirit even though it was admitted that "Spirit" might mean one thing to one man and one to another. I particularly remember that the late Clarence T. Craig so argued (and what a wonderful person he was!). Others in the group, this writer included, voted for *Holy Ghost* as a more definite, more personal name. The Commission finally adopted the name *Holy Spirit*, with the understanding, following a motion of Dr. Charles E. Forlines of the Methodist Protestant delegation, that the Creed should be printed in Methodist books in two versions, one to use *Holy Spirit* and one *Holy Ghost*. The motion carried, but it may be noted that now *Holy Spirit* is the only name to be found in all Methodist official liturgical formulae, the formula of Baptism included. Thus practice—or printers—do with resolutions!

The word *person* also has had a variable history, and Richardson makes something of this. He explains carefully how the Latin *persona* originally meant a mask worn by an actor on the Roman stage (*per sona*, something one sounded through), and did not at first have the powerful content that Anglo-Saxon ethos has caused to inhere in the word *personality*. The Greek *hypostasis* also, so Richardson affirms, may be considered something less than a full person. It really meant *confrontation*, and Richardson does not feel that the fathers of the Church intended to posit either in *persona* or in *hypostasis* the definite individualistic essence that we feel inheres only in a person. So God might, Richardson seems to affirm, declare himself in all manner of places and ways without breaking into a Third Person, as we understand the term. In fact, Richardson, in trying to get away from the number *three*, does seem to indicate that Deity may and does represent itself in manifold ways and places as "Father" and "Son," but their combined "relatedness" never quite comes to the distinct fullness of what in English we should declare to be a Person.

Now it must be admitted, as all Christian thinkers do admit, that the trinitarian formula is by its nature something that the human mind can

never quite "explicate," to use the old word. G. Campbell Morgan spoke best perhaps for uncritical piety when he said that "the subject should be left where God left it, a revealed mystery, not the revelation of a mystery. That is, revelation has declared a mystery; revelation has not given an explanation of that mystery." (1 Cor. 2:9-10.) Likewise, again and again, the greatest theologians admit themselves lost in a sea of irresolvability.

Cyril Richardson himself, three times in his scholarly work, admits that there is no way for us to see through the paradox. "All distinctions we are forced to make in the Godhead do in effect divide the essence," he states, "and there is no way of overcoming this. We are led to state paradoxes—to affirm the simplicity of the divine essence and the unity of God, while at the same time acknowledging necessary distinctions. Human thought is confronted with antinomies which it cannot surmount."¹⁰ Karl Barth says flatly that God's "nature cannot be unveiled to man."¹¹ And John Wesley, who would not have liked Karl Barth, put it this way in his sermon on the Trinity: "It was an evil hour that these explainers began their fruitless work. I insist upon no explication at all; no, not even the best I ever saw. . . . I would insist only on the direct words, unexplained, just as they lie in the text." (1 John 5:7.) Even Augustine, who was not afraid to dive into the subtlest questions of interpretation, and had the mind to do it with, shrank from a definition of *personality*. "We say three persons," he said, "not that we wish to say it, but that we may not be reduced to silence."¹² As if anyone or anything could reduce to silence Aurelius Augustinus!

Akin to question-begging or side-stepping has been the refusal on the part of some Christian thinkers to face the impossible mathematics of Three being One, or One being Three. St. Basil long ago deplored any mathematical concept being applied to God and tried to avoid the difficulty by, shall we say, denying mathematical jurisdiction. He held that God was not One in number, but in simplicity; that a numerical idea applied to God would limit him. "If it is folly to say that God is Three, it is equally foolish to say that He is One . . ."¹³ Dr. Leonard Hodgson goes along with the great Cappadocian, arguing that we cannot hold the Divine Unity as "a simple, easily intelligible notion," a mathematical unity, but as analogous

¹⁰ Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹¹ Barth, K., *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1936, Vol. I, p. 362. Quoted by Richardson, p. 67.

¹² *De Trinitate* 7.6.11; quoted by Richardson, p. 102.

¹³ Rawlinson, A. E. J., *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, Longmans Green, 1928, p. 284.

to the unity of an organism; "the higher the organism, the more complex the unity. . . . The unity of the Godhead must exceed in intensity any unity known on earth."¹⁴ He also says, "If we cannot fully understand the divine unity, it is more philosophical to acknowledge the mystery than to ignore, distort or explain away any of the evidence."¹⁵ Certainly; but it is even more philosophical to refuse to play ducks and drakes with mathematical concepts which have a validity all their own.

The human mind admittedly cannot measure God. The well of ineffable Divinity is too deep and we have nothing to draw with; but the human mind—I speak as a man—can evaluate its own standards and its own measures, and by the minds God has given to us we know that Three cannot be One nor One Three without changing and twisting ordinary concepts. Three can indeed be *in* One, and One can be in Three in a divine circumincession, with the Three Persons melting into each other as it were, so that in each may be at all times the Fullness of the Godhead bodily, and in the Godhead the fullness each of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Jacob Boehme, whose curious writing on the Trinity has not been too well remembered, worked out some subtle speculation along this line. By an immanency all its own, Boehme rather indicated that the Deity within itself could evolve into Three or One, according to a plan and will beyond the reach of man.

Indeed I feel that *circumincession*, if we understand what the Council of Florence meant by that term, is the best explanation here of the "in-ness and around-ness" of the Each in All and All in Each. The old illustration of Ruffinus, of spring, fountain and stream, inevitably comes to mind. The Spring, God the Father, Source and Creator; sends forth the Fountain (the Son) to incarnate the Water's glory; while "proceeding from both"—Spring and Fountain—flows the Stream (the Spirit). All the same water, one in essence in Spring, Fountain and Stream, but a trinity in expression. Allowing for the inadequacy of any illustration, Patristic thought certainly set a good pattern in that one!

III

The truth is, the idea of the Holy Spirit as a separate Divine Person could never have been accepted by the Church, and I am not sure would ever even have been thought of, had there not been given definite and repeated revelation concerning Him. Even Pentecost might have come and

¹⁴ Hodgson, L., *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944, p. 10 (table of contents, summarizing pp. 89-96).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12 (cf. p. 144).

gone with the words of Joel, the ancient prophet, taken as indicating no more than that another visitation of the Spirit of God, as the Old Testament knew it, had come about (Joel 2:38). That is, this explanation might have been the accepted explanation of what was happening that day had it not been for the teaching and promise of Jesus, as these were understood and firmly embedded in the Gospel. But that Jesus did teach and promise the coming of a divine Paraclete and the opening of a new dispensation, and that Pentecost to the disciples set the seal of truth as well as of fact on the Holy Spirit as God present with them, is undeniable. The New Testament does declare the Holy Spirit to be a separate Person, and it may be well in this discussion to put in from the old Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia the orthodox brief maintaining this truth.

The personality of the Holy Spirit is proved by the following considerations:

1. The personal pronoun *he* is used of him, as in John 16:13: "When he (*ekeinos*), the Spirit of truth, is come . . ."
2. He is expressly distinguished from God the Father, for he "proceedeth from the Father" (John 14:26); and "*searcheth* the deep things of God" (I Cor. 2:10).
3. Acts of will and intelligence are attributed to him such as can only belong to a personal agent. Guiding into all truth (John 16:13); testifying (John 15:26); convincing (John 16:8); interceding (Rom. 8:26); speaking (Acts 13:2).
4. He is directly contrasted with Satan (Acts 5:3), and may be the object of blasphemy (Matt. 12:31); falsehood (Acts 5:3); and grievance (Eph. 4:30).
5. He occupies a position with the Father and the Son in the formula of baptism (Matt. 28:19); and the apostolic benediction (II Cor. 13:14). He is distinguished from the Son as the other (*allos*) Comforter (John 14:16).¹⁶

Such "proof texts" in connection with unconscious allusions and attitudes throughout the New Testament do imply the unquestioned acceptance of the Holy Spirit as a Person, and from Pentecost on. "Ananias," Peter exclaimed, "why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? . . . thou hast not lied unto men, but unto *God*" (Acts 5:3f).

Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that there was an unwritten Gospel passed on by word of mouth from disciple to disciple for years before the little books which make up the New Testament were written down or collated together. Admittedly, the argument from silence—or from what-we-cannot-know-the-disciples-to-have-said-or-not-said is weak and may even be dangerous; but admit also that when their little books

¹⁶ Third edition, Funk and Wagnalls, 1894. Article, *Holy Spirit*.

did come out, there appeared in them, as something that had been known and accepted for years, the Holy Spirit as a Person. Christian scholarship has not given full weight to St. Luke's statement regarding the importance "of all that Jesus both began to do and to *teach until the day* in which he was taken up" (Acts 1:1-2). The Lord's final injunction to "go and teach them all things whatsoever I have commanded you" certainly implies a corpus of truth far wider in scope than the outline and contents of the four Gospels, precious as they are. A body of doctrine had certainly been taught by the Lord unto his own while he was with them, and while there are in the New Testament references and allusions to many things he did say, there are also indications that he *taught* as well as did "many things which are not written in this book" (John 20:30; 21:25). More theology was alive among first-century believers than ever was put down on paper by the evangelists or St. Paul.

We know this: That when the fathers of the Church eventually wrought out their faith in the fourth century in the resounding symbol of Nicea, amplified at Chalcedon, there did take position in the Creed the affirmation of the *Holy Ghost* as a Third Person of the Divine Trinity. Sabellius and his followers had fought their fight by that time, but even though they had reason and philosophy both with them (as they saw it), the vast, ageless, amorphous Mind of the Church never would accept their teaching that the *Holy Ghost* is less than God. If we wish to be naive about it, we could say that if there be a *Holy Spirit*—and there is—who leads us into all Truth—as he does—this was the Truth which he led his Church into in those things respecting himself.

All must agree, of course, with reverent scholarship everywhere, that the highest study to which man can aspire is to gain more understanding of Almighty God. In conducting such a study there must always be reverence, and may we add, a wholesome fear. With Richardson we would join in brushing away the traditions of men when these are seen by us to be inadequate; and with the pious Puritan leader of the old Bay Colony we should be ready to believe that God has yet more Truth which he may reveal to us out of his Holy Word—and, may we say, through his Holy Spirit.

Karl Barth is right, we feel, in saying that all that man can or ever will know with sureness about God is what God himself has chosen to show to him. Likewise, with all that the human mind finds itself able to understand with respect to God, there comes back at it again and again the inhibiting suspicion that out of the veiled immensity where God dwells,

there may come upon us anew with awful weight the old rebuke, "Thou thoughtest I was altogether such an one as thyself."

But it is the peculiar glory of Christian scholarship that with all this, it is not afraid to muse, to study, and to meditate on the things of God, and even to undertake to try to understand the mystery of his Triune Being, utterly unafraid. Richardson quotes someone who perkily said of the doctrine of the Trinity that "while one may be in danger of losing his soul by denying it, he is in equal danger of losing his wits in trying to understand it."¹⁷ If this be a true dilemma, which it is not, I vote to risk our souls before we abdicate the sovereignty of our minds. For—and this I would contend for firmly—our minds are our minds, and are to be used to think with, as the Creator means us to use them. We know in part, granted, but in part we do *know*, and order our lives accordingly. It is a poor theology that takes a supine satisfaction in being stymied by what are sometimes awesomely referred to as paradoxes. Paradoxes are no more than mental patterns belonging in the mind, or on the printed page, and never in the *Ding an sich*. No thing *in esse* apart from grammar or words is paradoxical, for the thing-as-it-is cannot be a contradiction. We may not know, we may not see, we may not understand, but the great Reality, whatever it is, is no paradox.

So with the Holy Trinity. God in Three Persons, *unus deus*, or in three *hypostases*, as the Greek fathers put it; or *personae* as the Latins would say (though the feminine gender certainly does not belong here, considering the divine *dramatis personae*); or confrontations, of which Richardson thinks there may be many. So be it. Whatever God is, he is, and the concept regarding him may stand as a paradox in the human mind, but not in himself. *Tu in te manes*, wrote Augustine, "Thou in Thyself remainest. We, however, are rolled about in changes." (*Volvamus in experimentis*.) We are.

We may not affirm that One is Three and Three is One without doing violence to true and valid thinking in that splendid instrument, the human mind, given to us by God. We may not "divide the Essence" as the fathers insisted, but let us not forget that we are trying to understand the Supreme Ruler of the universe and how he works, rather than get some marks down on a piece of paper under our own fingers. We may not "divide the Essence," but—again I speak as a man—may not the Essence divide itself, now One, now Three, "according to the energy of the might of his strength" (to quote St. Paul), seeing that the Divine Essence is

¹⁷ Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

the Prime Mover of the universe, his ways transcending our ways and his thoughts far beyond our thoughts?

The way out, of course, is the way—the practical way—the Church has always taken, solving for itself and for the satisfaction of its own mind that which is beyond all knowledge, and coming out through the centuries with the concept of a Divine Trinity which no logic can ever disprove and no mind understand. Practically, we worship where we cannot know, and trust where we cannot see. God is God, and in himself complete, nor is he minified or divided by the way we humans understand him.

I like the way á Kempis fixed it in the *Imitation*: "*Quid prodest tibi alia de trinitate disputare: si careas humilitate, unde displiceas trinitati?*" "What does it profit you to dispute high things about the Trinity? If you love humility, how can you displease the Trinity?" How indeed?

6. The Trinity and Society

A Unique Dimension of F. D. Maurice's Theology

GUY H. RANSON

WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT of the Maurice Lectures in King's College, London, in 1932, Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-72) began his return to a prominent place in modern theology. His contributions to contemporary thought are rich and varied, but what seems to be most fruitful is his theology of society. One of the unique dimensions of this theology is his contention that the foundation of society among men is the social relations of the Trinity.

Perhaps it should be pointed up at the outset of a discussion of Maurice's theology of society that he is not a conventional social scientist or philosopher of society. In fact he sets himself against both the intention and the methodology of such thinkers. They seek to create a smoothly functioning society upon the observable facts of social existence. They seek a society in which the natural societal capacities of men shall be actualized and which will be characterized by harmony and stability. Maurice believes that a society so conceived and so created is finite and sinful by nature and that it cannot long endure. It must necessarily perish because it is a man-made substitute for that society which God created not upon the foundation of fallen and sinful human nature but upon the eternal nature and will of the Triune God. The purpose of our present inquiry, therefore, is to set forth Maurice's understanding of the way in which human society is based upon the Trinity as its foundation and to examine this understanding.

Maurice speaks of two kinds of society; divine and human. He speaks of four kinds of interpersonal relationships which constitute society; among persons of the Trinity, between God and men, among men, and between men and the Devil. Divine society may be one or more of the first three kinds of interpersonal relationships. In order to be divine, society must be as it is willed by God and in which God is a participant. Divine society is characterized by agreement of members in doing the will of the

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Father. Human society may be of the latter two kinds of relationships, because in order to be human, society rebels against the will of the Father. Society is divine to the extent to which the will of the Father is done, and it is human to the extent to which finite wills are done in rebellion against God. Human society as it is empirically witnessed on earth is both divine and human, because in it men are in part obedient to God and in part they are in rebellion against God. Society as such has its foundation and its good from God, but it has its corruption from the rebellious wills of men.

SOCIETY CREATED BY GOD IN CHRIST

Maurice contends that there are but two views of society. One is theistic and the other is humanistic. He summarizes them: "Many writers begin with considering mankind a multitude of units. They ask, how did any number of these units form themselves into a Society? I cannot adopt that method. At my birth, I am already in a Society."¹

The humanistic writers think of society as a mere human product. In opposition to them Maurice contends that men are born into the society which God created in Christ. The first method commits the obvious error of supposing that men are unsocial by nature and exist in isolation until they make themselves social by creating the relationships which they enjoy as fathers, sons, brothers, and citizens. The truth is that men are born into such relationships. They do not create these kinds of relationships but are born as relatives to one another in such relationships.²

Men are human beings because they are social, Maurice believes. Scripture speaks "of Society as essential to the very idea of Humanity," and it witnesses to the fact that as men tend toward individualism they become less human.³ It is our nature as sinners not to acknowledge that we are constituted social beings, and to act as if we are by nature individualists who are separated from one another. In believing and acting upon this premise, men rebel against God's society and seek to create one in which they can give legal sanctions to their selfish individualism. It was to correct this error and to teach the truth about society that Christ gave some of his most profound teachings. As men accept this truth they may more adequately respond to God and participate in divine society.⁴

Maurice is here contending for an interpersonal view of society, which

¹ Maurice, F. D., *Social Morality*, London: Macmillan Co., 1869, p. 24.

² This is elaborated in *Social Morality*. See also F. D. Maurice, *The Conscience*, Macmillan Co., 1868, pp. 54-5.

³ Maurice, F. D., *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Macmillan Co., 1891-2, Vol. II, p. 51.

⁴ Maurice, F. D., *The Gospel of St. John*, Macmillan Co., 1888, pp. 385-91.

has as its primary distinctive the belief that society is created by God to be obedient to him as Christ is obedient to the will of the Father. The second distinctive of this interpersonal view is that society is to be equated primarily with interpersonal relations of "I's" and only secondarily with external relations. External circumstances of existence are merely the circumstances by which the essential personal relations of "I's" are made possible. Men can be interpersonally related as "I's" however, only as they are related to God. Until they are interpersonally related to God they are not fully "I's" but are as "its."⁵

This view of society, Maurice maintains, was revealed when Christ became man and revealed the true nature of mankind and the relationships which they have to God and to one another. Being both God and man he enables men to see that they are constituted to live in fellowship with God and one another. If they deny that they are relatives they become as dead bodies, because the interpersonal relations which make them persons are denied and they have only the external relations of things.⁶ This was revealed by Christ, but it was not constituted at the time of his incarnation. He revealed to men the society which was both originally embodied in the relations of the persons of the Trinity and purposed for men by the eternal will of God.

SOCIETY GROUNDED IN THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE TRINITY

The foundation of society is the personal and social nature of the Trinity. This is fundamental and determinative in Maurice's theology of society. In order to explain what is involved, we need to see four of Maurice's emphases.

The first emphasis is the social nature of the Trinity. Maurice could hardly be more insistent that the God who is revealed in Jesus Christ is the personal Trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit. If we truly understand God to be not an intellectual construct but a living Trinity of persons, Maurice affirms, we shall understand the Trinity to be "the underground of all fellowship among men"⁷ and "the ground of human life and of human society."⁸ Being social by nature, God created human creatures

⁵ Maurice, F. D., "A Dialogue . . . on the Doctrine of Circumstances . . ." No. VII of *Tracts on Christian Socialism*, London: George Bell, 1850; "A Clergyman . . . On What Grounds Can You Associate . . ." No. VIII, *Ibid.*, London: John James Bezer, 1851.

⁶ Maurice, F. D., *The Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament*, London: Macmillan Co., 1892, pp. ix-xi; *The Religions of the World and Their Relations to Christianity*, Macmillan Co., 1886, p. 243.

⁷ *The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice, Chiefly Told in His Own Letters*, Edited by His Son Frederick Maurice, Macmillan Co., 1884, Vol. II, p. 388. This work will be referred to hereafter as *Letters*.

⁸ Maurice, F. D., *Theological Essays*, 4th edition, Macmillan Co., 1881, p. 348.

who are social. His being, therefore, is seen to be the ground of the social being of men. We must learn that society stands upon "a united Worship of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit," and that worship of the Triune God necessitates our recognition of God as personal and social and our acceptance of interpersonal fellowship with God.⁹

Maurice's understanding of the social nature of the Trinity may seem at first glance to be Tritheism. However, he only thinks of Trinity in societal rather than in psychological or physical analogies. There is, of course, a danger of slipping into Tritheism of three separate personalities who associate like three human persons.¹⁰ Maurice does not move in this direction, however. He affirms in very strong terms the unity of Godhead.¹¹ He does emphasize strongly the distinctions of persons and wills in the Trinity, but he keeps ever before his mind the unity of persons in one essence. He must be understood always as speaking of three persons in one substance and not of three separate and individual personalities. He conjoins unity and trinity in understanding God, and this saves him not only from Tritheism but also from Unitarianism.

If complaint is to be lodged against Maurice on the Trinity, it seems that it should be directed not against alleged Tritheism but his failure to give clearer details of his understanding. He feared that too much effort at clarifying the relations of the Trinity would involve him in metaphysical abstractions.¹² He repeatedly inveighs against treating the Trinity as a man-made mental construct rather than as the "living Truth which underlies and sustains both the natural and the spiritual world."¹³ He believes that men must learn that society stands upon the "united confession of the Name (Trinity), a united Worship of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit" and that "the confession will only be united when we cease to confound our feeble expressions of trust and affiance, our praise and adoration, with Him to Whom they rise, from Whom they proceed."¹⁴

⁹ *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Vol. II, p. 144.

¹⁰ The social nature of the Trinity has been given considerable development by recent British theologians. For brief discussions of this development see D. M. Baillie's *God Was in Christ*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948, pp. 137-40, and Claude Welch's *In This Name*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952, pp. 133-7. A. M. Ramsey in *F. D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology*, Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 55, n. 2, sees the danger of Tritheism in the social analogy, but he says: "It would, however, be unjust to say that the tendency in Maurice's case ever approached Tritheism."

¹¹ *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 388.

¹² See especially *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 388, where Maurice writes to J. M. Ludlow that his concern is not about "certain profound relations in the Divine nature" but about God "as the underground of all fellowship among men . . . which will at last bind all into one."

¹³ *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Vol. II, p. 143. See the three sermons in this volume on the Trinity, pp. 105-59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 144.

The second emphasis of Maurice in arguing that society is based upon the nature of the Trinity, is that Christ's sacrifice in the flesh is a part of the eternal sacrifice of the wills of Son and Spirit to the will of the Father. The sacrifice of Christ on the cross is seen as the basis of a new society among men only because the basis of his sacrifice was eternally laid in his essential relation to the Father.¹⁵ The incarnate Christ submitted his will to the will of the Father and thereby revealed the "union and co-operation of the will of the Father with the will of the Son, which was . . . before all worlds; which lay in the very ground of creation, but which was never manifested in its fulness till the Son yielded up Himself to the death of the cross."¹⁶ Christ's "revelation of that primal unity is the revelation of the ground on which all things stand, both things in heaven and things on earth. It is the revelation of an order which sustains all the intercourse and society of men."¹⁷ Being both the Son of God and the head of the human race, Christ is able to submit his will to the Father and thereby enable men to submit their wills to the same Father. When there is agreement of wills among members of society in doing the will of the Father, then there are present the harmony and concord which are essential to society.

The third emphasis of Maurice is that the trust which is essential to society is like that which is present among members of the Trinity. Social organization is effective where there is mutual trust among men, and it disappears when there is no trust. Such trust among men can be had only as they have faith in the Triune God, only as they respond to God who creates men to love him and one another and to live in concord on earth.¹⁸

The fourth emphasis is that the Trinity is revealing himself personally to men in the existential situations of social life, and he is thereby relating them interpersonally to one another. For example, persons learn the nature of relations of sons and daughters only as they respond as such to their parents. As they seek to do God's will in these relationships they actually understand God's will and they become true sons and daughters. All other social relationships must be learned in the same way. Directions may be given in words, but the social relationships can be truly understood only by participating in them under the personal guidance of God.¹⁹ As we seek to be obedient to God in society we come to understand the historical revelation

¹⁵ Maurice, F. D., *The Doctrine of Sacrifice Deduced from the Scriptures*, London: Macmillan Co., 1879, pp. 108, 173-4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹⁸ *Letters*, Vol. II, pp. 572-3.

¹⁹ Maurice, F. D., *What is Revelation?* Cambridge: Macmillan Co., 1859, pp. 390-1.

of God's governance of society in the Bible and the church. Our existential experiences and the recorded history become complementary ways by which God brings us into the divine society where we are in association with him and with one another in *agape*.²⁰

It has become obvious that Maurice understands society to be dependent upon two actions. The first, which is entirely independent, is the action of God to create and to redeem men to fellowship with himself and with one another. The other, which is wholly contingent, is the action of men to respond to God to do his will. These two actions must now be examined in some detail.

SOCIETY DEPENDENT UPON THE REVELATION OF GOD

When Maurice says that God has revealed himself, he does not mean that he has given true propositions to men. He means that God has met men personally and related them to himself and to one another in society. Such revelation has been made by means of the constitution of nature, human societies, men's consciences, and finally and uniquely in the incarnation of Christ. All of these ways have a part in God's purpose to bring men into a redeemed society of men who submit to the Father's will and love one another, but the revelation in Christ is the one by which all others can be interpreted. In Christ God has made it clear that men are to understand God not by making their way up to him but by receiving God as he comes personally to them. In our response to God in Christ

we shall find—(1) That the discovery of God Himself, of His inmost being, of His own love, constitutes the Revelation; (2) That God Himself by His Spirit acting on the *spirit of man which is in us*, is the Revealer; (3) That the Revelation is of that which is *invisible* and infinite—beyond the grasp of the senses, beyond the grasp of the intellect.²¹

The revelation of God in Christ requires more than having man see and hear him. The revelation goes beyond both senses and reason. Maurice understands Paul to say that "the *Revelation* was precisely that which enabled him to recognise, through the visible, the invisible—in the crucified man, the Lord of glory, the Wisdom and Word of God."²²

By the figure of a ladder Maurice illumines his understanding of revelation.

²⁰ Maurice, F. D., *The Epistles of St. John*, London: Macmillan Co., 1893, pp. 38-45, 152-67; *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Vol. III, pp. 92-6.

²¹ Maurice, F. D., "Use of the Word Revelation in the New Testament," in *Present-Day Papers on Prominent Questions in Theology*, Second Series. Edited by Alexander Ewing, London: Strahan & Co., 1871, pp. 26-7.

²² *Loc. cit.*

There was a ladder set upon earth, and reaching to heaven that the voice of God may be heard . . . by those who are at the lowest step of this ladder . . . if they will reverently apply their ears to listen . . . and . . . ask whether there is not a Centre of all God's revelation, one in whom He created the world, one in whom He has enlightened men, one in whom He has made Himself perfectly known.²³

Non-Christians who believe in a knowable God, Maurice believes, maintain that men may ascend to him over a ladder by natural means. The Christian takes issue with them and affirms that God has descended the ladder in Christ and has re-ascended to bring men and God into personal rapport.²⁴ God was made known in the person of Jesus Christ, because being personal he could reveal himself as he is by entering into social relations with men in a living person with whom they could fellowship.

SOCIETY EMBODIED AMONG MEN BY THEIR RESPONSE TO GOD

True society has its foundation in the Trinity and it is revealed to men by God. It is, however, embodied among men by their response to God to do his will. Man is able to respond because he is created for fellowship with God. To discuss adequately this response would require an elaboration of Maurice's soteriology. All that we seek to do here is to indicate the means by which man responds to God to fellowship with God and fellow-men.

Maurice understands man to be a person, an "I," a self who is constituted like God, and who therefore is personal and social and able to enter into social relationships with God and men. A person is a relative rather than an object, and must be understood always as an "I" rather than an "it."²⁵ The ability to be related to persons in society, therefore, belongs to man as man. To be other than related interpersonally to other persons is to be less than man. This is to be a thing or animal.

Man or an "I" may be said to be horizontally related to men by nature. Man is related to God interpersonally, however, only as God initiates the relation and by grace makes it possible for man to respond. When man responds to fellow-men according to nature, he does so to seek his own. He therefore is selfish and sinful. This is disruptive of the society intended by God. Man can be related to his fellows to have a divine society, there-

²³ Maurice, F. D., "Essay on Archdeacon Hare's Position in the Church," in *The Victory of Faith*, by Julius Hare, third edition. Edited by E. H. Plumptre, London: Macmillan Co., 1874, pp. xxxiii-iv.

²⁴ Maurice, F. D., *Dialogues between a Clergyman and a Layman on Family Worship*, Macmillan Co., 1862, pp. 100-101.

²⁵ This is a constant theme in Maurice's writings. It is given detailed elaboration in *The Conscience*, Macmillan Co., 1868.

fore, only as he responds to God to do the Father's will. This requires a new dimension and a transformation of the "I." It necessitates the transformation of the "old man" or the "fleshly man" to the "new man" or "spiritual man." Maurice here makes the Pauline distinction between the man who seeks his own and the man who seeks God's will.²⁶ This must not be understood to be the philosophical distinction between the higher self and the lower self.

God brings men into an immediate relationship of "I's" with himself, Maurice affirms. God does not merely reveal signs and ideas of himself, which man then interprets as pointing to a power whom man should seek and find. God enters into rapport with man, he confronts him as an "I," he awakens man's consciousness of God's presence, and always there is "the unveiling of a Person . . . not to the eye, but to the very man himself, to the Conscience, Heart, Will, Reason, which God has created to know Him, and be like Him."²⁷

Man responds to God with knowledge of him only as man is caused to respond by God. Furthermore, man never really enters into right rapport with other men except as God causes him to fellowship with men in society. The relationships of "I's" in which men participate in divine society is never merely horizontal. The relationship must be triangular, with God a participant. God acts upon man to make man aware of himself as an "I," of God as an "I," and of other men as "I's." The social Trinity makes man awake to the social nature of men and relates him personally-socially to other men. This is existential knowledge. It is knowledge of existence as it is, because here man comes to see God, himself, and society as they are. Man experiences with the whole self interpersonal relations with God and men.²⁸

When man comes to understand the nature of his interpersonal relations to God and fellow-men, he is prepared for the good society. Society will no longer be thought of as a mere human creation by which men gain advantages for themselves. Society is seen, rather, as an order of interpersonal relationships which are based upon the social nature of the Triune God. When man sees himself as social in a society with like men and sees that society is based upon the holy God, he then confesses that he has an obligation to self and society. Herein comes the sense of right and wrong.

²⁶ *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 577.

²⁷ *What is Revelation?* p. 54; *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Vol. V, p. 113. For elaboration of this emphasis see Sermons III and IV of *What is Revelation?* or pp. 96-125 of *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Vol. V.

²⁸ See especially *The Conscience*, Lectures I and II.

Man then can act responsibly as an obligated person in order that he may help maintain the moral order which God purposes and establishes among men. He sees himself truly as a relative; one related to self, God, and men. It comes to his consciousness that in order to affirm his own real self he must accept himself as a relative. Such a relative can be truly ethical. When men recognize this web of relationships and respond to God to love God and neighbors, they may then accept the divine society as God takes dominion of their social affairs.

ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS

In his development of the understanding that society is grounded in the Trinity, Maurice reveals three primary insights which seem to be laden with promise for Christian social ethics. These insights must be viewed as promises rather than full solutions, however, because limitations appear in each as it is held by Maurice. Furthermore, Maurice may not have demonstrated that these insights are dependent upon his understanding of the Trinity. They might be more securely based elsewhere.

Maurice's first fundamental insight is the ontological status of society. He sees that society is from God and as such it is good. If society is based upon God, then Maurice really explains the origin of both good and evil in society and points the way to affirming good and opposing evil. If all good in society is due to man's response to God, then what we need to do is find the way and respond more adequately to God. Since God is not one whom we capture or to whom we make our way, even though this is what we want to do, we are always in danger of missing God's will even while we say that we desire to do it. This explains why men pervert society even while seeking to obey God, as for example in a theocratic society. Maurice explains also that God elicits response, even if it is inadequate, from men who have no conscious awareness of him. By this he understands why avowedly naturalistic societies have some good in them, as for example a social contract society.

Maurice does not take full advantage of his insight here. First, he is metaphysically hazy. He sees the inseparability of divine and human societies, because society can exist only in so far as it is divine. There can be no purely human society, because complete rebellion against God would result not in a perfectly human society but in nothing. However, Maurice does not keep clear the distinctions between divine and human societies. Perhaps this could be done by distinguishing existent and empirical society. The former could designate society as it exists among persons of the Trinity

and in the purpose of God for men, and the latter could designate society among men on earth and as described by social scientists. This would make it possible to sketch a clearer design of divine society and to indicate signs of its presence in the social organizations on earth. Maurice never really allows us to see with sufficient clarity his own understanding of the distinctions between divine and human society.

A second limitation here is that Maurice also manifests a metaphysical and epistemological confusion. He nowhere explains sufficiently the distinction between a society which is conscious of God and one that is not. To be sure, he talks of men and societies being confronted by God and of their rapport with him. However, he believes that society as such responds to God, because response is essential to its being. What then is the difference between a society that consciously responds to God and one that unknowingly responds? What exactly must a society know of God in order to respond in an adequate way to him? Such questions are not answered clearly, but until they are answered men will not know how to respond to God in order to frame their social institutions under God's design. Maurice wants simply to tell men to submit their wills to God and he will direct them in the social situations in which he meets them. He was not satisfied with this, however, because he was constantly engaged in social action to effect social change.

The second fundamental insight of Maurice is the existential nature of man in society. Men are not spectators contemplating society, but they are relatives whose interpersonal relations constitute society. That society which has its basis in God is known to men not as an idea but as immediate experience because they are "I's." Here, again, Maurice becomes hazy. In his proper refusal to separate being and knowing, he improperly refuses to distinguish them sufficiently. It must be recognized, of course, that simply to be in society is not to be aware of God and neighbor and to respond to God to accept his divine society for men.

Maurice seems to believe that his existentialism of society solves the problems of ontology and epistemology in regard to society. His great expenditure of energy and thought in social action seems to indicate his dissatisfaction with the solution, however. This, then, points out a third insight and corresponding weakness.

The third basic insight of Maurice is that society consists primarily of interpersonal relations and only secondarily of external relations. He bases both the foundation and the redemption of society, therefore, upon the perfect agreement of wills of the Trinity. Right personal relationships

guarantee a good society. What, however, is the exact relation of the interpersonal relationships of society to the external orders of society? Granted that men and societies cannot be made good by the manipulation of social organizations, one still asks what if any effect organizations have upon interpersonal relation. Maurice evidently thought that there was some effect or he would not have worked so hard to promote such things as cooperatives in the place of monopolistic capitalism, the state church against the free churches, and Christian socialism rather than state socialism. Nowhere does he attempt to clarify for us the exact nature of the relation of the internals and the externals of society.

In spite of some limitations in Maurice's own development of his unique understanding that society is grounded in the social nature of the Trinity, this seems to be a fruitful approach. The problems do not seem to be insurmountable. Perhaps it would be well for Christian social ethicists to give attention to this dimension of Maurice's theology of society, to explore and to develop its potentials.

A Christian Reappraisal of Realism in Foreign Policy

HARVEY SEIFERT

IN THE MOST CRUCIAL hour of the history of mankind, the contribution of the ethical leaders of Christianity has often been negative. Now the very continuance of human life on the planet is at stake—at the same time that the achievement of interplanetary travel also is becoming a possibility. The dramatically contradictory potentialities of modern culture have unfortunately been matched by basic confusion among those who ought to be providing guidance for the choices of men. The predominant emphasis among Christian ethical thinkers of the last few decades contributed to social policies so dangerously inadequate that they have become as much a threat as a promise.

Nowhere is this thesis more tragically illustrated than in contemporary foreign policy. It is here that the ambivalent potentialities of modern civilization come to a sharp focus. Whether our descendants will enjoy cruises to Mars, or whether this generation will leave no legacy but a barren, radioactive globe, will be largely determined by our success in piecing together some sort of creative accommodation in international affairs. Yet it is also in this area, because of the extreme complexities of the issues and the almost intolerable intransigence of the problems, that we easily fall into ethical inadequacy and confusion. The factors to be considered are overwhelmingly varied. The frightful consequences of a misstep restrict the latitude of experimentation. Narrow group interest colors every analysis. Gigantic power complexes bar the way for the vehicles of justice and love.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we should find here new illustrations of man's capacity to call the evil good and the good evil. To one man a particular policy is a necessary acceptance of reality, a way of proving that the children of light can be as worldly wise as the sons of darkness. To another man the same policy is a modern way of confusing Jesus with Beelzebub and of killing his disciples as a way of "offering service to God."¹

¹ Matt. 10:25, John 16:2.

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Contributing some measure of clarity and consistency in this area of social decision surely must be given high priority on any agenda for Christian ethics.

I

The dominant position of contemporary scholars in the field of international relations is widely designated as realism, as opposed to idealism. These terms are here used in a specialized sociological sense rather than in their traditional philosophical meaning. Represented by such men as Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan,² the prevalent realism in politics is significantly related to ethical emphases which have also recently been widely current. More theologically minded representatives of the social scientists involved have acknowledged their indebtedness especially to Reinhold Niebuhr.

A theology which stresses the transcendence rather than the immanence of God tends to make the processes of current history of less significance. Preoccupation with judgment to the neglect of grace limits the possibilities even of regenerate man. A relatively pessimistic view of man reduces social expectations. Greater reliance on revelation as a source of religious knowledge may neglect the extent to which social conditioning is a conservative influence. An *ad hoc* emphasis in ethics, stressing the freedom of spontaneous response in the situation rather than the discipline of systematic application of the norm, allows a lack of both consistency and incisiveness. The cumulative consequences of these factors is likely to be a social prescription compounded of short next steps rather than a bold new program pressing toward a more distant goal. Such an ethical system is in mortal danger of an adaptionism which unduly relaxes tension with the norm of love and which too easily concludes that ours is very nearly the best of all possible worlds.

It is false to repeat the frequent charge that neo-orthodoxy has "cut the nerve of social action." Quite to the contrary, this theological tendency has recovered in its emphasis on the sovereignty of God, for example, dynamic sources for social concern. The difficulty is that combined with this have been other theological emphases which have dulled its ethical thrust and which have made it adaptionist in effect. To this charge Reinhold Niebuhr is not an exception, but rather an illustration. Much recent Christian ethics has been infected with inadequacy because it has been

² Morgenthau, Hans J., *In Defense of the National Interest*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, and *Dilemmas of Politics*, University of Chicago Press, 1958; Kennan, George F., *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, University of Chicago Press, 1951, and *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, 1954.

directed only against the most obvious idolatries and because it has come too quickly to terms with the existing situation. This ethical theory has been compatible with and even contributory to realism in the theory of international relations. Men of religion must share the blame for whatever disasters result from the inadequacies of this formulation of social policy.

Advocates of *Realpolitik* in international affairs argue that the proper basis for foreign policy is national interest. In the absence of an effective international society there is no other way to secure desirable ends such as liberty, opportunity, or peace, than through the nation-state. National self-preservation and the protection of conditions contributing to national strength are therefore essential goals.

Realists emphasize the necessary role of power in world order. They are skeptical of any attempt to mitigate international conflict through appeals to moral principle or world opinion. International law and world organization are considered utopian proposals, the present pursuit of which may lead to defeat for gains which might otherwise be possible. Those holding this point of view are skeptical about man's ability to act altruistically or about any nation's ability to transcend limited interest. The best possible action is a flexible policy adjusting to each changing and unique situation according to canons of political expediency rather than of rigid norms. This leads them in the present situation characteristically to advocate some sort of balance of power as most likely to stave off war.

While realists do not completely eliminate more idealistic goals, they would confine them "to the unobtrusive, almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest."³ They fear that any more idealistic approach would betray nations into a fanatical dogmatism seeking unlimited ends in crusades which could only be followed by disillusionment. They are convinced that idealism oversimplifies the issues and defeats its own ends by neglecting essential means. Because it expects too much of unregenerate man it results in an unstable and ineffective foreign policy.

II

There is much truth in this position. No constructive policy is possible apart from the realities of the concrete situation. These include the ubiquitous involvement of self-interest in national policy. National purposes are not attained by moral fervor alone, but by a properly prudent calculation of effective means. To neglect the competitive power-relationships of

³ Kennan, George F., *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, p. 56.

nations is to be reduced to impotence. Every responsible ethicist would have to admit this. In the history of practical politics even the saintly Gandhi illustrated the point.

An utopian perfectionism, which assumes that it is immediately possible fully to practice the complete implications of the Sermon on the Mount, is both personally impossible and socially dangerous. Such a position is less than fully good because it overlooks much of the truth about existing situations. It is no devotion to the norm of love to underestimate the complexity and tenacity of social evil nor to overestimate the range of alternatives actually available to us. Too simple a moralism may result in international crimes. Recognizing only selected factors in the situation and reflecting dogmatic assurance of the righteousness of one's own position has led to persecutions and crusades in the past and to unconditional surrender demands and Hiroshima bombings in the present.

Any effort to build an utopian structure before enough solid building blocks are available is doomed to collapse. We cannot immediately rely on a nonexistent loyalty to the world as a substitute for nationalism. Such a premature reliance would only result in enlarging the sphere of anarchy and in narrowing whatever constructive consequences may now emerge from national loyalties. Furthermore, so long as there is a residual egotism in even the best people, it is folly to expect to eliminate all forms of coercion in social relationships. The Christian conscience raises questions about the form, amount, and agency of coercive power, but it ought also to recognize that sole reliance on persuasion would now leave justice without enforcement and order without protection. For reasons such as these Walpole could write, "No great country was ever saved by good men because good men will not go to the lengths that may be necessary."

The ultimate social expression of love is not immediately attainable because of the nature of man, of value, and of society. Man is finite. He is not God. He is limited in knowledge and capacity. His moral judgment is clouded by past sin. He knows neither the best possibility nor the full array of alternatives. His choice is always confined within the limited range of his awareness. The will of God always transcends the highest purposes of the best man.

Furthermore, the norm of love impels us to seek a complex system of values. In the same situation, given men as they are, different values may exert contradictory claims. It is not possible, for example, simultaneously to realize complete freedom and perfect order, or to maximize both the values of community and the values of individuality. One or the other must

be limited or modified for the sake of the fullest possible realization of a system of values.

The nature of interdependent society also restricts choice. The decisions of others always limit the alternatives available to us. The sickness or health of any part of the body affects the whole. When one nation thrusts its military might across its boundaries, other nations cannot conduct business as usual. Or, when a prosperous nation chooses to advance credits to an underdeveloped area, the citizens of the receiving nation may realistically choose to eliminate famine. Action is always limited to such alternatives as remain available after others have acted. Realists are right in insisting that social policies can never embody the absolute right. They can only approximate the norm of love in varying degrees.

The universality of this dilemma is underscored by the fact that Jesus himself moved within these limitations of the human situation. The full meaning of incarnation includes the concept of the divine will as active within the total circumstances of man's life. Jesus recognized necessary modifications to his ministry because of limitations in the persons with whom he would have preferred to work more adequately. He could do no mighty work in Nazareth because of unbelief.⁴ With respect to taxes to Caesar, he found it necessary to make concessions to circumstances in an ambiguous answer to escape a trap.⁵ Even Gethsemane gains a new meaning when one sees it as an agonizing experience, partly because action was restricted to available alternatives no one of which was completely good. To flee from Jerusalem would have denied God's call to witness there. To die in Jerusalem would leave some men physically unhealed and spiritually unmoved, both conditions being the frustration of genuinely desirable consequences which would have resulted from a continuation of the earthly ministry of Jesus. A proper note of realism reminds us that the norm of love is to be continuously approximated rather than immediately embodied in practical social affairs. The action of the Christian is to be guided by the full requirement of radical altruism. Concrete programs must also, however, be formulated in full recognition of the resistances imposed by unregenerate men. The best choice can only be the best possible from available alternatives.

This is the calling of God to us. God does not require the impossible. He does not condemn us for failing to do what we cannot do. Contrary, therefore, to much thinking on this subject, "best possible" action does not

⁴ Luke 6:5.

⁵ Mark 12:17; Matt. 22:21; Luke 20:25.

involve us in sin. It involves us in evil, but so long as any other course of action would have resulted in greater evil, our action may rightly be considered the circumstantial will of God. Foreign policy, like any other complex social program, always is compounded of such relative goods. This insight is a valid contribution of contemporary realism.

III

Realism in international relations has gone beyond this sound observation, however, to accept a degree of adaptionism which is proving to be self-defeating. Little being expected from man and society, little has been attempted. Policy advocated for the future has differed little from present practice. In an attempt to avoid utopianism on the left, this point of view has drifted into a sort of utopianism on the right, expecting too much improvement from too little alteration. Those using the label have proved to be insufficiently realistic. They have not recognized that short steps ahead become long steps backward when the ground is rushing back beneath our feet.

It is important to admit the necessity of compromise, in the sense of choosing from among available, imperfect alternatives. It is also dangerous. Compromise is always a slippery slope. Personal prejudice and selfish desire lead to easy rationalization. The compulsion of custom is to complete capitulation to the familiar. In ethical and religious terms, conclusions arrived at within the human situation always require correction by a prophetic thrust of faith. The tension must always be kept tight between the claim of love and concrete decision. In humility we must accept God's constant recall to the genuine best which is possible.

Political realists, aware of the problem of power, have often overlooked the power of ideals. The common acceptance of high ideals within a nation nurtures a more ardent devotion both from citizens and from other like-minded nations whose aid we desire. Deterioration of the moral fiber of a nation is a greater disaster than armed attack. Military might alone is not sufficient even to win wars, as anyone who recalls Valley Forge or the Battle of Britain must know.

God is active in the social world, supporting a moral order and amazingly energizing those who turn to him. Alongside the coercion of guns or the persuasion of logic, varied techniques of good will also have ability to achieve purpose. Love is even more powerful than other forms of force, could we only discover its strategies.

It should be clear, even on the most realistic grounds, that there is

a threshold of effectiveness which must be crossed before values can either be conserved or enhanced. Enough of love must be embodied into imperfect means before they can contribute to any constructive end. Punishment may contribute to the socialization of the child only if it is set within the framework of positive acts of love.

A significant convergence of testimony among the psychological and social sciences supplies evidence of the essential power of good will, even though that term might not be used. This testimony goes beyond the kind of anecdotal material to which special pleaders have often resorted. It involves conclusions drawn from the commonly accepted content of entire related disciplines, such as educational theory, psychotherapy, industrial relations, and criminology.

Specialists in education in the home or in the school are now stressing a climate of acceptance, understanding, and affection as indispensable to growth. The unloved child tends to become hostile, anxious, and antisocial. In dealing with emotionally disturbed persons, the psychotherapist emphasizes the importance of genuine respect and appreciative acceptance. In loyalty to the welfare of his client there is even a sacrificial element in the therapist's self-giving to the patient. In so far as modern industrial relations are based upon recent research, they manifest an interest in human relations in industry which go far beyond a sheer power struggle. The talk now is of understanding, communication, recognition of the basic rights of the other party, and even interest in helping the opposite group realize its legitimate aspirations. The modern criminologist is emphasizing prevention and cure, rather than punishment and deterrence. In attacking fundamental causes he too observes the need for sympathetic understanding and individualized treatment.

Specialists in these behavioral disciplines also recognize conflicts of interest. Their recommended programs still set limits to antisocial conduct. The use of coercive power remains always latent and often becomes overt. Yet recent research findings tend to support the indispensability of a sufficient measure of good will in creative social relationships. The resources of love are greater than skeptical men have imagined. Tension with the norm can be held tighter than we have often considered possible.

In addition to the power of the ideal, we need to recognize the relevance of distant goals and the importance of projecting social systems. Especially must this now be asserted in the face of the kind of pragmatic opportunism which has often fragmented national action into incoherent expedencies. More ultimate goals are essential to any sound definition of immediate

policy. Detailed day to day decisions will be different if they are taken as steps toward national self-interest or toward some higher norm. Means chosen are modified by the end sought. The soundest policy is that which is most significantly related to the most adequate, inclusive, and systematically coherent long-run goal. Contrary to the realists' position, distant aims are not misleading, but rather guiding. Both the norm of love and the "middle axioms" derived from it are always transcendent but they are also always relevant as goals.

An important consequence of this emphasis is the recognition that there is always a hidden alternative. Other and better social policies remain undiscovered in the present or in the future. We can always approach nearer to distant goals than our limited perspectives suggest. If we had a clearer insight into the will of God, we would recognize creative possibilities now obscured. If we weighed distant goals more heavily, we would insist that present choices include elements which might make even better choices possible in the future. Neither the pacifist nor the participant has dealt fully with the goal of peace until, in addition to nonparticipation or participation in present wars, he also invests energy in some movement aimed at the future elimination of war. His dimension of concern then includes a program designed to abolish for future generations the tragic decision to which he is now limited. Focusing attention on the availability of such superior alternatives should stimulate a more thorough and adventurous conduct. It should prevent too hasty an acceptance of the compromise which first commended itself.

On the general role of the ideal the advocates of *Realpolitik* cannot avoid the inconsistency of occasionally admitting what they generally deny. George Kennan, in the peroration at the close of *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, appeals to our obligation "to our own national ideals and through these ideals to the wider human community of which we are in ever increasing measure a part." One cannot really have it both ways. Either our basic devotion is to national interest or to the wider human community. Occasions on which the requirements of the two tend to coincide are not as numerous as realists seem to assume. When Hans Morgenthau writes, "A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principle,"⁶ he is indeed expounding a type of morality, but it is not the morality of the Christian faith.

We may well accept, on the one hand, realism's warning against

⁶ Morgenthau, Hans J., *In Defense of the National Interest*, p. 39.

utopianism. It is equally important, on the other hand, to guard against the adaptionism which is associated with the realistic position. In ethical terms, this avoidance of extremes would lead us to a realistic perfectionism, which maintains a tighter tension with the norm of God within the human situation.

IV

What would be the consequences of such a more adventurous approach to foreign affairs? For one thing it would allow us to see more clearly the liabilities inextricably associated with the assets of recent United States policy.

In addition to a possible temporary deterring value, a policy relying primarily on national power may strengthen the very elements in other nations which it is trying to weaken. A dictator more easily consolidates power when his people feel a foreign threat. An arms build-up aimed at security provokes counter-measures elsewhere which reduce our security. The social resources devoted to military purposes are thereby made unavailable for other measures such as economic aid. The protection of present prerogatives inevitably introduces a certain static quality into policy, during a period which for much of the world's population is uniquely dynamic. The beneficiary of any *status quo* is always in a difficult position during a revolutionary period. The new circumstances require an idealism and altruism which go beyond the processes and values in which he placed his previous trust.

Even the postponement of war which we anticipate from the current "balance of terror" is not always assured. Deterrence by atomic threat also carries its liabilities. The temptation to aggression is nurtured by each new development of terror. The nearer we approach to the ultimate weapon, the more important it becomes that a nation use it on its opponent before its opponent unleashes it first. In times of grave international crisis, when military attack seems inevitable, obliteration weapons encourage what fools call preventive war, or what Douglass Cater has referred to as a "theory of immaculate aggression."⁷ This tendency would be strengthened with each technological breakthrough which promised a decisive offensive or defensive capability. Even the possibility of limiting wars, under present circumstances, is slim. Faced with defeat in a conflict involving vital interest, a nation would presumably be led to increase the atomic firepower of its tactical weapons. How could this build-up, steadily continued because

⁷ Cater, Douglass, "Foreign Policy: Default of the Democrats," *The Reporter*, March 10, 1955, p. 23.

of the corresponding retaliation by the enemy, be prevented from becoming general atomic war?

On the positive side, a foreign policy based on a more perfectionist realism would tend to shift its primary reliance from expedient power to understanding reconciliation. While also undertaking to fix limits to aggression, and therefore maintaining a responsible military power, such a policy would pay attention to the velvet glove as well as to the iron fist. It would be more concerned with fundamental causes than with superficial symptoms. It would more readily undertake a comprehensive approach to justice than a fragmented defense of limited interest. International action would tend to replace national power. The United Nations, as a step toward stronger international organization, would become more of a constant reliance and less of an occasional convenience. Because we recognized legitimate aspirations in the rising level of expectations in underdeveloped areas, we would become more willing to ally ourselves with constructive revolution.

There are signs that we may be moving partially and spasmodically in such constructive directions. We may still use the time bought by a more purely power policy to fashion a more viable and comprehensively adequate approach. As more balanced positions are developing in Christian ethics, they should lend encouragement to a fuller exploration of these more desirable political tendencies. While this is no place for a detailed exposition, a few more concrete illustrations of the meaning of this approach can be provided.

With respect to the U.S.S.R., we need to make clearer an objectivity which includes friendship for the tolerable as well as condemnation for the unacceptable. If we treated a child or a spouse with the constant rejection, condemnation, and active hostility we have often directed toward the Soviet Union, we would have a juvenile delinquent or divorce on our hands. When military deterrence is of necessity used, an even greater emphasis must be placed on the reconciling aspects of policy. At the same time that we maintain military strength around Russian borders, we might stress the conditions under which this could be reduced. We could be displaying an even greater interest in a properly safeguarded expansion of trade and exchange of persons. Our positions should continuously be characterized by the initiative and imagination necessary to any successful negotiation.

To that band of nations lying between Eastern and Western orbits we need to interpret dynamic democracy by word and deed. A greatly expanded program of economic aid is called for, along with the liquidation

of imperialism. In the Middle East we ought to recognize the legitimate possibilities of Arab nationalism and unity. In central Europe we might carefully explore the possibilities in the disengagement approach.

In the Orient, in addition to the obvious implications of the principles just stated, we ought to recognize that it is better to woo China than to attempt a fruitless coercion. We ought to work out procedures by which we can recognize the government of the People's Republic of China and sponsor its membership in the United Nations, provided there be proper safeguards for Korea, Taiwan, and other neighboring states.

Occasional trial balloons or cautious probing in these directions deserve the support of church men. In the modern world we cannot afford the luxury of leisurely advance. Justice too long delayed is interpreted as evidence of exploitation. When the right action is refused until it is compelled by changing circumstances, one's opponent is likely to regard it not as evidence of good faith but as a reward for his own intransigence. Macaulay once reminded Parliament that a particular change might then still be made "with grace and dignity," but that he knew it would actually be made only "when it will be regarded, not as a great act of national justice, but as a confession of national weakness . . . and at such a time, that there will be but too much reason to doubt whether more mischief has been done by your long refusal, or by your tardy and enforced compliance."⁸ This unhappy consequence may be avoided only as the ethics of love is soon made more meaningfully relevant to the conflicts of nations.

⁸ Macaulay, Thomas B., *Speeches*, New York: Hurst and Co., 1853, Vol. 2, p. 292.

The Kerygmatic Theology and the Question of the Historical Jesus

WILLIAM FARMER—NORMAN PERRIN

ONE OF THE MOST important and influential movements in German theology at the moment is the "kerygmatic theology" of Rudolf Bultmann and his scholars. With the translation of some of the more important of Bultmann's works into English and especially his *Theology of the New Testament*, the influence of the movement is being widely felt outside Germany. At no point is Bultmann's position more interesting, or more controversial, than in the relationship he envisages between the kerygma and the historical Jesus, and in his attitude to the historical Jesus. His views here have given rise to a very lively discussion. Strong criticisms have been leveled at these views from outside the Bultmann school, while within the school itself a significant development has taken place at this point. Since this discussion is taking place in German and largely in theological journals which are not readily available outside Germany, this article is intended to report on this discussion for the benefit of those who do not have ready access to the originals.

I

We must begin by briefly recapitulating Bultmann's position, as it can be seen, for example, in one of his later books, *Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen*, Zurich, 1949. Here he discusses Christianity in its historical context of the Old Testament, Judaism, and Classical and Hellenistic Greek life and thought. He has five chapters, one each dealing with Old Testament, Judaism, classical Greece, Hellenism, and Christianity. The historical Jesus is discussed in the chapter on Judaism, not in the chapter on Christianity, because for Bultmann Jesus belongs in Judaism, not in Christianity. Similarly he can begin his *Theology of the New Testament*: "The preaching of Jesus belongs to the presuppositions [notice the plural] of the theology of the New Testament, it is not itself

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a part of that theology."¹ Bultmann makes a rigid distinction between the Christ proclaimed in the kerygma and the Jesus of history. For him it is the proclamation of Christ in the kerygma that awakens the response of faith, and one cannot, one must not, go back from the Christ of the kerygma to the historical Jesus. "Jesus Christ confronts men nowhere other than in the kerygma, as he had so confronted Paul and brought him to decision . . . The kerygma does not mediate historical knowledge (of Jesus) . . . and one may not seek to get beyond the kerygma and use it to reconstruct the historical Jesus . . . That would be the Christ according to the flesh of the past. Not the historical Jesus, but Jesus Christ, the preached Christ, is the Lord."²

What then is the work of the historical Jesus, as Bultmann sees it? Quite simply, Jesus was an eschatological prophet who, in the power of his passionate conviction that the Kingdom of God was imminent, demanded decision of his hearers. "He in his own person signifies the demand for decision, in so far as his call is God's last word before the End and as such is the call for decision."³ The decisive event is, for Jesus, still in the future, whereas for Paul, and for Christianity as such, it is in the past. "Jesus looks to the future, to the coming Reign of God . . . Paul, however, looks back . . . the decisive event, which Jesus expected, has for Paul already taken place."⁴ "Here lies the difference (between Jesus on the one hand and Paul and Christianity on the other) that Paul sees as present, or as having become present in the immediate past, that which for Jesus is still future."⁵

It follows from this, that Jesus did not regard himself as the Messiah. As the one who himself brought the Kingdom, he is the herald of the Kingdom, demanding decision on the basis of his message, not of his person. Bultmann is at great pains to dissociate Christian faith from any kind of dependence upon the historical possibility that Jesus knew himself, or did not know himself, to be the Messiah. "For the discussion of this question it is important that one should see clearly; that the possible demonstration of the fact that Jesus knew himself to be the Messiah or the Son of Man, would be the demonstration of an historical fact, it would not be the proof of any article of faith. Much more an act of faith is the recognition of

¹ *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, II ed., 1954, p. 1. All references in this article are to the German editions of the works concerned, and all translations from the German are made by the authors themselves.

² *Glauben und Verstehen*, I, 1933, p. 208.

³ *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, II ed., 1954, p. 8.

⁴ *Glauben und Verstehen*, I, 1933, p. 200.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

Jesus as the one in whom God's word decisively confronts us . . . and this is completely independent of the historical question whether or not Jesus held himself to be the Messiah. Such a question can only be answered by an historian, in so far as it can be answered at all, and faith as personal decision cannot be dependent upon the work of an historian."⁶

For Bultmann Christianity is a syncretistic phenomenon, which is made up of the Easter faith of the disciples and of elements taken from Jewish messianic expectation, from Hellenistic mystery cults, and from Gnosticism.⁷ The one constituent element from the historical Jesus is his eschatological prophetic activity with its legitimate demand for existential decision. Anything more than that about the historical Jesus we must not, and we cannot, build into our faith. Naturally enough, other scholars have not been content with this view of the historical Jesus and his significance for Christian faith, and a whole discussion has arisen about "the question of the historical Jesus." A bibliography of some of the more important contributions to this discussion is as follows:

- E. Käsemann, "Das Problem des historischen Jesus." *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (Z.Th.K.) 51, 1954.
- N. A. Dahl, "Der historische Jesus als geschichtswissenschaftliches und theologisches Problem." *Kerygma und Dogma* I, 1955.
- E. Heitsch, "Die Aporie des historischen Jesus als Problem theologische Hermeneutik." *Z.Th.K.* 53, 1956.
- E. Fuchs, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus." *Z.Th.K.* 53, 1956.
- G. Bornkamm, *Jesus von Nazareth*, Stuttgart, 1956, 1957.
- J. Jeremias, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Debatte um das Problem des historischen Jesus." *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Greifswald* VI, 1956/57. English translation in *The Expository Times*, August, 1958.
- E. Käsemann, "Neutestamentliche Fragen von Heute." *Z.Th.K.* 54, 1957.
- H. Diem, *Der Irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens*, Tübingen, 1957.
- F. Mussner, "Der historische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens." *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1957.
- E. Fuchs, "Glaube und Geschichte im Blick auf die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus." *Z.Th.K.* 54, 1957.
- R. Bultmann, "Allgemeine Wahrheiten und christliche Verkündigung." *Z.Th.K.* 54, 1957.
- P. Althaus, *Das sogenannte Kerygma und der historische Jesus*. Gutersloh, 1958.
- J. M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus*. *Studies in Biblical Theology* No. 25, 1959.

Of the above, the most important contribution from outside the Bultmann school is that from Jeremias, which is now available in English, and to which the reader is referred. It is obviously impossible to give even

⁶ *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, II ed., 1954, p. 26.

⁷ *Das Urchristentum*, pp. 191-195. "Christianity as a syncretistic phenomenon."

a brief report of the whole of the literature in this article, and what we propose to do here is to deal with the contributions of Käsemann, Bornkamm, and Fuchs. These three are all Bultmann scholars and their work is therefore from within the school and with full understanding of, and sympathy for, the Bultmann position. The fact that, as we shall see, they all progress significantly away from Bultmann's position may be an indication that Bultmann's position has inherent weaknesses, and if so would be a more convincing indication of this than any number of criticisms, however trenchant, from outside the school.

II

We will take the contributions in chronological order, and begin therefore with Ernst Käsemann.⁸ He begins by portraying the Bultmann position as an understanding of Christian faith as faith in the risen and ascended Lord "for which the historical Jesus as such no longer possesses constitutive significance" (p. 126), and argues that such a radical position demands a reaction, a new interest in the historical Jesus and his significance for Christian faith. He begins his own re-examination of the question of the historical Jesus by discussing the significance of the historical element in the New Testament narratives. The very fact that it is history shows that we no longer have direct access to it. We can know it only through tradition and interpretation. In any case, the ascertaining of *bruta facta* is no help to Christian faith as such. So the early Christians gave us, not factual reports, but kerygma, in order that it might lead us to existential decision between belief and unbelief, and not simply to an increase in our factual knowledge. The kerygma at first sight appears to be a breaking with the actual facts, but it is not so. It is actually the establishment of the true continuity with these facts because only in interpretation is history made relevant to the present, and in the interpretation of the kerygma the history is made relevant for us in our present (p. 130).

It can be seen that Käsemann is every bit as much a theologian of the kerygma as is his teacher. He is as anxious as Bultmann to maintain the priority and the fundamental importance of the kerygma for Christian faith. But the crux of the matter for Käsemann is the relationship between the risen Lord of the kerygma and the historical Jesus. The early church identified the risen Lord with the earthly, historical Jesus, and was not prepared to substitute a mythical figure or an heavenly being for Jesus of Nazareth (p. 134). It saw in the historical Jesus the once-for-all revelation

⁸ "Das Problem des historischen Jesus," *Z.Th.K.* 51, 1954, pp. 125-153.

which demands our decision, a revelation that was not superseded by the Easter faith but corroborated by it, and it also saw it as a history that has continual significance for us in our present, as the *extra nos* of our salvation (pp. 139-140). The early church has therefore portrayed the earthly Jesus in its Gospels and seen the *bruta facta* of the past as of the essence of its own faith and of its own history. We cannot give up the identity of the ascended Lord and the earthly Jesus without either falling into docetism or finding it impossible to see the Easter faith of the early church as anything other than a myth (p. 141).

So far Käsemann has been dealing with the significance of the historical Jesus for us, asking in effect whether we should seek to know anything about him. In this he has gone significantly beyond Bultmann who, as we have seen, refuses to allow the historical Jesus constitutive significance for our faith. Now Käsemann turns to the possibility of our knowledge of the historical Jesus, asking in effect if we can know anything about him. Like all the Bultmann scholars Käsemann is a radical critic and accepts the position that modern New Testament criticism, especially form criticism, demands that we reject everything in the Gospels as unauthentic unless we can find special reasons for authenticating it. But even with this radical criticism there are still certain things that can be established with reasonable certainty about the historical Jesus. These are:

1. The authenticity of the first, second and fourth antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount. These are authentic beyond doubt, and they demonstrate the amazing fact that Jesus claimed to possess an authority far beyond that claimed by any rabbi—an authority equal to an even greater than that of Moses. For a Jew this is a fantastic claim, it is in fact a claim to be the bringer of the messianic Torah, to be the Messiah. "The only category which could fit a person making such a claim is . . . that of Messiah" (p. 145).

2. The freedom which Jesus claims in regard to the Sabbath commandments and the purification laws, and also the authority he claims in dealing with the demoniacs.⁹ These claims of Jesus are authentic history and they establish as historical the astounding sovereignty of Jesus (pp. 145-147).

3. The directness and authority about the teaching of Jesus as he proclaims his knowledge of the will of God. This is something that is totally without parallel in contemporary Judaism. Examples of this are to

⁹ Käsemann accepts the authenticity of the reports of Jesus' power over the demons, which to Bultmann are legendary.

be found in the parables, and in Jesus' remarkable use of "Amen" in introducing his own sayings. "It is beyond doubt that he understood himself to be inspired . . . as an instrument of the living Spirit of God, such as Judaism expected at the time of the End" (p. 148).

4. The fact that Jesus regards himself not simply as a herald of the coming Kingdom of God, but as one whose gospel brings the Kingdom with it. The logion, Matthew 11:12f., is to be accepted as authentic and to be interpreted as meaning that with John the Baptist the old Aeon had ended and with Jesus the new Aeon begun (p. 149). This is in significant contrast to Bultmann, who sees the decisive change of the aeons as taking place between Jesus and Paul, as we have pointed out above.

Käsemann will not argue that it is possible to demonstrate that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah. What it is possible to demonstrate of him is something more in keeping with his attitude, and more characteristic, namely: that he worked and taught in such a way that the community of his followers truly testified to the essential nature of his mission when they responded to his proclamation with their confession of him as Messiah and Son of God (p. 150). The early church has identified the risen Lord of the kerygma with the historical Jesus, and although our knowledge of that Jesus is limited, we can know enough about him to recognize that there is an essential unity between him and the early church's message about him (p. 152).

We can see that Käsemann, while maintaining the emphasis upon the significance of the kerygma for Christian faith, is prepared to see the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Christ of the kerygma in quite a different light than is Bultmann. Moreover he has abandoned Bultmann's view of Jesus as simply an eschatological prophet whose demand for an existential decision of his hearers was God's word to them; he has become convinced that there is enough historical evidence in the New Testament to demonstrate that Jesus acted and taught in such a way that the only possible category in which we can place him is that of Messiah, although it is by no means certain that he made this claim for himself.

III

We turn now to the contribution made to the discussion by Gunther Bornkamm of Heidelberg in his book, *Jesus of Nazareth*, published in the series of Urban Taschenbücher, 1956. He writes with full knowledge of Käsemann's work, which he quotes with approval. Since he deals with all aspects of the New Testament reports about Jesus, we can learn from his

book how much of the New Testament evidence is now accepted by a Bultmann scholar, and how much of the Bultmann skepticism still remains.

The first chapter of the book is a very important discussion of "Faith and History in the Gospel." Bornkamm stresses the fact that the Gospel history of Jesus is always treated and understood from the point of view of the present significance of the events (p. 15). This is to be seen clearly in the records of the words of Jesus. The evangelists are concerned with recording the teaching of Jesus, and they do not take it upon themselves to add their own comments, as happens for example in the rabbinic practice with the records of the teaching of famous rabbis. But, at the same time, there is not the slightest hesitation about additions and modifications of the words themselves, which are designed to bring out the significance of the teaching for the present situation of the evangelists. Words from the earthly Jesus are understood in the light of their significance for the present. Words of the risen Lord which come to the early church through the mouth of inspired prophets are ascribed to the earthly Jesus (p. 17). This is possible only because the early church identifies the earthly and the risen Lord; it understands the kerygma in the light of the history and the history in the light of the kerygma. "Therefore the task set for us is to seek the history in the kerygma and the kerygma in the history" (p. 18). The very fact of writing the Gospels shows that the early church refused to replace the earthly Jesus by a mythical figure, and it also shows something else; it shows that the early Christians identified themselves with the people who came into contact with the earthly Jesus, refusing to abandon the history of Jesus in the interest of an eschatological enthusiasm (p. 21).

For Bornkamm, in approaching the details of what we know about the historical Jesus we can see that he is such that no category in contemporary Judaism can contain him. He is a prophet of the coming Kingdom, but so different from contemporary eschatological prophets as not to belong among them (p. 51). He is a rabbi, but one who teaches with a direct and immediate knowledge of the will of God such as no rabbi possessed or claimed to possess (pp. 51-52, and 90-91). He is possessed of an astonishing sovereignty, especially in dealing with people. In challenging his disciples, in arousing and subduing opposition, in meeting the needs of those who came seeking his help—in all these things he demonstrates his sovereign authority. Despite the critical difficulties about details in these narratives, this aspect of the historical Jesus is clearly authentic (p. 53). Jesus proclaims a coming Kingdom of God, but he also teaches that the Kingdom is present in his own ministry, hidden from some

eyes, but none the less there. In the teaching of Jesus the forgiving of sins, and the entering in of tax-gatherers and sinners, are aspects of the Kingdom of God. In his own ministry he claimed the power to forgive sins (Mark 2:5), and he deliberately entered into table-fellowship with tax-gatherers and sinners. There can be no doubt but that there was a real connection, for him, between these things which he was doing and the Kingdom of God which he was proclaiming (p. 74).

The above are aspects of the New Testament testimony to the historical Jesus which Bornkamm is prepared to regard positively. It can be seen that he has gone a stage further than Käsemann. Käsemann accepts as authentic, evidence concerning the *teaching* of Jesus, and concerning one aspect of his *work*, that of dealing with demoniacs. Bornkamm goes on to other aspects of Jesus' work (especially in his dealings with people) and makes a tentative beginning in regard to the *attitude* of Jesus. He deals with the significance of Jesus' forgiveness of sins and his table-fellowship with publicans and sinners and the relationship of this to the Kingdom. There are three things about the historical Jesus for which the New Testament offers us evidence: his teaching, the things which he said; his works, the things which he did; and his attitude, the things which he believed about himself and his work. Käsemann accepts evidence concerning the first, and makes a beginning on the second; Bornkamm accepts evidence concerning the first and the second, and makes a beginning on the third.

But having said this much about Bornkamm, we must go on to make it clear that there are many things about which he still shares the Bultmann skepticism. He is skeptical of the prophecies of the Passion, regarding them as having been formulated in the light of the church's knowledge of the Cross and Resurrection; he maintains that we cannot know when Jesus began to reckon with the possibility of his own death. He claims that the story of the last week in Jerusalem is so interwoven with legend that we can only be sure of one thing, and that is that Jesus went up to demand a decision in the capital city as he had already done in the provinces (pp. 142-145). For him also, the accounts of the Last Supper have been so influenced by the later ideas and liturgy of the church that we can no longer be sure of the course of events, or of the significance of the meal for Jesus, beyond the fact that it has some connection with the coming Kingdom.¹⁰

With regard to the Messiahship, Bornkamm, like Käsemann, is skepti-

¹⁰ Pages 147-148. This closely parallels Bultmann's position, for, as is well known, in his *Theology of the New Testament*, he does not deal with the Last Supper in connection with Jesus at all, but defers it until he comes to the theology of the Hellenistic church.

cal about the Messianic claims of Jesus. He regards the sayings concerning this as a reflection of the belief of the early church, as does Bultmann. Like Bultmann also, Bornkamm accepts the work of W. Wrede¹¹ as demonstrating that the commands to silence about the Messiahship in Mark are a literary device of the evangelist himself and that the original story of the ministry of Jesus was itself non-messianic. So it is no longer possible to demonstrate that the historical Jesus made messianic claims for himself, indeed it is practically certain that he did not do so. Neither Bultmann, Käsemann nor Bornkamm will listen to a word about the "Messianic Consciousness of Jesus." But although he will not admit that Jesus made any verbal claims to Messiahship, Bornkamm, like Käsemann, and unlike Bultmann, concedes that Jesus claimed Messiahship *in practice*, by the things which he said and did (p. 156).

IV

The third contribution to the discussion which we have to consider is that from Ernst Fuchs of Berlin.¹² This contribution is particularly important because Fuchs is generally regarded as the Bultmann scholar who is most truly following and developing the insights of his teacher; and yet, as we shall see, in this instance he is the one who has departed most widely from him.

Fuchs begins with an exact analysis of the content of Paul's faith in Christ as risen and as Lord, because, as he points out, Paul's faith in Christ antedates by some twenty years the Gospel records (p. 213). He has some very fine things to say about the faith of Paul, and here he demonstrates that he is truly a follower of Bultmann in that he is anxious to express the truths that he reaches in a form that can be preached. He comes to the crucial question, "What has all this to do with the historical Jesus?" (p. 217), and makes once more the point that there is an essential identity between the risen Lord of the kerygma and the historical Jesus.

He then turns to the historical Jesus and begins with a consideration of the parable of the Prodigal Son, which he claims is a parable "of real significance for the proclamation of Jesus, and one which on grounds of method and content we may use in this context, even if it should have been put later into the mouth of Jesus" (p. 218). "The significance of this parable is that it is a defense by Jesus of his own *attitude*" (p. 219). That Fuchs is prepared to speak in this way of the attitude of Jesus is itself a

¹¹ *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*, 1901, II ed., 1913.

¹² "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus," *Z.Th.K.* 53, 1956, pp. 210-223.

most significant step, for it is something which Käsemann does not do at all, and at which Bornkamm makes only a tentative beginning. The attitude of Jesus revealed in this parable is that he "presumed to be able to demonstrate the actual will of God, as if he himself stood in the place of God" (p. 219). This is what led to his crucifixion, that he claimed the right "as a man, without any kind of official religious office, to set himself in the place of God, and to demonstrate in his own attitude that the will of God is a merciful will" (p. 220). When we consider the teaching of Jesus, we must consider it in this context of his own attitude. This attitude of Jesus, that he acted and spoke as if he stood in the place of God, is to be seen in his teaching of the New Law, the messianic Torah which he proclaimed. It is also to be seen in the parables, and in the way in which Jesus deals with sinners as if he had the right to draw them near to himself, so that they need no longer flee from the wrath of God. "Jesus means (by the parable of the Prodigal Son) that as he accepts the repentant sinner mercifully, so also will God do this" (p. 219).

The fact that Jesus demands decision of the people is also an indication of his attitude, for it indicates that he himself has already made a decision. This decision of Jesus is that which he had to make after the death of John the Baptist. As one who was taking up, and developing, the work of John the Baptist, Jesus had to decide what John's death signified for him. The significance of the death of John for Jesus is that, from this moment on, Jesus had to reckon with the possibility of his own suffering and death. This is the consequence of his relationship with God: "Jesus' relationship with God presupposes the possibility of suffering from the very beginning" (p. 224).

The remarkable thing about this contribution by Fuchs is his preparedness to speak of the "attitude" of Jesus, of a decision which Jesus had to make, of the personal significance for him of an event like the death of John. This is the kind of language that the kerygmatic theologians have always been at great pains to avoid, and to find one of the leading members of the school now prepared to speak in these terms shows what a revolution is taking place inside the school itself.

V

The question now is: What does Bultmann himself think of all this? Fortunately he has published a contribution to the discussion¹³ in which he has commented briefly upon the position which Fuchs is now taking.

¹³ "Allgemeine Wahrheiten und christliche Verkündigung," *Z.Th.K.* 54, 1957, pp. 244-254.

In this he makes concessions to the new development. He is prepared, with Fuchs, to see the parable of the Prodigal Son as a defense by Jesus of his own attitude, and to see the attitude of Jesus as reflecting, and making clear, the attitude of God. In this context he is prepared, with Fuchs, to speak of Jesus' consciousness of his mission to proclaim God's word for the last hours. To be prepared now to speak of an attitude of Jesus, and of his consciousness of his mission,¹⁴ are most significant concessions for Bultmann to make. But he refuses to go further and to discuss, with Fuchs, the possibility of the significance of the death of John the Baptist in Jesus' thinking about his own death. To do this would be to enter into a discussion of biographical-psychological aspects of the historical Jesus, and this Bultmann is not prepared to do.

In conclusion we wish to note that these new developments within the *Bultmann* school have very real significance for the world of New Testament studies beyond the confines of that school, and indeed for the general theological world beyond the confines of New Testament studies. The prevailing approach to the historical Jesus has, in recent years, been increasingly limited. The two underlying reasons for this have been: first, a feeling that the radical findings of modern New Testament criticism have very severely limited our knowledge of the historical Jesus; and, second, a tendency to regard the kerygma rather than the historical Jesus as the essential ground of our faith, and, following from that, to regard the historical Jesus as of little or no theological significance. We must emphasize that the Bultmann scholars are still the most radical of New Testament critics. They are, of all scholars, the most inclined to see the influence of the faith and practice of the early church upon the Gospel narratives as we have them. But they are none the less now finding it possible to establish theologically significant things about the historical Jesus. Again, they are, of all scholars, the ones most interested in the kerygma. They are *the* kerygmatic theologians; but they are none the less finding that there is an essential relationship between the historical Jesus and the kerygma. The logic of their own position is driving them to explore this relationship, to approach the historical Jesus in the light of the kerygma, and the kerygma in the light of the historical Jesus.

In the light of these new developments it is of great importance to observe that it is a mistaken notion to think that either radical New Testament criticism or a concern for the kerygma makes it impossible to say anything of theological significance about the historical Jesus. On the contrary, the

¹⁴ The German word is "Sendungsbewusstsein."

essential relationship which the Bultmann school has now discovered between the kerygma and the historical Jesus makes it imperative that theologians should direct their attention to the historical Jesus as a legitimate object of Christian faith and as a first concern of Christian theology. But, needless to say, this must be done, on the one hand, in the knowledge that we can only approach the historical Jesus through what the early church proclaimed about him, and, on the other hand, by taking into account what we find when we approach the Gospel narratives in the light of a rigorously honest and truly scientific criticism.

The Immortality of Man

GERALD KENNEDY

THERE WAS A TIME when it was considered sophisticated to ignore the doctrine of immortality, or to regard it as of merely secondary importance. In the early days of my ministry, it was not unusual to hear it argued that the authority of Christianity in no way depended on a doctrine of a life after death. Those were the days when we talked about an unseemly emphasis on the death of Jesus Christ and a lack of appreciation for his life and teaching.

This attitude, I venture to think, was both shallow and unrealistic. It was little more than a brave whistling in the dark, and when men faced the issues honestly, they knew that to believe or disbelieve in life after death made all the difference in the world. You cannot argue the "quality versus quantity" definition of life with enough cogency to dismiss the significance of death as an ending or a beginning. Whether we like it or not, when the realization hits us that one day we must die like all our fathers before us, we must come to terms with the meaning of our own dying.

It becomes clearer with every decade of New Testament study, that the Resurrection gave authority for the teaching of Jesus. The Gospel writers gave so much attention to this Event, because it was the crucial evidence supporting the claim that Jesus was the Messiah. The good teacher who died for his faith would have had considerable influence on the world, no doubt. But the Savior was one who conquered death and illustrated God's vindication of man's highest striving and final sacrifice. To ignore the Resurrection is to study the human body but ignore the heart.

Now whether a person will believe that it is possible for men to survive death depends on his faith, his primary assumptions, and his experience of God. These are matters which are argued with great force on both sides, and it must be confessed that there are first rate minds in both camps. If

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we grant either side certain presuppositions concerning the relationship between body, mind, and spirit, then we must go along with them to their conclusions. But none of this is very helpful, for where we are willing or able to start depends on a vast number of intangibles. What kind of people are we? What is our religion? What are the reasons of the heart? One man takes off on a path that leads him to a flat denial of the possibility of men living after they die and according to his light, he argues logically. But another man is driven to the opposite conclusion and his reasons shine in the light of his faith. It must be admitted, however, that the latter represents the belief of the overwhelming majority of the race.

We cannot deny, I think, that whether or not we believe in immortality must deeply affect our earthly life. For this doctrine puts life into an entirely different framework and it affects all our judgments on earthly affairs. The man who sees his existence in the light of eternity will certainly think differently and behave differently than the man who assumes that death is the ultimate conclusion. Robert Louis Stevenson said, "To believe in immortality is one thing, but it is first needful to believe in life." That is true, of course, but the two subjects can hardly be separated in actual experience. To believe in life in a certain way demands immortality by the very nature of our belief. And on the other hand, if a man is immortal, then this present life takes on a new dimension.

There has been a growing respect for evidence of survival, particularly of communication between the two worlds. This has been influenced by the careful experimentations in the field of extrasensory perception and a growing recognition that there is much evidence in this realm which cannot be easily dismissed. In spite of some fakery by proponents of spiritualism, there has been a growing recognition of honest investigators in the field. A man like Sherwood Eddy writes a book giving his evidence and experience, and those who have known him are not willing to dismiss what he says as foolishness.

A minister and gifted medium has written his story and it has been published by the reputable firm of Harper & Brothers. Arthur Ford in his *Nothing So Strange* relates experiences that carry conviction because of the people involved. Of course there are failures of communication as well as successes and there are those who try to find other explanations for the phenomena. For me it is difficult to doubt but that honest men believe that they have communicated with those we usually call dead.

Yet in this field, no evidence is really convincing unless it is personal, or if you will, subjective. This is a very interesting phenomenon and it

tells us a great deal about the difference between the nature of evidence for religion and for science. I find little difficulty in believing that the earth goes around the sun, though it certainly looks as if it were the other way around. But I find myself curiously unconvinced when the most brilliant philosopher argues that men will not die. It comforts me that such a great man believes this, but somehow I cannot feel the same assurance as when a scientist describes atomic fission. It is not in the realm of logic that these matters of the spirit are settled, so far as I am concerned.

I have a highly respected friend whom I would trust with my life. He is utterly convinced that he has had a direct word from a mutual friend who died suddenly some few years ago. This man would never lie nor pretend to a knowledge he did not have. Still, because it has never happened to me, I cannot feel the weight of the argument nor can I speak with any authority in this field. This is perhaps only another Thomas refusing to believe until he touches the Lord and sees the evidence of the Crucifixion. Yet I believe, but not for these reasons. This evidence would carry great conviction if it were experienced, but in my case, such a thing has not yet happened.

As a preparation for this paper, I have been reading in the general field during the past months. There came to my attention two volumes written by Anthony Borgia about *Life in the Unseen World*.¹ The books claim to be accounts of death and entrance into the spirit world by Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson, a son of Edward White Benson, former Archbishop of Canterbury. Somehow he is supposed to have managed communication through an earthly friend, and this rather long and involved description of the other world is the result.

Now I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of this story, but it does not persuade me. It might as well be an imaginative novel of life on a lost continent, as indeed I have read several times in days past. But when it comes to things affecting personal destiny, we are saved by personal experience only. We are not the logical, rational machines we would sometimes pretend, and we live by faith.

What I want to do here is to give a testimony of faith, and nothing else. My belief in immortality is rooted in Christianity and it finds its foundation in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. I am aware that a distinction should be made between the Greek doctrine of Immortality and the Christian teaching which is rooted in God's raising of our Lord from the dead. Yet the only thing I am at pains to do here is affirm a belief in eternal

¹ London: Odhams Press, 1954.

life which for me is made inescapable by God's action after the Crucifixion of Christ.

Somewhere I read of a Bible study method developed in Sweden. A leader reads aloud a passage of Scripture to the group, and then each member considers the passage by himself and meditates upon it. Where there is a word or a phrase or a verse that is not clear, the person places a question mark in the margin. The phrase or sentence that begins to throw light on the text has a candle placed opposite it. Finally, the word or verse that strikes the conscience with a demand is marked with an arrow.

There is a sense in which this is the way truth always finds us. First there is the question and the mystery. Slowly it begins to shine in its own light or is illuminated by other facts and experience. Finally it strikes home to our being with a demand for a decision or an adjustment of our thinking. So the Resurrection, this central affirmation of the Christian Faith, comes to us as a question, a candle, an arrow. First of all, then, let us consider the experience as

A QUESTION MARK

We ought not to forget that what drew the women to the tomb on that first Easter morning was not hope but despair. It was not assurance, it was disappointment. In their unhappiness they had to do something and so they decided they could at least anoint with spices the dead body of the one they loved. There was simply nothing else they could do. But they went to the burial place of Jesus with sadness and not with expectancy.

This is the mood that best describes our time. We are in the midst of much confusion. I hesitate to confess that I like to look at Westerns on TV, but a Stanford professor who confessed to a like weakness analyzed the reasons which fit my situation. He said it was a relief to look at a simple world where wrong was black and right was white. Above all, he found it a relief to believe that evil could be destroyed with a six-shooter. I wonder if the great appeal of Westerns is to our unconscious desire for escape from a confusion that becomes at times almost unbearable. We long for a simpler world.

The world seems hopelessly complex. Who has an easy answer to the problems that haunt every waking moment? Where are the plain rules of happiness and who can tell us how to live calmly and wisely? Who is able to find the pattern of nobility in this conglomeration of seemingly unrelated events? Goodness and evil will not separate themselves clearly and a man's destiny seems inextricably interwoven into a dozen designs

not of his choosing. John Wanamaker said, "I know half the money I spend on advertising is wasted, but I can never find out which half." So we would confess that much we do is wasted and unprofitable. But which part is wasted?

Still we cannot accept this confusion as the ultimate condition of life. We cannot believe that this is the inevitable situation. Somewhere there must be a clue and somewhere it must be possible to discover the meaning of it all. One of the mysteries of human life is man's inability to escape forever the sense of meaning in life. As Professor Edwin Conklin, biologist of Princeton University, has said, "The probability of life originating from accident is comparable to the probability of the Unabridged Dictionary resulting from an explosion in a printing shop."

Yet no matter how far we go in our knowledge we merely enlarge the realm of mystery. Each expansion of the light reveals an even greater extension of the darkness. It is true as the nineteenth-century scientist phrased it, that we are at best merely children playing with some shells on the beach while the ocean extends out beyond us in all its vastness. For finally, we are confronted with death. Whatever little success we may have in exploring our environment on the earth, we cannot penetrate beyond our dying with anything like scientific knowledge. So we are forever faced with the question mark.

At a public meeting that was badly out of hand, the room was full of noisy, conflicting voices, all trying to make themselves heard. Finally the chairman rapped sharply with his gavel and called out loudly, "Gentlemen, gentlemen! Please let us keep this confusion orderly." So we cry out for some orderliness in the midst of our confusion. Over our minds as we are confronted with life, there ever looms the question mark of death.

In the second place, the Resurrection experience comes to us as

A CANDLE

The passing centuries make the Event shine with an ever increasing brilliance. It has stood through all the testing of time and cynical attack. The darkness has never been able to put it out.

The Resurrection is an illumination of the nature of God. It reveals him as austere and stern. He is no uncle wanting the young people to have a good time while the parents deal with the more serious matters of training and discipline. He is the Father who puts high demands upon his children because he loves them. There is nothing sentimental about the God who emerges from the shadows into the light of the Resurrection.

The Atonement is not for His sake but for ours. He is no tribal chieftain demanding payment for a broken custom. He is no helpless potentate caught in His own network of legislation. He is the God revealed as love that brings forgiveness and redemption. God stands forth in this light as utterly dependable who will find us in our worst and through suffering brings us to triumph.

John Bunyan, in *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, describes a period of deep personal depression in the year 1652. Suddenly there fell upon his mind a word of hope: "Look at the generations of old, and see: Did ever any trust in the Lord and was confounded?" He says that this greatly lightened his spirit and he searched for the text until he found it finally, in the Apocryphal book of Ecclesiasticus. So the Resurrection has lightened the spirits of men through the ages with this revelation of God's dependability and concern.

Here is light for the understanding of man's nature. We are made for greatness, not for littleness. We are created for fellowship with God, and we are made for eternity. The clue to human nature is not to be found in the jungle ethics of our contemporaries or in the cheap and tawdry behavior of so many of our heroes. It is to be found in Jesus Christ who went to the Cross and was raised on the third day by God.

Man can become an exploiter and a seeker after the main chance. That this is true of many men, cannot be denied by any explorer of his own heart. But what man is meant to be, is best revealed through testimony such as that of Mr. Adlai Stevenson, regarding the missionaries of Africa. This is his tribute:

Anyone who travels there is constantly reminded of their heroism. Missionaries laid a groundwork in religion, health, and education under difficult and dangerous circumstances. What they have done is almost beyond belief. They fought yellow fever, dysentery, parasites. And the gravestones I saw! My God, their gravestones—all through Africa.²

This is human nature at its best and it finds its inspiration in Christ.

In the Resurrection, there is the revelation of life. Our life is not a cheap romance or a silly yarn such as are found on magazine shelves in a bus depot. Since Jesus lived and died, we cannot think of man's life as a mere tale told by some idiot with no more than a passing interest. It is indeed a mighty epic, full of the grandeur of the eternal. It is full of tragedy, nobility, virtue. It is a facing of great issues and a business with God.

² *The Christian Century*, October 9, 1957.

Some time ago, that great counselor of youth, Zsa Zsa Gabor, uttered an oracle on the subject of love. "Marriage," she observed, "does something to a love affair, takes something out of it. There is a piquancy about love—when two people know they can leave one another—that never exists inside the circle of the wedding ring." Halford Luccock commented on this and reminded us of a remark made by John Strachey concerning Winston Churchill's biography of the Duke of Marlborough. Speaking of the life-long devotion of the Duke and his wife to each other, Strachey said, "Such a story of married love makes all the sizzling pictures of Purple Passion, served up on the newsstands, taste like ten cents worth of cold potatoes." Amen!

So much of our modern life tastes like ten cents worth of cold potatoes! So much of the talk we hear sounds dull and wearisome. So much of our glitter lasts but a moment and then the darkness descends more frightening than before. But to every generation, there comes the Easter experience to light a candle of hope and power in the midst of our darkness.

Finally, the Resurrection is

AN ARROW

Which is to say that there is something in it we cannot escape. To treat it as an isolated event we may take or leave, is to misunderstand it completely. It is one of those cosmic happenings which have absolute meaning. If it is true, it has terrible and wonderful implications for each man's life. If it is true, and I try to ignore it, I shall be found by its truth when it is too late. In any case, we are faced on Easter with something inescapable.

In all kindness, we must speak to the people who give it a passing nod once a year. The Easter Sunday Christians, like the poor, we have always with us. Yet their attitude is suicidal and deadly. For, mark you, if the Resurrection is true, then my denying it makes all my life a lie. If it is not true, then as Paul said, "we are of all men most to be pitied" (1 Cor. 15:19). Nothing more for us is left but stoicism and, unfortunately, most of us are not up to that lofty, lonely, comfortless ethic. We have to come to terms with death and what we believe about it. For that is the ultimate experience that casts its influence on every human activity.

What must we do now? What did the women do at the empty tomb? They bore witness to something that changed their lives and formed the basis for eternal hope. They became instruments of a power that overcame the world, even the Christian faith. It was not merely an artificial pumping up of enthusiasm or excitement, but a release of light and energy.

At the decisive naval battle of Trafalgar, a signal was run up on the Admiral's ship just before the ships closed on each other. It read, "England expects every man will do his duty." Collingwood saw the signal and remarked testily, "I wish Nelson would stop signalling, as we all know well enough what we have to do." But the message brought cheers from the ships in his line. Once the arrow of the Resurrection has found us, we do not need to be told what we must do about our living. But every time we think of it, our hearts are lifted up with rejoicing.

At last we commit ourselves to this Event. You see, the only way to make a valid test is to assume, for the time being at least, that the hypothesis is true. This applies to science as well as to religion. We test a thing by acting upon it. Either it works or it does not, but we shall only know after we have ventured forth in faith. This, I take it, is what Paul says to us. We live the truth of the Resurrection and then we find its power! Or as the Fourth Gospel states it, "if any man's will is to do his will, he shall know whether the teaching is from God" (John 7:17). This mighty experience raises us to new life here and now. Until the doctrine of life eternal becomes to us a living reality, it has not fulfilled its meaning.

Facing the wonder and glory of this experience of hope and assurance, we know ourselves to be the recipients of a gift beyond our imagining. We are like the writers who long for publication and finally go to some "vanity press" that they may have their names in a book. Why is this so important? The editor of one such publishing firm sums it up in these words: "Other houses may promise riches . . . we just offer immortality." And that is more important than riches.

When the Question Mark becomes a Candle, and the Candle becomes an Arrow, then the Resurrection experience is complete for us. Then we want to sing in the words of a hymn so popular with great revival crowds across America:

O Lord my God! when I in awesome wonder
Consider all the worlds Thy hands have made,
I see the stars, I hear the rolling thunder,
Thy power throughout the universe displayed,
Then sings my soul, my Savior God, to Thee:
How great Thou art, how great Thou art!³

³ The first verse of the song *How Great Thou Art*, composed by S. K. Hine, is used by special permission of Manna Music, Inc., 1595 Crossroads of the World, Hollywood, California.

Religion and the Arts

"Psychologism": Roadblock to Religious Drama

TOM F. DRIVER

THE THEATER has always been an important battleground in the contest of ideas. In a day when theology is displaying a renewed vigor and a determination to speak relevant words to the culture, it is natural that religious ideas should return to the drama.

At the present time, there is no lack of interest in religious themes among both playwrights and critics. The excitement caused recently by Archibald MacLeish's *J.B.*, in itself an unworthy play, is evidence that religious and philosophic questions can get a hearing on the contemporary stage.

The real hurdles lie in the conventions, assumptions, and ideas playwrights are bringing to their task. Among the more debilitating of these is preoccupation with psychology. It prevents many competent writers from dealing effectively with social, political, philosophical, and theological themes that would be welcomed by audiences haunted with fears of meaninglessness and futility.

The influence of Freudian psychology on the American theater has been documented in a book called *Freud on Broadway*, by W. David Sievers,¹ a comprehensive, if not altogether discriminating, treatment of the subject. Mr. Sievers' thesis is that the American drama is more mature today than it was in 1900 and that the change has come about through the influence of depth psychology.

The question is not whether our theater is better off today than it was half a century ago. No one would wish to go back to the days of Clyde Fitch. Neither is the question one about the extent of the influence of psychology in our theater. The question is whether the contribution of psychological preoccupations is more on the credit or the debit side; whether we have as good a theater in the middle of this century as we ought to

¹ New York: Hermitage House, 1955.

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have; and whether psychology, whatever its contributions at one point, may not now be deflecting our playwrights from more mature concerns.

Three popular successes of the American theater—William Inge, Robert Anderson, and Arthur Laurents—are instructive. I shall approach the subject of "psychologism" in contemporary American drama by commenting upon their work, not because they are our best dramatists, which they are not, but because their successful psychologism seems tailored to a widespread public taste.

I

William Inge made his New York debut in 1950 with a vivid play called *Come Back, Little Sheba*, in which he explored certain broken ideals that nearly destroyed the marriage of a midwestern couple. He spoke of the measure of reconciliation that can come when hopeless illusions are allowed to die. Two years later he brought forth *Picnic*, in which a muscular male was introduced into a group of lonely Kansas women, with predictable anatomical and emotional results. Next came *Bus Stop*, in which various lonely people, snow-bound in a roadside cafe, found love of one kind or another.

The most recent Inge play is *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs*, often said to be his best.² It represents the concerns of four members of a family near Oklahoma City in the 1920's: the father, a blustery ex-rancher turned harness salesman; the patient, appealing mother; and the teen-age daughter and younger son, who carry much of the weight of the play. Also present are the mother's sister, a withdrawn brother-in-law, a homeless, lost, Jewish blind date for the daughter, and a girl next door who is fast developing into a flapper.

In Mr. Inge's terms, the "dark at the top of the stairs" is that body of unknown fears one must face as he becomes an adult. Although Inge looks at that dark primarily through the eyes of children, his more interesting statement is that grown-ups continue to face it. Says Rubin Flood, the father: "My gosh, how'm I goin' to tell *them* anything about the world when it looks just as confused to me as it does to them?" One after another, the various characters discover that their own troubles, which naturally tend to preoccupy them, are not the only ones at hand. In the final rounding out of things, Mr. Inge's secular play might seem to combine those two apparently contradictory sayings of St. Paul: "Let each one bear his own burden," and "Bear ye one another's burdens." In one

² As this is written (September, 1959) a new Inge play is expected: *A Loss of Roses*.

sense, *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs* is a play of confession and reconciliation, in secular terms.

To speak in this manner, however, is to carve a semi-Christian homily from the non-Christian or sub-Christian tissue of the play. According to the box-office principle that a play should have something for everyone, there is reason to believe that Mr. Inge has expected this from a certain serious-minded segment of his audience, who, in lecture hall and pulpit, are likely to give the play the dignity of being a contribution to the public welfare. Indeed Dr. B. Davie Napier, Professor of Old Testament Criticism and Interpretation at Yale University Divinity School, wrote a celebrated sermon in which he held that *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs* was "a play of human redemption in terms analogous to the Christian gospel."³ He communicated his views to William Inge, who replied: "I want so much for people to see in the play what you did. . . . As a writer, I work always with a dim consciousness of my deeper meanings, but I had felt some theological import to the play."⁴

So great is the allure of William Inge's work for the moral appetite of a slightly sophisticated culture that, even before Professor Napier's sermon was published, The Reverend Sidney Lanier felt it necessary to warn Christian clergy against confusing the message of Inge with the New Testament message of reconciliation. He described accurately the play's basic outlook:

It is the world as seen by Sigmund Freud, or at least his disciples. It is in this sense a religious play; the religion is one which Mr. Inge and Mr. Kazan share: Latter-Day Freudianity. . . . it is very important that we recognize the "realism" of the play bears within itself the didache, if not the dogma, of a vigorous upper-class religion.⁵

It is possible to identify the basic tenets of the Freudianity mentioned by Mr. Lanier and dramatized in *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs*: (1) the Oedipal situation is the most important aspect of human nature; (2) the ills of mature life are the result of childhood experiences; (3) there is no satisfactory adult life without sexual fulfillment and, conversely, sexual fulfillment is the hallmark of satisfactory adult life; (4) the proper and sufficient attitude toward all defects in human behavior is acceptance. Such ideas are not, of course, authentic Freud. They are what pass for

³ "The Problem of the Dark," *The Pulpit*, November, 1958, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Christianity and Crisis*, XVII.6 (April 14, 1958), 51-52. For a critique of the psychological orientation in Inge, see Robert Brustein, "The Men-taming Women of William Inge," *Harpers' Magazine*, November, 1958, pp. 52-57.

Freud in some circles. In short, "Freudianity." They are an example of what may be called psychologism in the American theater.

It is hardly necessary to document the appearance of Freudianity in the other plays of William Inge. *Picnic* and *Bus Stop* concentrate primarily on tenet (3), with the result that they are less complex and less interesting than *Come Back, Little Sheba* and *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs*, which include all four. Nevertheless, when you have mentioned these basic notions you have exhausted the intellectual content of the Inge play. He is a superior craftsman. The observation of detail is competent, and there is an unusual ability to write scenes which seem entirely casual while they are actually performing the playwright's function of exposition and development. The temptation, therefore, is to hail Mr. Inge as a dramatist of American ways, a realist who can paint accurately the picture of mid-western life, without pausing to ask whether the "realism" is not in fact an *apologia* for a particular view of the nature of man.

The paying customer at *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs* is likely to feel, because of the technical skill of playwright, director, and cast, that he has had his money's worth. Yet there lingers in some minds the question whether all that ability has not, in the last analysis, been spent upon a kind of theater which, under the guise of seriousness, actually prevents our asking the most serious questions of all—those questions which have to do, not with what life looks or feels like, but with what it means and what it requires.

II

Robert Anderson's *Tea and Sympathy* includes certain motifs which seem at first to lift it out of the purely psychological realm. Tom Lee, a student in a prep school, is falsely accused of homosexual tendencies: since the accusations are false, enter the problem of justice. One of the accusers, the headmaster of the school, is covering up his own homosexual tendencies: enter the theme of hypocrisy. Most important of all, the headmaster's wife Laura gives herself to Tom for the purpose of establishing his masculinity: enter the question of self-sacrifice and the necessity to be involved in the needs of others even at cost to oneself. A play in which questions of justice, hypocrisy, and self-sacrifice are raised would seem to be pertinent to human problems broader than the merely psychological.

There is no doubt that these strains are present in the play and that they did much to account for the high esteem in which the play was held by critics and audiences. What must be asked, however, is whether these questions were what gave the play its essential quality and, if so, why Mr.

Anderson felt obliged to get at them by taking the psychological way around. If Mr. Anderson was really interested in presenting a dramatic action which had to do with justice, hypocrisy, and self-sacrifice, was it then necessary that we be given so much detail about the psychological development of Tom, Laura, and her husband? If the moral questions were paramount, did we need to know so intimately the inner struggles of Tom and the psychological conflicts within Laura? Would it not have been more to the point to show the conflict of Laura on the level of moral or ethical deliberation rather than to rely solely upon one final speech in which she asks him in later years to consider her act and to "be kind"?

Most of the psychological detail given in *Tea and Sympathy* would have been unnecessary if (a) the moral questions were indeed paramount, or if (b) our theater did not consider psychological detail to be indispensable in the creation of "realistic" character and situation. It is one of the weaknesses of the play that the author seems never to have made up his mind whether he was primarily interested in the psychological mechanisms of his characters, that is, in understanding them according to psychological theory, or whether he was writing a play in which a school community's assumptions about justice, hypocrisy, and self-sacrifice were to be examined. The result is that the moral level of the play is never fully realized. It is there only to please those who must take home a "lesson" from the theater. The romantic atmosphere of the play, emphasized by Elia Kazan's directing, swept the moral questions and answers before it, so that in the end the audience was made to acquiesce in the virtue and wisdom of Laura's act without ever having examined the reasons for doing so. It is interesting to speculate on the number of defenses of Laura's adultery that have been made by moralists because the dim lights and soft voices of the last scene, toward which the whole dramatic creation moved, proved too subtle an adversary for the critical intellect.

Nathan A. Scott, Jr., has suggested that this psychological play is without psychological profundity.⁶ How, he asks, does Laura know that Tom is not really homosexual? How does she know that one sexual encounter with her will cure him of his fears? What are the complexities of her own personality which enter into her decision to make the final gesture? The point here is that a genuine exploration of the moral issues involved in the situation would have required a more penetrating psychological study than has actually been made. But in that case, the psychological searching would have been undertaken in the service of the moral explora-

⁶ *Christianity and Crisis*, XVI.19 (November 12, 1956), 156.

tion, to give it rigor, realism, and point. As it is, the psychological profundity is no greater than is necessary to satisfy the audience's smattering of insights, and the moral dimension is there only to seem to round out the picture. In other words, *Tea and Sympathy* includes no genuine moral exploration at all and only such psychological detail as will answer to the contemporary audience's idea of realism. The play is actually a piece of fantasy, the romantic adolescent mood being its entire *raison d'être*.

III

In his first Broadway play, *Home of the Brave* (1945), Arthur Laurents showed some success in relating public and psychological themes. The play had trenchant things to say about relations between Jews and Gentiles in America revealed in wartime experiences. Along the way it made good use of the psychological understanding of character development. Such knowledge was everywhere brought to bear upon the social problems which were the primary concern.

Mr. Laurents has subsequently moved away from social questions. The psychological element in his writing comes more and more to the fore.⁷ This change is probably symptomatic of a shift in public sensitivity between 1945 and 1959. Issues of social responsibility and collective action are much less sharply focused today than they were in the thirties and forties. In a time of prosperity, while the tedious maneuvers of the cold war are being carried on by the diplomats, there is leisure for introspection and reason to ask what makes the individual tick.

The Time of the Cuckoo (1952) was transitional. Mr. Laurents took a look at the sexual mores of certain Americans and Italians whom he brought together in post-war Venice. While he did raise some questions about the relative values of American Puritan and Italian Catholic attitudes toward love and courtship, he was interested primarily in exploring the personality of Leona Samish, his American spinster heroine. In his most recent straight play, *A Clearing in the Woods* (1956), Mr. Laurents resolutely removed every concern *except* the psychological. The play is frankly the dramatization of an individual's search for self-identity, a case study in which everything is seen through the heroine's eyes and nothing is known of her except what is relevant to her psychoanalysis. The clearing sought for in the woods, and finally attained, is her state of inner peace. The play might be regarded as a signal example of the ultimate condition the psychological theater may achieve: absolute concentration upon

⁷ Mr. Laurents' book for the musical, *West Side Story*, is an exception, but not his book for *Gypsy*.

one character alone, and absolute rejection of any concerns or perspectives which psychoanalysis does not include. Perhaps only in a day of such theatrical thrashing about as ours could it have been imagined that the subjective consciousness of an unknown individual might form the basis of a drama.

IV

Why should "psychologism" have a baleful effect in the theater?

The question requires answering in two ways. First, there are the baleful effects which psychologism has *outside* the theater, inherent limitations in popular psychological views of man. The theater intensifies these and shows them in a revealing light. Second, there are those problems peculiar to the art of drama that arise when the psychological view of man is applied to playwriting. I will mention four points in each category.

1. Wherever it holds scientific ambitions, psychology assumes that a cause-and-effect explanation of human behavior and thought is possible. As a working hypothesis for a natural science, there can be no objection to this. But when it becomes the basis of a comprehensive view of man, one must immediately object that human actions are being robbed of their intrinsic meaning. The idea of deliberative human action is being subsumed under the idea of natural phenomena capable of explanation and prediction. The threat to the meaningfulness of human actions is then posed in a very acute way.

When the cause-and-effect attitude to human behavior is carried over into playwriting, it becomes a convenient means of dodging the question of *what* man is doing, since it concentrates on the question *why*. W. David Sievers, in the book referred to, feels that the dramatist ought to ask *why*. He refers to this interest as motivationism, and he distinguishes this motivationism, in the drama, from realism. The latter, he says, asked the question *what*.

Actually, however, theatrical realism also was an attempt to ask *why*. Emile Zola's famous remarks in the preface to *Thérèse Raquin* show clearly that the realism he wanted was that of "experimental science," exploring the causes which lie behind observable phenomena. In other words, why do people behave the way they do? Zola's realism sought the answer by "taking into account all circumstances, environment, and 'organic cases.'" ⁸ Psychology seeks it by searching the character's unconscious.

Psychology, or "motivationism," is the recent heir of the realism that

⁸ "Preface to *Thérèse Raquin*," in *European Theories of the Drama*, ed. Barrett H. Clark. New York: Crown Publishers, rev. ed. 1947, p. 400.

came into the theater with the help of Zola and Antoine, and it has the same goal of observing phenomena with detachment in order to explain their causes. The realistic theater has turned into a psychological theater, but it has not thereby come any closer to dealing with man as a being whose actions are intrinsically meaningful.

2. As a result of the cause-and-effect hypothesis concerning human behavior, psychology contradicts the human experience of freedom. It is not possible, as everyone knows, to build arguments in proof of freedom. Philosophy has debated the point endlessly with no conclusion. Samuel Johnson may be regarded as having said the ultimate word on the subject when he declared that all *thought* is for determinism, all *experience* against it. In this sense, deterministic psychology represents the triumph of thought over experience.

In the theater, the critical issue is not whether human freedom may be proven, but rather whether the theater will remain capable of exhibiting man in his *experience* of freedom. Zola's kind of theatrical realism tended to make the environment responsible for man's behavior. Psychology, at least the kind most influential in the theater, makes the past responsible. The past, at any given moment, is not within a man's control and so lies outside his area of responsibility. In Greek drama, also, emphasis on the decisiveness of the past was corollary to the denial of freedom. But the Greeks did not suppose that destiny, or *moira*, was a scientific fact, the discovery of which yielded the clue to the human problem. Rather, the Greek understood himself as inwardly free even if *moira* held him externally captive, and he then stood up to his fate, as we say, and achieved dignity in the doing of it. The modern psychological view of man, through the insult of explaining him, robs him even of the capacity to fight back.

3. If psychologism destroys human dignity by eliminating freedom, it also removes the stark pessimism of much of our tradition by its assumption that knowledge is power. The aberrations of men and institutions are understood to be correctible. Man and society may be perfectly adjusted to one another if only enough psychological and sociological knowledge is obtained. Freud himself, of course, was extremely pessimistic on this score, especially in his later writings; but there are few today who follow him in that regard. Psychologism reinforces, in the popular mind, the naive belief in the perfectibility of man. There is no evidence in man's moral and political history, however, to support such a belief. It can only be held in spite of the facts.

4. Psychologism tends to remove the question of good and evil. What is explainable as the result of an antecedent cause is neither good nor evil in itself but simply a fact that may or may not be altered. Thus there grows up the cult of acceptance, in which, since all is accepted and nothing rejected, all values disappear except the value of psychological understanding, which is taken for granted.

V

When the psychological view of man is applied to playwriting, serious problems arise. Some of these have been mentioned already, since they are clear instances of those limitations inherent in psychological views. There remain, however, special problems which psychologism poses for the theater.

1. Psychological theory tends to dull the playwright's powers of observation. Any theory about reality inhibits direct observation once its original insights have become cliché. That has now happened with psychological theory. To tell us that the hero is incapable of love because no one cared for him as a child (as John Osborne does, for instance, in *Look Back in Anger*, and as even the television westerns have begun to do) no longer represents an insight into character but is merely the repetition of a current notion about personality development. It would be better for the psychologist to base his theory upon the work of the playwright than for the playwright to base his art upon the theory of the psychologist.

2. Psychologism teaches the audience that its goal is to understand character psychologically. This leads the playwright to assume that if he has explained his character he has written a play. A failure of the 1957-58 season afforded an unusually clear illustration of the pitfall. In Ira Levin's *Interlock*, Act I introduced a rich widow who offered to befriend a struggling pianist. Act II revealed that her apparent altruism was in fact a front for a villainous personality which wanted to smother the pianist's talent. Act III brought things to a close by explaining how the woman got to be the way she was. At the very point where something should have been *done* something was *explained*. Had the play been skillfully handled the audience might have been enlightened as to the psychological development of an individual, but even at that it would not have witnessed a dramatic action.

If the audience does come to feel that it understands a character psychologically, it feels superior to the character. This is one reason modern dramatic characters are so lacking in stature and move the audience only to pity, rarely to fear.

3. Psychologism in the theater is the result of, and fosters anew, the misconception that character is more important in drama than action. It was a typical error of the nineteenth century to assume that a play is to be read primarily in terms of character. Aristotle had been wiser when he mentioned in the *Poetics* what surely must have been obvious to all, that a play might conceivably exist without character but could not without action.

A dramatic situation requires not that we should *understand* a character but simply that we should *believe* in him. Dramatic action requires that something shall happen to and through the characters; something that is embodied in the events of which the characters are a part. Action transcends character. It is therefore a reduction of the dramatic field, and a narrowing, when psychologism places in the center of the stage the personality of the character rather than the action of which the character should be a part.

4. As a corollary of its emphasis on character rather than action, psychologism in the theater tends to eliminate from drama the presentation of what we may call a public, as opposed to a private, world.

Dramatic action, since it transcends each individual who is a part of it, presupposes an objective world common to all its participants, a world in which events, historical occurrences, ideas and the life of community are real and decisive. The idea of dramatic action implies a theater of action, and in all cases where the action is not reduced to psychological conflict, the theater of action is a public or communal world, be it the family, the nation, the cosmos, or what-have-you.

When the Ibsenite brand of realism in the theater began to give way to the Freudian, a public arena began to yield to a private one. We do not need to call for a return to Ibsenism in order to be able to observe that the private arena is not as rewarding theatrically as the public one. The great contribution which Ibsen, Shaw, and others made to the drama was to rescue it from the social irrelevance into which it had fallen during most of the nineteenth century. It is this, far more than Freudian psychology, which accounts for the growth toward maturity American playwriting has known since 1900. The danger today is that through the overgrowth of psychology in the theater the sense of the public arena may be choked out. Such a sense, if by some miracle it survived, would not necessarily be expressed today in terms of what are called "social questions" of the Ibsen order. Ibsen, after all, held only one among many possible notions of a "public world" and his was by no means the most comprehensive. What

is required can be expressed simply as the awareness that man's existence belongs primarily to an arena more objective and more comprehensive than the psychological.

Because the focus of psychology is on the individual (at least that is true of the most influential psychology up to this time) and because its criterion of health is adjustment, it encourages no principle of social critique. It could not take seriously a rottenness in the state of Denmark, but would have to concentrate on the disease of the prince himself. Lawrence Olivier's *Hamlet* film, so greatly indebted to Ernest Jones' *Hamlet and Oedipus*, gave the impression that Elsinore existed without relation to any life outside her walls. The story became that of "a man who could not make up his mind."

Politics, history, philosophy, religion, and intellectual ideas in general receive short shrift in the psychological theater. Such subjects require that one be concerned about a public community, one in which traditions are received and transformed by the active participation of an individual whose concerns are, to a significant degree, objective and whose contribution is more than mere adjustment. The psychological theater puts such things aside, eliminating them absolutely, as in *A Clearing in the Woods*, or making them mere background, as in all the plays of William Inge.

VI

Psychologism has been one of the primary factors in reducing much modern drama to the representation of pathos. It was enough that, since the Renaissance, the democratic and industrial revolutions had combined to rob the dramatic protagonist of his social stature, and that economic theories had made him the victim of impersonal forces; but these were as nothing compared to the last indignity, whereby his very consciousness was made suspect, first by the scientists, and then by playwrights who forgot the difference between science and art. The patient himself somehow managed to survive this radical treatment, but since his capacity for choice and purposeful action was paralyzed he was left contemplating his insecurities. Meanwhile the true victim was dramatic action itself—action in a public world of which the protagonist had once been a part.

Many have argued that the qualities of contemporary playwrighting to which objection is here made are but reflections of the era into which we have come, a time which does not know the ancient orders of Church, Class or Reason, and which is therefore thrown into acute individualism and subjectivity, conditions in which psychological interest thrives. The

argument is cogent, the only fault being that it is usually overstated. Objective concern with a public world still exists in the modern world. It was there in Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, Shaw, O'Neill, and Pirandello, in the expressionist theater, in American social drama of the thirties and in the Federal Theater Project. It is visible again in the plays of Eliot, Beckett, Greene, Duerenmatt, Ionesco, Brecht, de Ghelderode, and many others. Psychology was welcomed into the theater not primarily as a substitute for lost social and intellectual orders but rather because it was assumed falsely to be the new realism.

Any objection to the role of psychology in our theater would, of course, be ill-founded if it asked for retrenchment to a hypothetical pre-Freudian existence. There is no possibility of our looking at man again without some degree of psychoanalytic prejudice, at least until the Freudian theories have exhausted themselves or been overthrown by someone as revolutionary as Freud himself. The ideas of the repressed unconscious, the driving force of the libido, the struggle between id, ego, and super-ego are with us to stay. The issue now at stake is whether the arts, and particularly the theater, shall allow these ideas to dominate their work and to blind them to insights which are older and more valuable to the artist.

There is no doubt that psychology is currently box office. Norris Houghton has told of his experience with the Coxe and Chapman dramatization of *Billy Budd*. Seventeen producers refused it, on the ground that since it was told from a moral rather than a psychological perspective, it would not succeed. When it reached Broadway the box office judgment of the seventeen producers was vindicated.

It is not to the box office, however, that one must look for sound judgments as to what is good for the theater in long-range terms. It is better to examine closely those traces of dissatisfaction and ennui which appear when we reflect on our attendance at the most successful products in our theater. The distinctively theatrical element so often lacking is the presentation of a responsible character capable of helping to shape an objectively significant dramatic action. In spite of all the pathos of our time, the sense of ourselves as responsible agents is not dead, nor can the theater long afford to act as if it were.

Worship in the Psalter

LAWRENCE E. TOOMBS

BIBLICAL FAITH INVOLVES the conviction that the life of man and the life of God may touch upon one another, and that in this contact the human being is given powers which he could otherwise never possess, and enabled to realize to the full the potentialities which are latent in his nature. In the act of worship this possibility may become reality, and consequently, worship is not an optional activity of the church, but a means of grace by which God carries on his transforming activity in the lives of those who worship. It is, therefore, a deficiency, which can without exaggeration be called a tragedy, when worship loses its grip on reality, and becomes an otherworldly thing without relevance to the practical conduct of life.

The Hebrew Psalter, that amazing deposit of the spiritual struggles and deep worship experiences of many generations, remains the surest safeguard against the separation between worship and life. The Israelite did come aside from his ordinary life to worship in the Temple, but he did not make the mistake of leaving his personality at the door to be picked up unaffected when the service was at an end. His most active, and often his most mundane, concerns came with him into the sanctuary, so that the words of his Psalms were shaped by the experiences of the world from which he came and by the desires and hopes of his heart. From the perspective of the Psalter *worship is life, examined in the presence of God, and interpreted by him in relation to his deeds and purposes.*

THE BASIC MOODS OF WORSHIP

Herman Gunkel's pioneer work in applying the principles of form criticism to Old Testament research has produced many fruitful and stimulating results, not the least influential of which has been his analysis of the literary types found in the Psalter.¹ Gunkel intended his classification to be an objective literary analysis, based solely on structure and affected as little as possible by the theological content of the Psalms. In this aim he

¹ The analysis is found in Gunkel's *Einleitung in die Psalmen*, where references to its author's other studies may be found.

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was not wholly successful because of the nature of the material with which he was dealing. The Hebrew poet was not bound by firm rules of meter and line length analogous to those which apply, for example, to the sonnet. His art was of a more flexible kind, responsive to the subject matter and especially to the mood which the poet was attempting to capture. Gunkel's classification of Psalm types is, therefore, more than the bare bones of a poetic form. It reflects what the psalmists considered to be the basic moods of worship; those facets of human nature which must find expression when the worshiper brings himself into the presence of God.

When the literary analysis of the Psalms is looked at from this point of view it is clear that underlying the hymns, laments, royal psalms, thanksgiving songs, songs of pilgrimage and so on, which make up the *Gattungen* of the Psalter, four basic themes continually recur, and by their presence dictate the language, metaphor, and literary form of the psalm. These are praise, lamentation, confidence, and thanksgiving. Sometimes the themes appear singly, the whole psalm being dominated by praise or thanksgiving; sometimes two or more of them are interwoven, or appear antiphonally in the psalm; sometimes all four are built up together into a complex pattern. The conclusion seems inescapable that the psalmists felt capable of expressing the entire worship experience in terms of these four moods alone.

If the question is asked why the psalmists made praise, lamentation, confidence, and thanksgiving the foci of their poetry, the answer must be that for them these were the theologically crucial moods of life itself. It is because they are vitally important in life that the psalmists fixed upon them as central in worship. In the offering of these themes, as it were sacrificially, in the presence of God, worship has a healing and purifying effect on the whole of life. Thus the Psalter speaks of "the sacrifice of praise," and "the sacrifice of thanksgiving," and makes the worshiper aware that the most acceptable of all sacrifices is "a broken spirit" and "a contrite heart." The moods of worship are also the moods of life.

THE MOOD OF PRAISE

The only mood of worship capable of standing by itself either from a literary or from a theological point of view is praise. There are psalms which are nothing but praise, into which none of the other moods enter.² But praise stands at the beginning of many psalms which otherwise display

² This is Gunkel's "Hymn Type" (*Hymnus*), of which representative examples are Psalms 33, 65, 96, 103, 135, 147.

a somber mood of questioning and doubt. This contrast is strikingly expressed in the opening lines of Psalm 73.

Truly God is good to the upright,
to those who are pure in heart.
But as for me, my feet had almost stumbled
my steps had well nigh slipped.

Praise is as appropriate for the end of a psalm as for its beginning. Each of the five books of the Psalter closes with a doxology, and many individual psalms say their final word in a mood of praise. To cite only one example, Psalm 22, which opens with the cry of dereliction, rises near the close to a powerful affirmation of faith.

All the ends of the earth shall remember
and turn to the Lord;
And the families of the nations
shall worship before him.
For dominion belongs to the Lord,
and he rules over the nations. (27, 28)

To represent the psalms as beginning and ending with praise, but as in the main concerned with other matters, would be to do them less than justice. Even in their darkest moments praise was never far from the lips of the psalmists. The psalms of lamentation often have a peculiar undulating rhythm, swaying pendulum-like between the extremes of despair and praise.

Yea, I hear the whispering of many—
terror on every side!—
as they scheme together against me,
as they plot to take my life.

But I trust in thee, O Lord,
I say, "Thou art my God."
My times are in thy hand. (Psa. 31:13, 14)

The psalms of confidence and thanksgiving are so closely akin in content and language to the psalms of praise that they are in reality modified hymn forms.

This ubiquitous quality of praise in the psalter indicates that it is not one mood of worship among many, but the normative mood, which runs like a basic harmony through the entire structure of worship, and is never completely submerged by sorrow or despair. The psalmists' prayers for release from persecution or trouble are not motivated by a desire for personal ease or comfort, but by the desire that the lost mood of praise may be renewed.

Why go I mourning
 because of the oppression of the enemy?
 Oh send out thy light and thy truth;
 let them lead me,
 let them bring me to thy holy hill
 and to thy dwelling!
 Then will I go to the altar of God,
 to God my exceeding joy;
 and I will praise thee with the lyre,
 O God, my God. (Psa. 43:2, 3)

When the mood of praise returns it reappears transmuted and triumphant as thanksgiving.

The primacy and pervasiveness of praise in Old Testament worship comes from the conviction that praise is the basic mood of life, as well as of worship. If there were no barriers between man and God, and if the life-giving communion between the Creator and the creature could be sustained unbroken, all of life would be an act of pure praise. To catch the vision of a God worthy to be praised is to see the possibility of a new order of life in which praise is a continuing quality present in every moment of existence as the heaven is everywhere present in the bread. It is life with this added dimension of praise of which the twenty-third psalm speaks:

Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me
 all the days of my life,
 and I shall dwell in the house of the Lord
 for ever. (v. 6)

One of modern man's most genuine needs is to realize his ability to praise. The production and maintenance of our multiplied physical possessions, the speed and complexity of twentieth-century life, and the necessity to concentrate sharply on the material data of existence tend to make worship problem-centered and self-centered—easily self-conscious, but God-conscious only with difficulty. Yet man, as the Bible understands his nature, was not made to live forever with his nose in the dirt, seeing only the physical environment in which the accidents of birth and geography have placed him. If we are members of the people of God, as well as of the human race, we must be able to lift up our eyes, and see who has created these things. Praise is this lifting up of the eyes, the appropriation to oneself of a vertical dimension which confers new meaning on the events that take place on the dead level of our natural existence. To purvey a form of worship which is not suffused with praise in every part is to deprive the worshipers of a unique opportunity to enter this emancipating experience,

and is, therefore, an offence against the human personality, as well as the violation of a peculiar responsibility which has been given to the church.

THE MOOD OF LAMENTATION

In view of what has been said about the primacy of praise in worship it is surprising to discover that the largest block of poems in the Psalter does not consist of psalms of praise, but of lamentation.³ Israel suffered much in her troubled history from the tyranny of her own rulers and by the sword of foreign conquerors, and the Jew was often required to suffer for his faith. While this fact provides an historical explanation for the frequency of the mood of lamentation in the Psalter, it does not account for the direction which the Hebrew lamentations take. A theological factor is at work alongside the historical. As a mood of worship lamentation represents a radical breakdown of the mood of praise, and, therefore, it deals with the most serious spiritual problem posed by the religious life—the sense of isolation from God.

It would be possible by a feigned piety, not far removed from hypocrisy, to act as if the mood of praise were being sustained when in fact it is not, or to condemn as irreligious the failure to maintain it unbroken. The psalmists, however, knew that life cannot always be lived on the heights. It must descend into the valleys, even on occasion into the valley of the shadow of death. In these valleys the great issues of life are raised, faced, and settled, and there the qualities of manhood are tested. Sickness and natural disaster, religious persecution, the malicious attacks of personal enemies and the subjugation of the land by foreign conquerors brought their unhappy consequences to Israel, as they have done to every other nation in history.

In Israel as elsewhere these experiences produced a literature of lamentation. But in Israel the lamentation rose above complaint against human cruelty or the perverseness of a blind or hostile fate, and called into question the sovereignty of God, and his concern for the nation which he had bound in covenant to himself. The sense of urgency is imposed on the Hebrew less by the pressure of the enemy against him than by the feeling that in his extremity he is cut off from the power, love, and mercy of God. The kind of question which the psalmists ask in the bitterness of their suffering shows this to be the case.

³ This, too, is a separate type for Gunkel (*Klagelieder*), which he divides into two classes, "Laments of the Individual" and "Laments of the Community." Representatives of the type are 44, 80, 7, 22, 36, 51, 74, 86, 130.

My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?
Why art thou so far from helping me,
from the words of my groaning? (Psa. 22:1)

Rouse thyself! Why sleepest thou, O Lord?
Awake! Do not cast us off for ever.
Why dost thou hide thy face? (Psa. 44:23, 24)

Has God forgotten to be gracious?
Has he in anger shut up his compassion? (Psa. 77:9)

The penitential psalms disclose a barrier between God and man which breaks up the mood of praise and turns it into lamentation at a deeper level than natural disaster or political oppression. Sin is hated, feared, and condemned, not so much because it disturbs the human personality and makes the individual maladjusted and mentally ill, or because it works hardship on others, or even because it offends God; but, primarily, because it comes between the need of man and the grace of God, and leaves the human being ultimately and tragically alone. The writer of the fifty-first psalm expresses his dread of the isolation from God which his sin has produced in the words, "Take not thy holy spirit from me" (v. 11).

Removal of the sense of separation from God which suffering of any kind so often carries with it is one of the deepest rooted needs of human nature. The scope and reality of the need are powerfully revealed in the book of Job. The metaphysical problem of the origin of human suffering is not so central in this book as the crushing realization of being isolated from God which Job endured as a result of his affliction. The way to a resolution is opened when Job appeals his case to God and hears the divine word directed personally to him. To forget the Jobs among the worshiping people, and to deny them the opportunity in worship of presenting their own trials before God, is to place them under the peril of lives permanently scarred by embitterment and self-pity which might have come victorious out of pain.

The failure of worship to grapple with the reality of sin is still more serious. The weight of guilt, unconfessed and unforgiven, remains in spite of the devices of logic which seek to explain it away and the tricks of terminology which deal with sin by calling it something else. It is a weight not easily carried, and one which the human being characteristically tries to thrust from himself and fasten on his neighbors or on his environment. When the fundamental relationship—that of man to God—is disrupted, all other relationships become distorted and ugly. As G. K. Chesterton

saw, sin poisons, not only man's inner being, but the external world in which he must live.

He sayeth, "I have no sin; I cast the stone,"
And throws his little pebble at the shrine,
Casts sin and stone away against the house
Whose health has turned earth's waters into wine.
The venom of that repudiated guilt
Poisons the sea and every natural flood
As once a wavering tyrant washed his hands,
And touching, turned the waters black with blood.⁴

The healing ministry of the church goes on in many ways in the pastor's counseling with his people, but it should not be forgotten that healing also takes place in the service of worship when the mood of lamentation is allowed to bring the power of God to bear on the need of men.

THE MOOD OF CONFIDENCE

A strong current of praise runs not far beneath the surface of the most intense lamentation, and, when it comes to open expression, it does so in the mood of confidence. Confidence is, therefore, never an independent theme in worship.⁵ Its themes are the same as the themes of praise, with the difference that they have their psychological setting in sorrow, rather than in joy. The seventy-fourth psalm portrays the despair of one who saw the desecration of the Temple and the enemy "roaring in the midst of the holy place."

How long, O God, is the foe to scoff?
Is the enemy to revile thy name for ever?
Why dost thou hold back thy hand,
why dost thou keep thy right hand in thy bosom? (vv. 10, 11)

Precisely at this extremity the mood of confidence asserts itself in the form of a vivid recollection of God's saving activity in the past.

Yet God is my king from of old,
working salvation in the midst of the earth. (v. 12)

Because they rejected every man-made and man-controlled instrument or institution as a ground for confidence, the psalmists were thrust back on the character and activity of God as the only sure ground of hope. One does not fully realize the degree of distortion involved in representing the

⁴ Lines from "The Modern Manichee," by G. K. Chesterton. Used by permission of Miss D. E. Collins and A. P. Watt & Son, London, England.

⁵ The dependent nature of confidence as a theme in worship is seen in Gunkel's classification where he does not recognize confidence as a special psalm type, but as a feature of many Lamentation Psalms. He calls it *die Gewissheit der Erhörung* (the certainty of a hearing).

God of the Old Testament as a wrathful and vindictive judge until he reads the psalms of confidence. Out of the wealth of poetic language with which the psalmists invest the theme, two words, descriptive of God's character, are repeated so often as to make it clear that they are the foundation stones on which the psalmists' confidence rests. They are "steadfast love" and "mercy." Psalm sixty-nine gives a fair representation of the impact which these words make when they occur in the context of confidence.

Let not the flood sweep over me,
or the deep swallow me up,
or the pit close its mouth over me.
Answer me, O Lord, for thy steadfast love is good;
According to thy abundant mercy, turn to me. (vv. 15, 16)

The steadfast love (or, as the King James Version renders it, loving-kindness) and the mercy of God, to which the mood of confidence makes its appeal, were illustrated and demonstrated for the Hebrew in God's historic dealings with Israel, and particularly in the events which formed the heart of Israelite faith—the exodus from Egypt, the covenant at Sinai, and the occupation of the land of Canaan. That God broke the power of the slave masters and joined the ex-slaves to himself in covenant was the supreme act of steadfast love, the indisputable evidence that the Lord is a God who sees affliction and comes down to deliver, and the assurance that whenever his people are in distress the same lovingkindness and mercy will be shown to them as to their fathers. This is why the recitation of the mighty acts of God is an important element in the psalms of confidence.

If the psalmists' insight into the meaning of confidence is transferred to the Christian scene it becomes startlingly clear that our attempts to drum up this mood by listing the achievements of the saints or by taking stock of our human resources are unworthy of the religious tradition in which we stand. The one ground of confidence which the Christian possesses is the historic act of God in Jesus Christ, and when the mood of confidence is called for in worship it can best be realized by the simple appeal to those events in which the love and mercy of God are fully and finally revealed.

THE MOOD OF THANKSGIVING

Confidence, however powerfully and with whatever conviction it may hope for a good issue out of trouble, can never be the final note of worship. There are those among the worshipping community who can bear testimony, not only to the hope, but to the reality of salvation. If worship is to be

complete it must recognize the fact of deliverance, and in so doing pass beyond confidence to thanksgiving.

In literary form a thanksgiving psalm is a complete act of worship.⁶ It begins in praise, glorifying God for what he is and does; and it closes with praise, returning at the end to the point of beginning. Between the two extremes of praise the psalmist relives in memory the suffering, danger, or sin from which the goodness of God has rescued him, and recalls the confidence which went with him in his sorrow. The cyclic movement of thanksgiving from praise to praise is more than a mere recurrence to the starting point. It is praise on a newer and deeper level; praise which has been tested and knows whereof it speaks. The man whose life no shadow has touched may sincerely praise God, but his worship is always open to the suspicion of shallowness and complacency. Job was a man "perfect and upright," yet until he had passed through the fires of suffering Satan could with some justification suggest that his religion was only skin deep. When a man has been in the depths and has met the saving grace of God there, his character and his faith emerge tested and matured. His praise is transmuted into thanksgiving.

The giving of thanks, conceived with the psalmists as a recapitulation of the whole structure of worship—arising in the mood of praise, passing through the mood of despair when God seems far away (but not without confidence that he remains gracious even though he seems to have turned away his face), and returning to the mood of praise at the end—is worlds removed from thanksgiving which is a "counting of blessings." This pseudo-religious exercise is often painfully close to self-congratulation, and far from praise. The psalmists characteristically give thanks to God, not for what he has given them, but for what he is.

Enter his gates with thanksgiving,
and his courts with praise!
Give thanks to him, bless his name!

For the Lord is good;
his steadfast love endures for ever,
and his faithfulness to all generations. (Psa. 100:4, 5)

If this attempt to describe the worship pattern present in the Psalter has been at all successful, it will have important practical consequences. The biblical structure of worship must be seriously considered as a model for every Christian act of worship; not, of course, to be followed slavishly

⁶ The *Danklieder* (Songs of Thanksgiving) appear twice in Gunkel's classification as either thanksgiving of the individual or of the community. Cf. Psalms 30, 34, 116, 118.

or mechanically, but in loyalty to the understanding of human nature and its needs which the pattern reflects, and with the imagination necessary to bring it to life in the modern world. Such a use of the psalms may be the means of elevating private and family devotions from the status of formal duties performed out of a sense of obligation, to a well-spring of healing and health for the individual and his family. It may perform a similar service for the often stilted and hastily conducted worship of church groups, and may infuse a sense of reality into the formal services of the church, and into such separate elements within them as the pastoral prayers and the reading of the Scripture.

There is no intention of suggesting that we have in the Psalter a philosopher's stone which will at the mere touch transmute all the base metals of worship into pure gold, but the promise of a new life in worship should at least be an incentive to the study of the psalmists' insights into the structure and theological nature of the worship experience.

Creation, as Viewed by Science, Philosophy, and Theology

A Review Article

L. HAROLD DEWOLF

LANGDON GILKEY, of Vanderbilt University, has rendered to Christian thought a most valuable service by making the doctrine of creation the subject of a solid study. His book, *Maker of Heaven and Earth*, the first published volume by this lay theologian, seeks to show that the belief in God as the Creator *ex nihilo* is essential to a Christian doctrine of redemption and to a properly meaningful personal life. He defends it against the charge that it is contrary to science, maintaining that it is, instead, a strong ally of the whole scientific enterprise. He carefully distinguishes the essential doctrine from various mythological forms of statement and from misconceptions of many kinds.

Even if the author had accomplished nothing but the calling of theological attention to the doctrine of creation, that would have been worthy of praise. Theological discussion has recently been so concentrated on man, on Christ, and on the church that we needed a sharp reminder that Christians also believe in "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." Indeed, without this doctrine, the whole structure of basic Christian belief would be insupportable. In reality, however, Dr. Gilkey has accomplished much more.

Rightly attributing "the fundamental bent" of his thought to Reinhold Niebuhr (p. 7), Gilkey has nevertheless significantly bridged the barriers between schools of theological thought, as he has set his own independent course.

For example, he will have none of the usual present one-sided stress on divine transcendence, as he emphasizes that the immanence of God is also a sound Christian doctrine. Again, in a manner reminiscent of much liberal writing, he contends for the indispensability of philosophy, "rejected often by practical men and theologians alike." "Their rejection," he contends, "is never successful, for neither a sound culture nor a sound religion can long exist without the help of philosophy" (p. 120).

In his thoughtful chapter on "Creation and Evil," he produced some anxiety in my mind by stress on the traditional doctrine that death and all the ills that beset the world are God's punishment visited on man and other creatures of earth because of the Fall. Would this generally candid, clear-thinking author settle for *that* as an explanation? It was a relief to find these forthright sentences:

"To modern Christians, however, this understanding of natural evil is no longer convincing or desirable. Dependence, weakness, and mortality are too evidently parts of the structure of finitude to be conceived as results of sin. . . .

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Secondly, few contemporary Christians can conceive of the Fall as a past historical act of Adam, for which God punished the entire race. Their conceptions both of primeval history and of God forbid such an understanding of the Fall and its effects." (p. 190).

The traditional doctrine does, however, include some truth about natural evil, and this Dr. Gilkey recognizes. It does rightly imply that evil does not have an essential and therefore everlasting place in the creation. It suggests also the truth that much of the anxiety, fear, and anguish which people suffer is due to estrangement from God and can be overcome by genuine faith.

One of the finest passages in the book is the analysis of that meaninglessness which oppresses so many Americans and toward which many others are headed in their pursuit of merely material, technical, and other transient values (chap. 6). Some of these values are good in themselves, but lacking rootage in any larger, coherent world view, they are felt to share the uncertainty and doom of life itself. The air of confidence and hope which characterizes much American humanism is actually a vestigial product of Christian faith and without it sinks easily into pale sentimentality or disillusioned despair. Gilkey's parallels drawn from ancient Greek and Buddhist humanism are instructive and prophetic. Any preacher will find that one chapter abundantly repaying the investment in the book and its reading.

Precisely because this is such a clear-headed book which has provided the context for genuine communication on such significant issues, I should like to raise a number of critical questions. These have to do with Gilkey's interpretation of science, of philosophy, and of Christian theology.

I

1. It is surprising to find so astute and widely read an author saying repeatedly (pp. 25, 55, and 285) that science cannot so much as "ask questions about the origins of the whole system of finite things" (p. 25), indeed, that any idea of such a factual beginning of the universe would be "scientifically . . . untrue" (p. 285). Such statements apparently overlook the remarkable serious discussions of cosmogony among astronomers and physicists, of late. Computing from measurements of the expanding universe and of radioactive disintegration, scientists have variously placed the absolute beginning of the whole matter-energy system from three and one-half to five billion years ago, recently tending to favor the latter figure. Others have postulated alternative theories of continuous generation (or continuous creation!). The question is altogether unsettled; but it is *asked* and seriously investigated as a scientific problem. The correcting of his statements about this question would not, of course, invalidate Gilkey's further contention that the question as a *scientific problem of fact* would not be of ultimate concern to us. The religious issue would be raised only when one asked what was before the universe of finite things or what was the ground of all present being. Such issues are outside the scope of scientific investigation, though not irrelevant to it.

Dr. Gilkey argues that the rise of the sciences with "the breakup of medievalism" was due to the fact that at that time "Christian concepts began to permeate the secular spheres of ethics and of science" (p. 116). Specifically he attributes the rise of the sciences, in their modern, empirical form, to the Christian doctrine of creation, with its dual implication that the world was intelligible and that it was not intelligible by a *priori* deduction, but only by empirical investigation.

He makes an attractive case and as a Christian apologist I should be happy if it could be substantiated. However, I doubt that the argument can withstand criticism.

Specifically, the argument contrasts the inadequacy of ancient Greek culture to sustain empirical science such as ours with the adequacy of the Christian doctrine of creation. In doing so, the author says that the Greeks regarded the world order as an order of "inherent purposive forms," hence "deducible from ideas or forms in our minds" (p. 112). In contrast, he says, modern science denies both these notions. This raises two questions. Has Gilkey taken into account Leucippus and Democritus? Certainly they believed, as he rightly says modern scientists affirm, "that the intelligibility and order of the material world are to be found within its physical and material relations, rather than in its qualitative and purposive forms" (p. 112). In view of the vast scientific accomplishments of Albert Einstein and other pure mathematicians, is it true to say without reservation that according to modern science, the world order "is not deducible from ideas or forms in our minds, but is 'contingent,' and therefore discoverable only by sensory experience . . ." (p. 112)? Moreover, the Hebrew doctrine of creation is as old as the golden age of Greek culture. If the birth of science was impossible in classic Greece because of inhospitable ideas, why did it not occur among the Hebrew exiles of the same period, who held the doctrine of creation which Gilkey says gave rise, about 2,000 years later, to the empirical sciences?

There does appear to be a remarkable positive relation between Christian thought and the rise of modern science. Much evidence of that is marshaled by a distinguished British scientist and clergyman, Arthur F. Smethurst, in his recent book, *Modern Science and Christian Beliefs* (Abingdon Press, 1955). However, there may have been other necessary prerequisites to the beginnings of modern science as important as—perhaps more important than—the belief in creation. Perhaps what was needed was a thorough joining of the Judeo-Christian heritage with the rational discipline of Greek philosophy, a union accomplished in the late Middle Ages, and spreading widely, with renewed emphasis on Greek philosophy at the very time when the sciences took their great forward surge in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Certainly the moral earnestness of faith and the intellectual demands of the revived Aristotelian logic both challenged profoundly the easy tolerance, the mystery-mongering, and the paradoxical sophistries which in the Orient and in other ages of the West had short-circuited men's desires to investigate and resolve the conflicts of opinion about the world around them. If these contributions of Scholasticism were also essential factors in the cultural preparation for the sciences, then the doctrine of creation must be seen as only one of the contributions of Christendom to scientific presuppositions. This subject needs further study in the history and philosophy of science.

II

Dr. Gilkey's treatment of philosophy shares some of the broad generalizations and indefensible assumptions which sometimes mar Reinhold Niebuhr's highly suggestive and often brilliant comments on the history of philosophy. These weaknesses in Gilkey's book appear principally in the last chapters and are sometimes in apparent conflict with more carefully measured statements made earlier.

For some reason, Gilkey supposes that philosophy, if it finds evidence of God at all, must describe God as impersonal (e.g., p. 289). Why? Were not Berkeley,

Lotze, and Royce philosophers? What of such living philosophers as Hocking, Brand Blanshard, and Peter A. Bertocci? The same names should sufficiently refute his statement that God is "far from the bloodless abstraction of idealist philosophy" (p. 94). It may be conceded that every idea about God, whether philosophical or theological, is grossly inadequate to represent him as he is. But such idealists as have just been mentioned no more think that any barren abstraction adequately represents God in his reality than does any theologian. Several of these philosophers do rather well in conveying, as well as defending, belief in a God who is personal, purposive, and of ultimate concern to us.

Another indefensible assumption about philosophy is that it cannot affirm the divine transcendence. Why not? If, on the whole, it is more reasonable to believe that God is transcendent than to think him solely immanent—as Gilkey clearly believes it is—then this ought to be affirmed by philosophers as well as theologians.

While Gilkey is criticizing the impossibility of philosophy discovering the transcendence or concrete personal being of God, he writes, "As a wag remarked of a famous idealist: 'His absolute is only the dark night in which all cows are black.'" (p. 127.) Who was the wag who saw what philosophers were occupationally incapable of seeing? It was the idealistic philosopher Hegel, commenting on the thought of Schelling! (See the Preface of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.) This example well symbolizes the strange idea which Gilkey seems to have taken from Niebuhr, that philosophers are necessarily incapable of seeing philosophical incoherencies and abstractions, which remain for theologians to indicate. Most criticisms which theologians make of various philosophies have, like the one at hand, been made by philosophers before them.

Another charge against philosophy is that it "seeks to resolve the problems of *thought*, not necessarily of *life*" (p. 39). Its goal, he thinks, must be complete theoretical clarity, precision, and coherence. Of course it is easy, then, to contrast the superiority of theology, which is not playing theoretical games, but probing the mysteries of ultimate concern to us. Such argument indefensibly lumps all philosophy together and attributes to all the abstract rationalism of some. Would such characterization apply to William James? Henri Bergson? Charles Renouvier? All these, and many more, chose dualism or pluralism, rather than a monism purchased at the price of losing relevance to concrete, living experience. Even such a systematic idealist as Edgar S. Brightman always insisted that the data of experience must take precedence over any neat theoretical unity of system.

It is strange to find Gilkey repeating the charge which Karl Barth has long made familiar, that philosophy, and specifically theistic evidences, can lead only to idols (p. 267). Much wiser and truer to the evidence are Gilkey's earlier words, "The religious question concerning an Almighty Creator, a Preserver and Savior, is ultimately *about* the same 'Being' as the metaphysical question concerning that Real from which all existence comes" (p. 35). All that we can say about God is undoubtedly inadequate, but it would hardly be prudent to argue that every inadequate or even mistaken idea about him is proof that the thinker is only an idolator!

One of the most interesting lines of inquiry suggested in this searching book concerns the question whether there can be a Christian philosophy. Is it legitimate for a philosopher to take certain basic ideas from his Christian faith and subject them to philosophical testing? If he finds that these ideas can be well defended

by philosophical argument, has he then a proper "Christian philosophy," as Thomists like Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain would contend? Or is the result only poor philosophy and poor theology?

Dr. Gilkey's position on this issue seems equivocal. On the one hand, he argues that philosophy and theology are bound to be in tension, never really in accord, because the "method of religion is to see all things in the light of its special knowledge of God; the method of philosophy is to see all things in the light of what it knows generally of all things" (p. 39). He even says, "In method the philosopher who inquires into the structure of existence is committed to look with equal interest at every kind of experience of 'reality' which human beings have" (p. 38). This would make a Christian philosophy, or even a philosophy wholly coherent with Christian faith, impossible. On the other hand, he rightly observes that every philosopher takes certain kinds of experience as clues to the meaning of the whole. Hence philosophy "always understands experience from some position adopted in faith" (p. 37). This seems to contradict flatly the doctrine that the philosopher must view all kinds of experience "with equal interest." Gilkey concludes that the Christian insights "can become systematized into a 'Christian philosophy'" (p. 42), but he leaves the issue of "equal interest" unresolved. Likewise, we must ask whether such a "Christian philosophy" would be doomed to "impersonal" and "bloodless abstractions" as he has told us all philosophy must be.

III

Thirdly, some critical questions must be raised about the author's treatment of theology.

He seems to assume that theology has sources of information totally different in kind from any available to the philosopher. Philosophy is man's effort to explain coherently his own experience, while theology is the study of God's own revelation to us in history. Is the difference actually so absolute?

Certainly God reveals nothing to man excepting in man's experience. Moreover, all man's experience occurs in history, and if God is truly, as Gilkey and the reviewer would emphatically agree, the Creator and Sustainer of all things, then God may well be revealing himself to us in any experience the philosopher may examine. If God revealed himself to the Second Isaiah in that prophet's sublime insight and thought, how does Gilkey know that he has never revealed himself, even a little, outside the biblical tradition, as, for example, in the thought expressed in the *Tao Tê Ching* quoted on p. 278? I am not arguing that theology and philosophy are the same. I would insist on distinguishing them carefully. It is only the particular kind of absolute contrast assumed throughout this book which I would question.

Finally, I would ask why, after so much of sober, clear, and usually consistent exposition, the last pages of the book must be devoted to a Tillichian dilution of all that has been affirmed. Theology, it is there asserted, must always assert itself in myth and paradox. Some of the paradoxes used to illustrate this necessity seem quite gratuitous, though traditional. For example, to believe in God, Creator of heaven and earth, it is not necessary to assert that "before all time, God . . . created out of nothing . . . time" (p. 288). Unless one is committed to believing in an abstract eternalism hardly consistent with Gilkey's admirable insistence that God is personal and active, one may well believe that time has always been in the

very being of God himself. Other examples given of the inescapable paradoxes involve no inconsistency nor any logical tension whatever.

In his basic explanation of paradox, Gilkey says that it is "the use of affirmation and denial . . . to express the depth of mystery of something unusual or strange, which could not otherwise be accurately described in its total impact (p. 275). As an example, he speaks of "John," who, they say, "is so old and yet so young," because his "total character . . . reveals itself in some respects as aging and in others as fresh and vital" (p. 275). Now we may all be grateful for paradox, as a rhetorical figure in preaching, poetry, conversation, and other kinds of discourse. But to say that the person described as John must, *of necessity*, be described in paradox seems far from true. One will say much more about him if one tells in what respects he is revealed as aging and in what respects fresh and vital. In brief and piquant speech, it may be better to be content with the paradox. But in a psychological analysis or a recommendation for employment, in short in contexts where precision and clarity are more important than catching interest or provoking thought, it would be far preferable to go beyond paradox.

When we are making affirmations about God, there is, of course, always a vast realm of mystery beyond all that we can declare. But in order to say that, it is not necessary for theology to resort to bewilderment by gratuitous self-contradictions and unexplained myths.

Gilkey breaks free of Tillich's grasp when, near the very end, he says that "a knowledge of God that is *merely* analogical and paradoxical is no knowledge at all" (p. 291). For example, we say that God is personal and free, "but not as we humans are personal and free. Until we know in what sense these words apply to God, however, they are useless to us." (pp. 291-292.) Therefore, "if we are to speak intelligibly about God we must possess some direct and unsymbolic knowledge of Him" (p. 292). Good! Better still, the author goes on boldly to say what this knowledge is, for the Christian. "In the Word of God Incarnate, therefore, Christians confront God directly; through him they stand '*coram Deo*,' in the presence of God. Thus the personal recreative love of God in Christ, not the ontological power of God in general existence, is the one unsymbolic and direct idea of God that Christians possess." (p. 293.) This should be wholeheartedly applauded, were it not for its exclusiveness. Moreover, I am disturbed by the previous insistence that the doctrine of redemption requires the doctrine of creation and the later teaching that the doctrine of creation is a myth, that is, symbolic. An unsymbolic idea which presupposes the truth of a symbolic idea would seem to be in an ambiguous position.

The reviewer's impression is that the diluting section on myth and paradox is a vestige of an older position, not now representative of the author's own pioneering thought. This impression is heightened at the very end. Gilkey closes one of the most significant of recent theological books with these forthright and thoroughly non-Tillichian statements:

"The judgment and especially the love of God in Christ are the sources and the continuing grounds of our relation to God in faith. Correspondingly, it is this love and the personal terms that are expressive of it that are the center of our theological efforts to understand God. God is first love and then being for us. For as Christians we know God as the source of our existence only when we first know him to be the love that will not let us go." (pp. 293-294.)

IV

If I have appeared mostly negative in my comment on this book, it is not because my personal response to it is mainly negative. Quite the contrary. I have disagreed in some places, but mostly because I have found elements which seem to me to weaken the main theme which I heartily applaud. The main contention, for the reasonableness and rich significance of the doctrine that a personal God has created heaven and earth for a sublime purpose in which we are responsibly involved, is worthy of all praise. Moreover, the mind and spirit which speak in the pages of Dr. Gilkey's fine book make me want to know him better and discuss with him the great issues which he raises. I hope that his book will have a wide reading and that many other readers will be drawn into serious thought under his guidance.

Book Reviews and Notices

The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching. By VINCENT TAYLOR.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. x-321 pp. \$5.00.

This book is the final work in the trilogy begun with *The Names of Jesus* (1953) and continued with *The Life and Ministry of Jesus* (1954). The express aim of this concluding volume is to examine the doctrinal teaching of the New Testament writings.

The methodological problem of choosing between an exegetical approach which traces the profile of each New Testament writer in turn, and a more genetic one which sketches the chronological development from Jesus into the second century, is solved by Taylor by combining the two and devoting roughly one-half of the book to each. Part I thus calls the roll of the New Testament writers and surveys briefly the teaching of each. The Pauline letters and the Fourth Gospel receive fullest treatment; a separate chapter is devoted to the Christological "hymn" in Philippians 2:6-11.

Three prominent features of this survey may be mentioned. A pattern very quickly emerges as answers are sought from each writer to such common questions as how each depicts the "humanity of Jesus," his Messiahship, his pre-existence, and his relationship to God, to the Holy Spirit, and to the world. Secondly, great stress is laid upon the titles employed by each writer as indices to the "superhuman dignity" ascribed to Jesus Christ. Many details are so treated as to contribute to this central emphasis; the Virgin Birth tradition in Luke, the representative function exercised by Christ in Paul's theology (the "second Adam"), and the Paraclete sayings in the Fourth Gospel all come under purview as symptoms of this ascription of supernatural status and divinity to Christ. And thirdly, Taylor distinguishes rather sharply, in the successive sketches, between "traditional" teachings appropriated by each writer and the contributions added by each.

Part II describes first the character and the "emergence" of the "divine consciousness of Jesus." "His consciousness of divine Sonship is the key to the presentation of Jesus we find in all the Gospels. . . . All these things are true of Him because He knows Himself to be the Son of God" (p. 169). The life and worship of "primitive" Christianity, its prayers, hymns, Old Testament proof-texts, and sacraments, are then surveyed to show how here, on the flat plateau of common and popular faith, before, apart from, and after the "great New Testament writers," we are compelled to conclude that Christ was regarded as divine. What this "primitive" Christology fails to do, the "great writers" complete as they relate the work of Christ to his person, reflecting upon its Christological implications, and as they adjust in consequence their doctrine of God, in this way starting down the path which was to lead to the *Quicumque Vult* as the "ultimate intellectual implicate of the Christian faith" (p. 248, citing J. S. Whale). Not only so; two additional chapters argue that the New Testament requires that brand of trinitarian doctrine which understands the three Persons in the "full" (i.e. the modern) sense of the term "person" and that kenotic view of the two natures of Christ which affirms a pretemporal voluntary act

of renunciation by the Son of his divine prerogatives and powers. The final chapter attempts a summary statement "Towards a Modern Christology."

Comment could be made, of course, on many minor points in a work of this scope, but two important issues are raised by the book which pertain to a good deal of current exegetical discussion. In the first place, the primary perspective from which a New Testament writer's position is plotted is repeatedly set by the question to what extent and how his usages, above all his titles for Christ, confirm and support the affirmations of Nicaea and Chalcedon. This gives the whole book a decidedly apologetic cast; it is really the New Testament's "contribution to the doctrine of the Person of Christ" (p. 155), not its own doctrine, which occupies the center of the stage. Thus the interrogation of each author is cast very heavily in terms of the doctrine of the two natures, putting a stress on "person" as distinguished from "work" which is at best unnatural in the context of the New Testament itself. For instance, the emphasis on the sufferings of Jesus in I Peter is viewed as picturing a "true human life" and is laid to the presence of "primitive teaching" (pp. 82-3); later (pp. 209ff.) we are told that a "defect" of the primitive teaching is that it has not connected "person" and "work"!

When, in addition to this, "humanity" and "divinity" are confused with the modern contrast between "the historical Jesus" and "the Christ of faith"—a confusion which bedevils a great deal of contemporary discussion—further distortions inevitably follow: the humanity of Christ is found asserted wherever in the New Testament primitive historical traditions and memories can be traced (e.g. pp. 101-2); the titles by which faith takes its expression are interpreted onesidedly in terms of the "supernatural"; Mark 6:5 is taken as an indication of Mark's "bold historical realism" (pp. 4, 101); and anyone who refuses to engage in historical speculation regarding the consciousness of Jesus is tarred in advance with the brush of docetism (pp. 170-1; 284).

A final consequence of the orientation around the concepts of the later dogma is that Taylor does not know what to do with the "subordinationism" of Paul, Hebrews, and John. In Paul it is finally laid to the "unsystematized" nature of his teaching (p. 59); in Hebrews it is described as an unassimilated remnant of Jewish monotheism (p. 96); and in the Fourth Gospel it is evaporated into the language of love, the nature of which is to affirm complete dependence on the one loved—with the incredible implication that, had the Evangelist favored us with the Father's loving reply to the high-priestly prayer, the Father would have startled us by speaking as though he were the Son (p. 106). The trouble all the way through is that Sonship and subordination are understood *a priori* as antithetical, blocking the way to the inner logic of this subordinationism, for which Sonship rests precisely upon obedience, high claim upon the renunciation of every independent claim, "I and the Father are one" upon "I can do nothing of myself."

The second issue is this. An historical approach to New Testament theology is certainly justified in raising, indeed it is bound to raise, the question of the correspondence between the worship, the credal formulations ("titles"), and the writings of the early Church on the one hand, and the historical reality of revelation on the other. This is the historical question of our time. But to carry this back to a question of the emergence of a consciousness within Jesus himself seems to me to be not only a procedure vigorously resisted by the New Testament materials, unpreoccupied as they are with such psychological considerations, but also to violate the New Testament writer's understandings of that revelation. It is not enough to

answer the historical question by insisting upon the "reliability" of the Gospels for the study of Jesus' career and teaching. This is presupposed where the Canon exists. It is precisely the *nature* of this reliability which needs in our day to be examined, for the hour is past when that reliability can be defined in terms of authenticity or the preservation of *ipsissima verba*. Yet such a definition is required if one is to trace this emerging consciousness.

Taylor appears to think that if one can charge Bultmann with a few radical extremes, one can dispense with the fundamental insights of form criticism (cf. *The Life and Ministry of Jesus*, pp. 26-7); instead, every "deep-seated conviction" of the Christian community is "best explained" if traced to Jesus Himself (*The Person of Christ*, p. 162). Even the Johannine sayings are used to discuss the divine consciousness of Jesus, with the argument that this Gospel is "based ultimately upon authentic utterances of Jesus" (p. 169). Even if this argument could bear the weight which it is asked to support, the argument for authenticity in general is patently circular: the self-consciousness is demonstrated by the sayings on Sonship, and the sayings on Sonship are defended as being homogeneous with a tradition which describes Jesus as acting with a sense of Sonship (pp. 158-9; 166).

The difficulty here is not simply that of a lack of sufficient authentic materials; it is a problem of understanding the materials which we do have. For the early Christians, it was of course impossible to separate assertions that Jesus was the Son from assertions about Jesus acting and speaking as one aware of his Sonship. The human integrity of the figure with which they were confronted demanded this kind of coalescence of the two kinds of assertion. This is the truth in Cullmann's observation that the conviction that Jesus used this or that Christological title of himself belongs inseparably to the early Church's faith in him as the Christ (*Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments*, 2. Aufl., p. 8). Note: belongs to its *faith*. But Taylor has divided these two questions; the consciousness of Jesus has become an historical phenomenon which can be plotted, ascertained, and made plausible by rational and temperate historical argument (the constant and subtle implication being that denials of this position really rest on intemperate extremes of criticism). It is the emergence of this consciousness which provides the historical foundation upon which Christology must build (p. 186). And then, from this historical given he seeks to wrest the answer of faith, that this consciousness is "such as to suggest, or point to, an origin grounded in being" (p. 187). Thus Jesus' divine consciousness as historically demonstrable is made to authenticate the content of Christology.

But Jesus' divine consciousness, in the New Testament portrayals, would not bear this burden of authentication even if it were historically demonstrable. Paul's "God was in Christ reconciling . . ." refuses to be melted down into a "Jesus was certain that in him God was reconciling . . ." That is, the *kerygma's* elaboration of the meaning of the Christ event cannot be identified with Jesus' own understanding of his mission, his experience, his commitment.

This is the danger, it seems to me, lurking in the current renewal of interest in the question of the "historical Jesus," and especially in the preoccupation with Jesus' self-consciousness which marks the Christologies of both Taylor and Cullmann. (The corollary of this preoccupation is the striking but indefensible neglect of the death and resurrection of Jesus as definitive factors in the emergence of early Christian faith.) For so soon as this identification is made one can no longer distinguish between faith's response to the Christ (as the recognition of his reality and meaning) and personal familiarity with his thoughts and intentions. Faith

becomes equivalent with knowledge (demonstrable or not!) of the historical Jesus, and stands and falls with that equivalence—the Achilles' heel in both the liberal and the fundamentalist understandings of the Gospels. If we persist in this identification, then there is no holding back from the experiments with Jesus' subliminal consciousness, with extrasensory perception and the like, which Taylor tentatively allows himself. When Christology moves into these realms in this way it will have ceased being responsible exegesis and will have become the diversion of ecclesiastical dilettantes who have made of the Church's life-and-death struggles in the history of dogma a parlor game.

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Human Spirit and Holy Spirit. By ARNOLD B. COME. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959. 208 pp. \$4.00.

The traditional discussions of the Holy Spirit have suffered from a failure to relate the Spirit of God to the spirit of man. Orthodox theology was dominated by the dualism of soul and body, a spiritual and immortal substance and a material mortal substance. Charles Hodge, for instance, repudiated "trichotomy" (the doctrine that man "consists of three distinct substances, body, soul and spirit") as unscriptural and heretical (*Systematic Theology*, II, pp. 47f.). The human spirit was identified with the soul, and the Spirit of God was identified with the third Person of the Trinity as a Divine substance. The Holy Spirit was credited with conversion and sanctification on the authority of Scripture, and was known primarily as the One who "spoke by the prophets." Such theology and anthropology made it difficult if not impossible to relate the Spirit to "the human spirit" in the ongoing life and experience of the Christian man. This certainly is one reason for the absence of a "solid" doctrine of the Spirit in the Church.

It is Dr. Come's main purpose to remedy this situation. He has written this book in order to establish the validity of the human spirit as the human self or person who responds to the Holy Spirit. Building his case carefully and in detail upon recent Old Testament scholarship, especially upon the works of Johannes Pedersen and Aubrey R. Johnson, he argues that the spirit in man is his discreteness, sentience, self-objectification, and especially his "freedom to achieve self-realization by unifying the ground of self and the projection of self into the true subject-self." "To be *spirit* is to be person, in the full, inclusive, dynamic, living sense of the term" (pp. 121f, 124). Such a spirit or person is able to live only by communion with God who is Spirit and with his fellow men who are spirits. In fact, to be spirit is to exist in such personal communion.

As he develops his argument, Dr. Come criticizes K. Barth, for not allowing that man is spirit who is able to respond to God's spirit (p. 83f.). He objects to P. Tillich for making "participation of man in the life of God" a step beyond "personal encounter" (pp. 121f, 161f.). He criticizes also L. S. Thornton for not making it clear that *koinonia* is communion, a personal responsive relatedness rather than "participation in" (p. 157f.). In short, Dr. Come interprets "the human spirit and the Holy Spirit" as persons in communion. To him, this communion is the essence of Christianity, and the key for understanding both God and man.

Dr. Come represents a type of piety which is common in American Protes-

tantism; one derived especially from Methodism. It is axiomatic in the spirituality of many of our churches that there is a normative Christian experience, and that it consists in a personal relationship with God, or in the experience of God as a Person. From this it follows that the religious man responds to God as a person, freely and reciprocally; and that God and man are persons or spirits. Now, such piety is a fact. But it is not peculiar to Christianity, and it overlooks other aspects of "faith" which one finds in our churches. It is risky to identify man's relation to God with any type of experience, especially when such experience is not shared by many who are nonetheless Christians in our churches; especially, also, when "fellowship with God" is often loosely related to the Gospel and the Law of God.

There is also the question as to the exegetical validity of identifying the human spirit with the human person and the Holy Spirit with the Person of God (pp. 130, 135, 140, 150, 169, 184). This is hardly the only way to interpret the many biblical texts, or even the Pauline writings upon which Dr. Come leans heavily. Finally, comparing the Trinity to distinctness, encounter and communion, together with the statement that "Spirit in God includes Father and Son," sounds and perhaps is at once unscriptural and heretical.

In short, Dr. Come has written a lively and interesting book. He has engaged himself in an exciting experiment in thinking. But in our judgment, in spite of much help from Pedersen and Kierkegaard, he has begun and ended with a thesis which seems to us to be neither scripturally nor theologically adequate. It is dangerous for a theologian to work with axioms.

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Out of Nazareth: A Selection of Sermons and Lectures. By DONALD M. BAILLIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. 211 pp. \$3.50.

It would be untrue to say that D. M. Baillie was a prophet without honor during his lifetime. To the small but steady stream of theological students, including a trickle of Americans who flowed through the divinity halls of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews University, he was a kindling teacher and a revered friend. From the Edinburgh Conference of 1937 onward, his was an influential though characteristically quiet and retiring voice in Faith and Order discussions. But it was the publication of his *God Was in Christ* in 1948, only the second book from his pen in nearly forty years, that brought Donald Baillie at once to the very center, the fulcrum, of theological thought in our day. Not only because this volume wrestled with the central reality, conviction, and problem of Christian Faith—the meaning of Jesus Christ. But because it dealt with the difficult and disputed issues of Christology with such wisdom, discernment, and above all fairness, that it was acclaimed equally by theologians of the most diverse and contradictory outlooks. Slight in compass, modest in pretension, it remains the most authentic and helpful exposition of Christianity's pivotal truth.

Nevertheless, it is true to point out that recognition of Donald Baillie's stature and, in consequence, the dimensions of his influence have increased mightily since his death. In considerable measure, this is due to a series of posthumous publications, edited by his brother, John Baillie, of which this is the latest and perhaps the last. It consists of twenty-one sermons, most of them (one would judge) first preached

to university students at St. Andrews, supplemented by three occasional lectures and then by a somewhat fuller exposition of "The Doctrine of the Trinity" as Professor Baillie was accustomed to set it forth in his classroom in theology.

It is not easy to fasten upon the secret of the quite extraordinary, one may say unique, power of this speaking and writing. It would seem to lie in a union of simplicity and profundity focused unfailingly upon the basic realities. Here is refutation of the assumption that religion must be obfuscated with complexity in order to impress intellectuals; for this is theology made understandable for the childlike. But through and beneath the obviousness of the truths is a sense of depth which is translucent and luminous.

If one search further for the secret of this rare and compelling fusion of the simple and the profound in interpreting the ultimate, it is not difficult to identify. It is: the author's proximity to the mind of Jesus of Nazareth. In this day when most preaching makes its start from the prophets or Paul, it is revealing that twelve of these twenty-one sermons find their texts in the Gospels; it is altogether appropriate that the series should begin by confronting the skeptical query at the threshold of Jesus' career, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" and conclude with the post-resurrection command, "Follow thou me." Here, as in *God Was in Christ*, there is a clear-thinking, resolute insistence upon the true and full humanity of Jesus without sacrifice of his divinity; and it is the man of Nazareth, accepted as Teacher, as Master, as Lord as well as God Incarnate, who directs this humble devout follower every step of the way and enables those who will join him in that discipleship to enter with enlarged understanding and far securer certainly into the inmost heart of their Faith.

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The Ecumenical Era in Church and Society. Edited by EDWARD J. JURJI.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. ix-238 pp. \$5.00.

This collection of essays has been published in honor of John A. Mackay, who retired last June from the presidency of Princeton Theological Seminary. Dr. Mackay's ministry has been as varied as it has been distinguished. He has touched the life of the Church at many points; and, as Johnson said of Goldsmith, "he touched nothing that he did not adorn." This breadth of interest and influence is reflected in the title and substance of this symposium, which marks the passing of a notable milestone in the ministry of one of the great ecumenical figures of our time.

The series is introduced by an affectionate and discerning tribute to his chief by Hugh T. Kerr of Princeton Seminary. The essays which follow are grouped in three main sections: Structure and Theology; World-Wide Scope; and The Message and Its Communication. The first section contains contributions by W. A. Visser 't Hooft, George Hendry, and Emile Cailliet on some theological aspects of the ecumenical movement and of modern culture.

Under the rubric, "World-Wide Scope," the editor has gathered five essays, which overlap at some points, but in the main complement one another. Eugene Carson Blake writes on the American Churches and Ecumenical Mission; Hendrik Kraemer on the East-West Encounter; Norman Goodall on the Church's World Mission; G. Báez-Camargo on Latin-American Culture; and Paul Devanandan on the Hindu Renaissance.

The third and final section has a notable piece by F. W. Dillstone on the encounter between Christianity and the scientific ecumenical movement, and essays on evangelism by D. T. Niles and Elmer G. Homrighausen.

It is of the nature of symposia that they are uneven. The editor, having invited contributions from a panel of eminent men, must take what he gets. In this case the editor is to be congratulated on what he has received. This volume does not reflect, in all its parts, Mackay's passion for clarity of thought and precision in the use of language. But it is a readable and interesting series, which includes some essays of outstanding merit. Among the latter must be included the contributions of Hendry, Kraemer, Devanandan, and Dillstone.

Dr. Hendry writes with beautiful lucidity on "The Theological Context of the Church Today." Within the compass of twenty pages he exposes some of the primary theological issues of ecumenism. Hendry identifies the "secret" of the ecumenical movement as "the willingness of the Churches to advance beyond the confrontation and questioning of one another to a common and critical self-questioning in face of the mission to which they are called." The fact is that concern for the mission of the Church to the world is the source of this salutary self-questioning. In the medieval *Summa* and the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly there is no *Quaestio de ecclesia*, because these classical documents were produced at times when the Church was relatively unconcerned with its mission to the world. "The Church has been compelled to question itself anew, to seek for a definition which is adequate to its mission, and to measure itself by it."

This critical self-interrogation is the "internal dimension of ecumenicity." The external dimension exists in the quest for reunion. Dr. Hendry proceeds to an examination of the classical marks of the Church, not as "positive descriptions of what the Church actually is," but as norms by which the Church may pursue the task of self-questioning and reform. Much of what he writes here challenges directly some of the presuppositions of sectarian "Catholicism." But it is presented irenically; and the whole essay, in form and content, is a model of ecumenical "conversation."

The contributions of Kraemer and Devanandan complement one another in an interesting way. Dr. Kraemer writes on "The Encounter Between East and West in the Civilization of Our Time." The real play in the meeting of East and West has not yet begun; "it is in process of being staged." East and West are "in a process of re-evaluation" of themselves and of one another. In this process there are sharp contrasts. The mood of severe self-criticism in the West, "which often develops even morbid tendencies," is not paralleled in the East, at present.

Western culture, in Kraemer's view, is not at the end of its impact "but is headed towards increasing influence." This robust confidence is a refreshing contrast to the cultural lassitude and religious timidity which blights much Western discussion of East-West relations. "The singularity and universality of Western culture . . . have still a very significant role to play, if it remains faithful to its peculiar genius."

How should the Christian Church face the coming dialogue between East and West? How should she express "her inherent missionary nature"? These questions have not risen above the horizon of the Church nor "entered the perspective" of the theologians.

Kraemer's own robust theological position is maintained. It is fundamentally

the same as that of his epoch-making book, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*. He has "lengthened his cords" to embrace a wider and deeper conception of the movement of history. This is the new element in the Kraemer approach. He recognizes a "specific Christian ferment and dynamism in Western culture, even in its present secularized form" and admits of the presence of patent contrasts and hidden affinities between the "Christian" West and Eastern religious and cultural patterns. But if the cords have been lengthened, the central stake remains. It is "God's self-disclosure in the historical Jesus Christ." The real issue in the coming dialogue with "the grand elusive Eastern systems of *humanist* thinking" will (presumably) be the vindication of "the personal conception of the living God as manifest in Jesus Christ."

Dr. Devanandan's closely reasoned essay, "Renascent Religions and Religion," carries the dialogue to a concrete situation and is an important counterpart to Dr. Kraemer's profound and provocative generalizations. Devanandan has written much in this field, but I do not think he has written anything more penetrating and luminous than this brief essay.

At one point, in analyzing the concepts of Sarvodaya, the movement led by Vinoba Bhave, he appears to be moving back toward the "crown of Hinduism" thesis of J. N. Farquhar. "Is there not," asks Devanandan, "a Christian responsibility to seek ways and means of so communicating the Gospel in India today that it may help *Sarvodaya* enrich the concepts into which it is endeavoring to put new meaning?" The *Sarvodaya* understanding of man and society "stands to gain" from the Christian view "where true personal relationship is made possible because the Person is also involved in it." The *Sarvodaya* "change of heart," interpreted in Hindu terms of Self-realization, "can well be charged with dynamic and revolutionary content" by the Christian concept of "conversion" as the coming into being of a new man in Christ. And so on. Is not this the presentation of the Gospel as "the crown of *Sarvodaya*?" And are these not still living questions, even if they do raise, in a new context, the old question as to whether or not the Christian revelation can be properly regarded as "crowning," and of "the grand elusive Eastern systems of *humanist* thinking"?

That this issue is not yet settled is clear; for Devanandan reopens it in this discerning analysis of change and renewal in modern Hinduism. But it is reopened with a new ingredient. This is not quite the mixture as before; it is certainly not the mixture as J. N. Farquhar knew it. For the central and unanswered question in the Hindu renaissance, as Devanandan sees it, is "whether a new life which is at present abroad in the country (India) is inspired by faith in what Hinduism stands for; or whether it is in the social ideals, the human values, the material good to which the same devotion and zeal are given as was formerly claimed by traditional religious faith." It might be argued that these social ideals, human values, and so on are inherited from the "specific Christian ferment and dynamism" in Western culture, and that these vestigial remains of Christian faith do find their fulfillment or "crown" in the Gospel. Devanandan raises the crucial question as to the real influence of *Vedanta* in Hindu religious life and thought. Upon the answer to this question must depend the validity of his suggested approach to *Sarvodaya* and other expressions of renascent Hinduism.

The Dean of Liverpool Cathedral has given us a striking essay on "encounter" in a realm which is much less remote from the concerns of Dr. Devanandan than might at first appear. Dr. Dillistone writes on "Christianity and the Scientific

Ecumenical Movement." He contrasts the Cathedral and the Reactor, Organic Man and Organization Man, the Pilgrim and the Passenger; and in fresh and arresting language he faces the missionary challenge of an "ecumenical secularism," with its dramatic symbols and its staggering achievements.

Enough has been written to indicate that this symposium represents an important contribution to ecumenical thought and discussion. One can rejoice not only in this tribute to an ecumenical prophet and statesman but also in the fact that the occasion has evoked a measure of fresh and prophetic writing on ecumenical themes.

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An Analytical Philosophy of Religion. By WILLEM F. ZUURDEEG. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. vii-320 pp. \$4.75.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, distinguished for the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, used to liken the effect of philosophy to the effect gained by rearranging the books of a library. When one begins, a new chaos ensues, for books which were once contiguous now have to be stacked here and there; and only very slowly does the chaos decrease and a better order begin to appear. When the new arrangement finally appears, everything seems rational and proper, and books are then positioned as a matter of course. What begins as a debilitating and confusing enterprise, almost completely destructive of sense, tradition, and utility, looms in the end as the very activity whereby these are secured.

Professor Zuurdeeg, a Dutch-trained teacher of philosophy at McCormick Theological Seminary, must at this point hope for the compassion of his readers and critics; for his book, whatever its intrinsic faults and merits, has indeed made a kind of chaos out of many cherished philosophical and theological arrangements (usually called "systems"). But there is another and longer-term objective, well beyond the negative moves for which positivism and analytical philosophy are so well known, and it is to this that he points his entire effort. The rearrangement and the reordering are not done in a day or in one book; and though Professor Zuurdeeg's effort makes things appear rather random, it is only just to recognize that very little, if any, new Christian doctrine is being proffered, nothing world-shaking of an ethical sort is suggested, scarcely a single affirmation of tradition is even being denied! The entire book aims only to shake up the conventional and habitual ways of hanging together our creeds, our beliefs, and our confessions.

Thus, Zuurdeeg is no religious reformer (not that he lacks the zeal of the believer or the faith of a seminary professor), nor is he trying to write a new confession or jazz up the old. Instead he seems to be modestly contending that all is not well in contemporary reflection about religion. All kinds of people, including the theologians themselves, are writing about the nature and status of theological affirmations. The theory "about," the "meta-theory," in this instance "about" language concerning God, is a mare's nest of difficulties. We are told, and again by theologians, too, that religious language, even the Bible, is mythical, or that some of it is true, some is revealed, some is even said to be both mythical "and" true, etc. The problems concerning the status of religious language have by now become problems for the very users of that language. It seems a bit unfortunate

to me that Professor Zuurdeeg does not address himself more particularly to Anders Nygren, Gustav Aulén, and others of the Swedish theologians, who did these very things in a forthright and clear manner under the stimulation of a most engaging Swedish positivist, Axel Hägerström. Nevertheless, Zuurdeeg's main point is clear enough.

Most philosophers of religion have had, as Zuurdeeg notes, a recourse to a kind of theory here. They have tried to place religious language in a reality-context, thicker and more adequate, by far, than the world of appearances. They have described a metaphysical order by reference to which the religious language could be seen to be true and ultimately valid. And some contemporary theologians still are trying to revive this kind of scheme under the rubrics of ontology and process philosophy. Zuurdeeg contends that this is all wrong. It is not simply that it is mistaken or meaningless; Zuurdeeg's excuse for his book is, as I read it, that all is not well in philosophizing about theology. He is not redoing the content, be it biblical, Presbyterian, Calvinistic, or from God himself; instead, he writes in the conviction that a radical reassessment and realignment of theology is essential in order to bring it into accord both with religious belief (with thanks to the existentialists for showing what belief is) and with the canons of correct usage of various languages (with thanks to the empiricists who have studied myths, morals, grammars, etc.).

Thus, his objections and negations, his distinctions and diagrams, are only justified if they bring such a realignment nearer. In effect, then, Zuurdeeg is not burning up the precious library nor is he confounding us by saying no system is better than system. His kind of analytical philosophy is not quite anarchical nor is it an arbitrarily designed regimen of meaningfulness. But many more positive steps are required before the task will be done, and this Zuurdeeg is not slow to admit. He invites polemics from far and wide and, whatever the outcome, his proposals deserve serious attention simply because they are relevant to so many causes in the contemporary intellectual scene.

However, there are questions to be raised about Professor Zuurdeeg's performance too. As I read the contemporary philosophical literature I discover a difference among the analysts (some students think this is not difference in schools but a transitional movement, from and to, within the movement). Earlier it was typical of the group to insist that there were formal requisites by which all language could be scaled in meaningfulness, in validity, in truth-values, etc. The substantial claims of poets, ethicists, theologians, and metaphysicians were severely handled on the grounds of their not being in accord with supposedly interfield criteria, be they those of logic or of meaning. Dr. Zuurdeeg has an enormous category called convictional language, which includes world-views, metaphysics, myths, cosmic word-pictures, a part of morals, and a galaxy held together under theology. Apparently everything called convictional language is sharply differentiated from indicative, tautological, and analytical languages (pp. 44ff.). All convictional language is expressive of *homo loquens*, who is *homo convictus*. Dr. Zuurdeeg insists that convictional language makes a point and is meaningful—if you remember that a man is conviction-ridden and a hapless babblers.

To return to the analysts of our day, again, is to be reminded that there is another emphasis among them, not quite so legislative nor dogmatic. Some philosophers, not least the Oxford group whom Zuurdeeg dismisses as apologists (p. 16), are wondering whether philosophers can make interfield pronouncements, criterio-

logical, logical, or linguistic, any more than they can make extraterritorial transcendent claims as did the older metaphysicians. This group then says that perhaps the philosophers have to learn the intrafield meaningfulness and criteria. Furthermore, this suggests that truth and falsity may not be interfield notions at all and, therefore, linguistic analysis may have to be piecemeal again, a matter of discerning the meritorious arguments within respective kinds of discourse. Finally, the very standards may be subject-dependent, or there may be, as the expression now goes, a logic for every language.

Dr. Zuurdeeg's convictional languages need just that kind of analysis. He has analyzed them only grossly. What his group of languages needs is an assessment of specific arguments and claims. Most Christians surely believe that their theology is true, even if it is expressive. Zuurdeeg lets the tough-minded enjoy truth and unanimity, rightness and wrongness (p. 46 and p. 56), while everyone who speaks convictionally must content himself with looser kinds of adequacy. Zuurdeeg gives one the impression of judging these things from the outside, and, indeed, this is how he believes analytic philosophy to function.

Other features of this book which might offend many readers, such as a certain artificialness of style and arbitrariness of distinctions, seem to me to inhere in the rigidity of Zuurdeeg's philosophic position. And I would think a more concrete situational analysis of actual believing and actual religious talking would relieve the monotonous abstractions which fill his paper. However, this is not to detract from the merits of this first-line attack. This book has something to teach us, albeit not so much by way of conclusion as by way of mode. It urges a re-examination and rearrangement, and its promise remains for the rest of us to claim by our own efforts.

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Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judea. By J. T. MILIK. Studies in Biblical Theology No. 24. Translated by John Strugnell. Naperville, Illinois: Alec R. Allenson (S.C.M.), 1959. 160 pp., 25 plates. \$2.50.

A New Quest of the Historical Jesus. By JAMES M. ROBINSON. Studies in Biblical Theology No. 25. Naperville, Illinois: Alec R. Allenson (S.C.M.), 1959. 127 pp. \$2.50.

The Gospel of Mark: Its Making and Meaning. By CURTIS BEACH. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 124 pp. \$2.25.

1. After a person reads a dozen or more comprehensive books which describe the Qumrân Community and the finding of the Dead Sea Scrolls, he wonders what unique ideas or interpretations he may find in a new book upon that theme. This volume is one of the clearest and best organized of the volumes dealing with the Scrolls, and offers some fresh interpretations. Father Milik, a Polish priest, has been active in the exploration of the Qumrân caves and in the excavations at Khirbet Qumrân. Four chapters are descriptive, dealing with The Story of the Discoveries, The Qumrân Library, History of the Essenes, Essene Organization and Teachings. The last chapter is evaluatory: The Discoveries in the Judean Wilderness and Their Importance. The volume has the *Nihil Obstat* of the Roman Catholic Church.

While Father Milik follows views which are generally traditional and sound, there are some interesting deviations in his conclusions: (1) The Qumrân community is *definitely* one made up of Essenes. (2) The Essenes are to be seen in four developing states: (a) Strict Essenism, (b) Essenism With Pharisaic Nuances, (c) The Essenes During Herod's Reign, (d) Essenism With Zealot Tendencies. It was this last stage of the Qumrân Essenes which brought about their destruction in the summer of A.D. 68. (3) While the Teacher of Righteousness cannot be identified, he was a priest and the founder of the Qumrân community. (4) The Man of Belial is Mattathias Maccabaeus! The Wicked Priest is Jonathan. (5) The Qumrân community followed a different calendar from that observed in Jerusalem. (6) While the Essene doctrine forms a link between the Old and New Testaments, it does not represent a unilinear development from Old Testament teaching. (7) The New Testament and the Qumrân texts contain some startling parallels; but the "Christ-event" of the New Testament attains a stature and a saving work that no Essene Messiah could attain.

This volume is highly recommended for general usage by all types of persons interested in this intriguing area of New Testament backgrounds.

2. "The Quest of the Historical Jesus" has been a much used phrase since Albert Schweitzer's volume by that English title was published in 1910. Francis Burkitt, in his Preface to Schweitzer's volume, remarked: "Our first duty with the Gospel as with every other ancient document, is to interpret it with reference to its own time. . . . Regarding the apocalyptic symbolism of the Gospels, it may be that we have to translate the hopes and fears of our spiritual ancestors into the language of our new world." The problem which Schweitzer faced was one of eschatology, and it is still part of the problem faced today. Yet the contemporary problem is different, as Robinson views it: "Jesus' message is eschatological, the Church's *kerygma* is christological." While Jesus sought his followers to detach themselves radically from their present evil age, Christians after Jesus' death and resurrection (including those today) have been asked to die and rise with Christ. "Our 'life' which is 'hid with Christ in God' (Col. 3:3) is the transcendent selfhood created by Jesus, and made available to us by him. In this way the line of continuity from the historical Jesus to the Second Adam of Pauline speculation is apparent. And, although we no longer use these speculative categories, the selfhood of Jesus is equally available to us—apparently both via historical research and via the *kerygma*—as a possible understanding of our existence." Such is the conclusion of this penetrating book.

Robinson declares that the original quest of Schweitzer and others was impossible and illegitimate, because it is only through the discovery of the *kerygma* as the center of the Gospels and of primitive Christianity itself that the new quest becomes possible and legitimate. "The *kerygma* calls for a total encounter with the person of Jesus, in which the self is put in radical decision." Yet to make the new quest possible there must be a new concept of history and the self; hence, "Jesus' understanding of his existence, his selfhood, and thus in the higher sense his life, is a possible subject of historical research." The procedure of the fresh quest of the historical Jesus "would be to test the validity of the *kerygma's* identification of its understanding of existence with Jesus' existence."

This is a book for the scholar, for one alive to recent areas of New Testament studies. Every sentence breathes stimulation; the volume as a whole lies within

erudition; the author gives the reader an introduction to almost every leading New Testament scholar of yesterday and today. This book makes one realize that there is no "simple gospel" in the New Testament. The reader asks a practical question: "How make this kerygma intelligible to the nonscholarly lay masses today?"

3. Curtis Beach believes that "Mark's Gospel is a theological or evangelical message set forth in the form of a dramatic narrative . . . worthy to be compared to classical Greek drama; and it is safe to say that this story of the suffering Son of God has moved people as no Greek tragedy has ever done." In an interesting, clear, and scholarly fashion the author develops his thesis. Part One deals with general problems, such as the Gospel's purpose, its structure and plot, its place in the gospel tradition, its expression of early Christian theology; while Part Two follows the traditional pattern of a carefully organized commentary which briefly explains important scriptural passages. It is written in a simple idiom for all readers to enjoy. I found every page both fascinating and sound. Scholars quoted are mainly Frederick C. Grant and Morton Enslin, but the volume indicates the author's feel of New Testament scholarship as a whole.

Some views in the book which impressed me are: (1) Mark shows a progressive revelation of Jesus' messiahship in six steps—at the baptism to Jesus himself, in the wilderness and the exorcisms to Satan, to Peter at Caesarea Philippi, to the three disciples at the Transfiguration, to the Jewish nation at the Sanhedrin trial, to the Roman centurion at the crucifixion. (2) Mark as a tragedy is similar to Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, and T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*. (3) The general outline of Mark is probably true to the ministry of Jesus, while the theological aspects of the Gospel are rooted in the tradition of the Christian Church; but Mark (the man) is the "architect" of his Gospel. (4) In his thesis that Mark is addressed to a congregation of martyrs, Dr. Beach in several pages (59-61) does an excellent piece of work in outlining the high points of the Roman Empire situation behind the Markan evangel. (5) The "empty tomb" is the creation of the later Church, and not a part of the primitive tradition. (6) Interpretations of Jesus as Messiah (Christ), Son of David, Son of Man, Son of God, Lord, Savior are posthumous developments. (7) Peter's reminiscences as one of the basic sources behind the Gospel of Mark is disputed, while form criticism is viewed as having great value in the retention of the Gospel materials. (8) The triumphal entry into Jerusalem is a Christian product rather than a historical account; the cleansing of the Temple may be historical.

While there are various places where any New Testament student might question Dr. Beach's statements and conclusions, the volume as a whole is stable in its viewpoints and represents the consensus of solid New Testament scholarship.

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The Sociological Imagination. By C. WRIGHT MILLS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 234 pp. \$6.00.

The Status Seekers. By VANCE PACKARD. New York: David McKay Company, 1959. 376 pp. \$4.50.

These two books are, each in its own way, provocatively conceived and skill-

fully written. Packard's book is an interesting case in point—a true instance—of the thesis of Mills's book.

We cannot by any means do justice to Professor Mills's analysis of the general character of recent sociological literature by academicians if we simply say that he sees it as largely a matter of verbal abstraction, often empirically meaningless and of semantic obscurity and pretentious language. Yet this much he certainly says very plainly, even aggressively. The fact is that Mills has become an authentic gadfly of the professional sociologists, his own "status" securely established with studies such as *White Collar*, *The Power Elite*, and *The Causes of World War Three*. In this latest work he is academically naughty enough, for example, to describe the "grand theory" of Talcott Parsons at Harvard and his influential (perhaps we should say fashionable) "structure of social action" as 50 per cent verbiage, 40 per cent fairly obvious when translated into the king's English, and 10 per cent conservative ideology!

Concurrently with the appearance of *The Sociological Imagination* there appeared Vance Packard's popular book about status seeking. Packard has already made his mark on American readers with his *Hidden Persuaders* in 1957, a journalistic account of some recent developments in market analysis and advertising as they are sophisticated by depth psychology and motivational research. *The Status Seekers* is journalistic, too, but a far better book; more substantial and inherently more significant because it deals with a universally important concern—social role, personal status, and class structure. It is a stellar example of how journalistic skill can take the materials of professional American sociologists and put them into ordinary language so that people can read them and gain some insight into their individual and group egoisms. All of the high-order abstractions and nonempirical discussion has been squeezed out of Packard's book; it is of the earth earthy, and plain enough for all to read without any sacrifice of the interpretive dimensions. His sources, employed as a newsman would use them—not as "secondary sources" for professionals—are investigators of the standing of James West, August Hollingshead, W. F. White, and John Dollard.

Many sociologists suffer a painful wound, viz., the limited circle of readers who know and study their published work. Most of what they write goes into highly technical treatises in edited special series or into the academic journals for captive audiences. Consequently there is bound to be widespread regret if not conscious envy when a William (H.) Whyte or a David Riesman or a Wright Mills bursts like a star upon the reading, thinking public. Vance Packard pours salt into the academic wound when he comes along with a tremendous best-seller, read and discussed almost to the point of fashion-requirement, all based upon the work of the professional social analysts without having himself gathered any of the primary research data, nor made the winnowing, the tabulation, the generalizing. It seems—well, rather unfair and somehow *piratical*!

This view of the academic reaction to *The Status Seekers*, of the irritation caused by its lack of methodological sophistications and technical terminology (which Mills accuses the professionals of having substituted for constructive and plain-spoken problem-solving) is not overdrawn. Perhaps the most interesting example of it is an extraordinarily petulant and lengthy review by Seymour Lipset in *The Reporter* for July 9, 1959. The basic point in *The Status Seekers* sturdily survives all such footnote cautions and pilpul: status is sought eagerly and even frantically in our

democracy as a reaction to the feelings of uncertainty suffered in a society that denies all claims to higher status *as something given*; the "conformist" style of life is psychologically inevitable in a fluid open society in which people compete for advantage and eminence in role, status, and class identity.

Several of the "social analysts" (of varying degrees of professional status) have met great popular interest and acceptance. One thinks of more journalistic writers such as John Keats (*Crack in the Picture Window*) and Russell Lynes (of "Harper's Magazine"), or of more scientific writers such as Riesman and Mills. But Vance Packard is all journalist, and at no point does he ever pretend something else. His amazingly popular best-seller work puts the American people into his debt.

The genius of Professor Mills's book is spelled out in a long appendix (195-226) to his *Sociological Imagination*, entitled "On Intellectual Craftsmanship." A major part of it is his discussion of how, in the end, there is too much gobbledygook, which he says "is revealed by the ease with which 95 per cent of the books of social science can be translated into English." In the spirit of George Orwell's 1984 glossary he calls all such writing "socspeak"—and it is precisely this technical gag which Vance Packard's book has unloosed in the interest of cultural maturity.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

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Indians and Other Americans. By HAROLD E. FEY and D'ARCY McNICKLE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 220 pp. \$3.75.

This informative and moving book written by the editor of the *Christian Century* and a former staff member of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (a Flathead Indian) will prove to be one of the important books of our time. Our uneasy awareness of our red brother, our conviction that our treatment of him has been less than just, and the desire to find some workable solution in the future all find lucid expression in this well-documented book. Every American citizen who seeks to overcome our abysmal ignorance of this basic problem should study this remarkable document.

In spite of the exposure and criticism of governmental policies of the past and present, it is recognized that the men under whose direction Indian affairs were handled were law-abiding, home-loving, and, in some instances, of heroic stature. Yet it is quite apparent from the record that until the last thirty years there has been no administration of Indian affairs worthy of that name. Fey and McNickle are concerned lest we repeat the old mistake over again in our anxiety to give full citizenship status to our Indian brethren.

Promises were made to the original inhabitants of America. Some were kept, but many were either broken or repudiated. The record indicates that the original mistake was the failure to recognize that the Indian and the European had different concepts about the use and ownership of land. The Indian acknowledged the existence of surface areas, respected boundaries which were agreed upon, and supported "use rights," but his cultural heritage made it difficult for him to understand ownership, title matters, and the inheritance of land. In the days when lands were transferred, the agent and the Indian did not talk the same language. Consequently, up to 1934 Indian lands had been depleted by 90,000,000 acres and there were over 200,000 landless Indians.

Improvement in our administration of Indian affairs began with the publication of the Merriam Survey in 1928. The report recommended: (1) the obtaining of facts by impartial investigators, (2) the setting of definite objectives, and (3) the development of policies in order to achieve these objectives. It is unfortunate that in spite of the progress made, Congress seems determined to slip out of its responsibilities as soon as possible. As late as August, 1953, a law was passed which would terminate governmental responsibility. The law "implies that Indians dwell in the twilight zone of perpetual infantilism. One is expected to view them with contempt for not assuming their rightful obligations as citizens or to pity them as one would the inmates of a walled institution."

Critical study should be made of the Indian Relocation Program which got under way in 1951. It was defective in many ways. For example, no provision is made for the Indian to return to his people if the trek to the city fails.

Finally, the book looks to the future and recommends steps to be taken: cultural differences should be recognized, attitudes and experiences should be developed which will lead the Indians themselves to select and pursue goals, more land and financial credit must be made available. Finally, we must be prepared to allow the Indians themselves to make the primary decisions affecting their lives and property, "not that their decisions will be superior to those made by men possibly more skillful; but that, being their decisions, the people will be content to live with them and to change them as experience teaches."

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Psychology of Religion. By PAUL E. JOHNSON. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Revised and Enlarged Edition. 304 pp. \$5.00.

For nearly a quarter of a century, Paul Johnson has been a respected leader in the psychological study of religion. Within recent months he has been made the first Albert V. Danielson Professor of Psychology and Pastoral Counseling at Boston University School of Theology. His scholarly writings, based upon a thorough training in both psychology and religion, have been studied carefully by both psychologists and clergymen.

The first edition of *Psychology of Religion* provided the majority of the contemporary leaders in the area with their first introduction to the psychological study of religion. This definitive work has now been enlarged, making available to new generations of students the benefits of Professor Johnson's maturing thought.

One of the delightful accomplishments of the revision is the retention of all the material of permanent value from the first edition, and the elimination of portions which merely reflected the fashions of thought of the day in which they were written. New sections of material have been provided to deal with recent developments in the psychological study of religion.

The original ten chapters of the first edition have been expanded into thirteen chapters in the new edition. This has been accomplished by expanding the first two chapters of the earlier edition into four chapters in the revised edition, and by adding a new chapter on "A Religious Vocation." This expansion allows a much more adequate treatment of the psychological approach to the study of religion, and an improved delineation of the historic developments in the psychology of religion.

By treating the topic of religious experience in two successive chapters, it has been possible to retain the original chronology of the studies of religious experience and at the same time to include more recent insights.

Other major revisions include the replacement of the chapter on "Regenerative Powers" by an almost entirely new chapter on "Conversion," and the chapter on "The Normal Personality" has been renamed "Religion and Health" with appropriate modifications of the content. Significant portions of new material have been added. Although the final chapter, "The Religious Community," retains the same title in both editions, the material has been completely rewritten and the result is an immeasurable improvement.

An interesting development in Dr. Johnson's writings in recent years has been his usage of case studies of living religious leaders to illustrate his insights. In this volume the fascinating story of the life of Kagawa illustrates the conversion process. The approach of the Alcoholics Anonymous organization is also described as illustrative of the redemptive possibilities in human life.

The thought of Martin Buber is given a significant place in this new edition. The parallels between Buber's thought and the interpersonal approach in psychology are noted. Johnston's version of the interpersonal approach is continued in this volume, with references to some recent developments in the viewpoint.

The teacher or pastor who valued the first edition of *Psychology of Religion* will rejoice that the volume has been preserved in its essentials, while being brought up to date in the areas of both psychology and religion. It is good that students will be able to be introduced to psychology of religion by Paul Johnson for some years to come. The gentle, devout nature of the man and his patient, understanding guidance as a good teacher are as evident in the pages of this revised edition as they were in the earlier book.

HOWARD M. HAM

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What Is the Nature of Man? Images of Man in Our American Culture.

Philadelphia: The Christian Education Press, 1959. ix-209 pp. \$3.00.

This symposium is made up of the study papers prepared for the Religious Education Association Convention in Chicago in 1957 and the papers which were read at the Convention, together with an introductory chapter by Randolph Crump Miller—sixteen chapters in all. The purpose of the Association in selecting this subject was to give an image of man in the Judeo-Christian tradition that will be more convincing and appealing than those with which it has to compete.

After reading and rereading these papers one cannot escape the impression that they do more to indicate the size of the problem of religious education in a pluralistic society than to provide solutions to the problem. In the early days of planning for the study the program committee thought it necessary to send definitions of sacred and secular images of man to those who were to prepare the study papers. The first definition of secular man referred to him as a creature of the economic order, motivated by hedonistic desires. It concluded with this statement: "Supporting the economic and hedonistic views of man is a philosophy of man as a child of nature, a higher animal, whose values and behavior can be understood, predicted and controlled by the social sciences, without benefit of religion." A second definition of secular man spoke of him as a "product of nature and society" whose goals are "personal

integration, a democratic society, and maximum fulfillment of moral and spiritual capacities—such as the ability to love, to create and appreciate beauty, to seek the truth, and to make intelligent and ethical choices.”

The one definition of sacred man declared him to be “a person created by God in the divine image.” “This person is a part of nature, but has a destiny beyond nature. He is immortal. He avows a God-given moral order, is aware of and cherishes divinely given rights, capacities and responsibilities.”

A well-known botanist, Professor Edmund W. Sinnott of Yale, shows that he considers this the fundamental issue when he says in his paper that the basic disagreement between the Communists and ourselves is about what man himself really is. But Randolph Crump Miller in his introductory chapter reminds us that the American people have never had a clear image of man because there has not been a generally accepted image of God. In speaking of the religious convictions which were at the center of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution he writes:

“It was not the faith of the Puritans or the convictions of the Anglicans in Virginia that dominated the image of men in these documents, although men of Puritan and Anglican persuasion were involved in the drafting of them; it was the semisecularized natural theology akin to deism that was reflected there, something both acceptable and unacceptable to Jews, Catholics and Protestants. Because there is a benevolent Creator, who created men in his own ‘image,’ we recognize that God has endowed them with certain ‘inalienable rights,’ including ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’ There is nothing here of the glorification of God, and the pursuit of happiness is not equated with ‘enjoying him forever.’ This religious basis of the American way is very close to the ‘religion of democracy’ advocated by some as the only possible religious teaching in our public schools.”

Professor R. Freeman Butts of Teachers College, Columbia University, rejected the images of “sacred” and “secular” and urged the Convention to help find or create anew the image of the “free man.” And he implored the Religious Education Association not to try to influence public schools to be “hidden persuaders” for religion, just as he tries to keep them from being “hidden persuaders” against religion.

A Jesuit, Professor Charles Donahue of Fordham University, proposed a novel plan to foster a sacred image of man in a state school system while keeping in touch with all phases of national culture. He suggested that religiously concerned people in some communities might ask the state schools to appoint someone they might talk with, “some pluralistically-minded person with a broad knowledge of religion and real powers of empathy” whose job would be attention to co-ordinating the school program with the religious life of the community. For the state universities he suggested denominational departments of religion and theology. Theists should take the position, he believes, of being willing to respect all consciences, secularist as well as theist, and ask from state education only a fair chance for the sacred image of man “according to our rules of pluralistic fair play.”

The immensity of the problem facing religious educators is put most forcefully by Joseph Sittler who reminded them that exacting biblical scholarship has disclosed the distinction between religion and biblical faith. He speaks also of the particularity of the biblical speech and of eschatology as the form of biblical speech. And he presses the problem of creating the sacred image in our pluralistic society by elaborating and illustrating the contextual character of biblical ethics.

This is an uneven book, uneven not so much in the clarity and force with which convictions are presented as in the disparity of these convictions. The thesis of the book is not supported by all the contributors. However the provocative exchange between the papers involve the reader in the discussion and result, it seems to this reviewer, in making clear and imperative the responsibility of religious education for presenting the sacred image of man.

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Corpus Christi: The Nature of the Church According to the Reformed Tradition. By GEDDES MACGREGOR. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959. 302 pp. \$5.00.

Here is a searching and well-ordered study that must challenge the attention of all who are concerned with questions relating to the nature of the Church, to whatever communion they may be attached. It will also shatter some prejudices and dispel a vast amount of mere innocent ignorance regarding the doctrine of the Church in the Reformed and Presbyterian tradition. A Scot with doctoral degrees from both Edinburgh and the Sorbonne, Dr. MacGregor holds the chair in "philosophy and religion" at Bryn Mawr; but his previous book on John Knox gave notice that he possesses the equipment of an historian and a biographer, and here we find him exploring with masterly competence an extended area of the history of doctrine.

The first chapter shows the close relation of this study to the unresolved difficulties of the ecumenical movement, briefly marking out the peculiarities of Lutheran, Anglican, Sectarian, and Reformed ecclesiologies. The medieval background is next brought to attention, with some necessary reminders of the familiarity of the Reformers with Aquinas as well as Wyclif. In the chapter on Calvin, points emphasized include Calvin's sense of the continuity of the Church as reformed with the medieval institution, his "methodological" mistake in linking his ecclesiology with predestination, his permission of distinctions of rank in the ministry, and certain aspects of his provisions for worship and discipline. Two valuable chapters of Scottish Church history follow, completing Part I of the book. These feature the theme of ecclesiology, but doctrine is set in intimate relation with historical events and crises. Those who have read G. D. Henderson's *Religious Life in Seventeenth Century Scotland* will be prepared for the chapter on "Seventeenth Century Scottish Divines," but will appreciate the fresh research and understanding evident here, especially in the treatment of the brilliant James Durham, who, dying at the age of thirty-six, left writings of permanent worth, stressing Christian unity. What is said of the Aberdeen Doctors is of interest, but too brief to be satisfying, "important" though they are acknowledged to be.

Part II, comprising chapters vi to xii, treats a series of topics which represent main aspects of the doctrine of the Church. One of these, chapter ix, is entitled "the Body of Christ" and presents a technical study of this Pauline expression; but in the other chapters as well we are never out of range of the concept this phrase implies. Under the heading, "Incorporation by the Holy Spirit," Baptism is thoughtfully discussed in relation to the Corpus Christi theme. Dr. MacGregor deplores the modern loss of the sense of the Holy Spirit's work in Baptism, the incorporation of the baptized into Christ. In a chapter explaining how the Church

is "the unique instrument" of divine activity the Reformed doctrine of the ministry is treated. Here he goes so far as to say that "according to the Reformed tradition there are, strictly speaking, no individual ministers," but only those who "*participate* in the corporate ministry of Christ, the only Head of the Church." It is questionable whether the negative phrase here can be supported in the Reformed tradition, though the positive part of the statement can be amply documented. We may not pause to comment on the valuable chapters on the Eucharist, and on the episcopate. The Conclusion (pp. 227-250) reflects contemporary discussions and affirms "the Reformation attempt to recover the Headship of Christ in His Body."

MacGregor has a commendable addiction to source documents, and his familiarity with his sources enables him to sprinkle his work with well-selected and often striking quotations. There are a good many footnotes; but they are not impediments to the awakened reader; instead they are the very feet on which the book marches. There are useful appendixes, a bibliography, and a sufficient index.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

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Fundamentalism and the Church. By A. GABRIEL HEBERT. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957. 156 pp. \$3.00.

"Fundamentalism" and the Word of God. By J. I. PACKER. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1959. Paper, \$1.25.

At the present time there is a controversy raging in Great Britain concerning biblical authority particularly as this relates to the doctrines of the inspiration and inerrancy of the Bible. This conflict is not unlike the fundamentalist-modernist conflict in our own country several decades ago, but it has assumed a distinctiveness in keeping with its English setting. Although this conflict is not very well known in American circles, it has penetrated into every level of British church life, including the university religious groups.

Gabriel Hebert, a member of the Anglican Society of the Sacred Mission, makes clear at the beginning of his book that he is concerned about the growing influence of the conservative evangelicals in the English churches and also the universities. He acknowledges that the term "fundamentalist" is no longer appropriate since the extreme liberalism and the dictation theory of inspiration which characterized some conservative groups in the past is not held by these English evangelicals. Nevertheless, since there are marked affinities between this modern version of conservatism and historic fundamentalism, Hebert retains this questionable term. Hebert himself takes a position closely related to contemporary critical biblical theology. He sees the Word of God as the revelation of God within and behind the Bible rather than as identified with the Bible. He sees that much in the Bible must be interpreted symbolically and that symbolism is a mode of expression that is peculiarly adapted to the dramatic presentation of the Bible. Hebert nevertheless takes a conservative position regarding the content of much of biblical symbolism. For example, concerning the symbolism of the fall as recorded in Genesis he affirms that this points to an historic first fall.

Hebert's main criticism of the conservative evangelicals is that they do not fully acknowledge the human side of the Bible and therefore often become guilty of intellectual dishonesty in their exegetical work and also become susceptible to

the temptation of idolatry. Hebert contends that on the main points of Christian doctrine there is little difference between the main stream of classical orthodoxy and the modern fundamentalists. Yet in the approach to the Bible the fundamentalists diverge from traditional theology by imposing upon the Bible a materialistic conception of truth and absolutizing a particular doctrine of inspiration. It is this introduction of nonbiblical standards and methods that so often prevents the fundamentalist from letting the Bible speak for itself. Hebert commends his opponents for their enthusiasm for missions but deplores their tendency toward sectarianism and isolationism.

James I. Packer, a lecturer at Tyndale Hall, Bristol, replies to the critics of fundamentalism and to Hebert in particular in his *"Fundamentalism" and the Word of God*, sponsored by the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship. Packer contends that Hebert, Richardson, and others misunderstand the nature of the new fundamentalism. Fundamentalism, according to Packer, is not a modern movement of reaction but simply "a twentieth-century name for historic Evangelicalism." Packer defines fundamentalism as the doctrine of the "inerrancy of Scripture and the literal acceptance of the creeds." He takes pains to distinguish the contemporary English version of this movement from its earlier American counterpart in that the former group seeks to avoid cultural obscurantism and draws from the wisdom of the church through the centuries.

Packer holds that the most severe limitation of Hebert's book is that Hebert does not take into consideration that the fundamentalist doctrine of Scripture is solidly Christological, i.e., that it is founded on Christ's view of the Old Testament as infallible and inerrant. Packer acknowledges that there is much symbolism in the Bible and his treatment of the Genesis myth is not too different from Hebert's. Packer remains true to the Reformation view that the original meaning of the verse is normative, whether this be understood as being literal or figurative. Here, too, there is seeming agreement with Hebert. The chief point of divergence seems to lie in Packer's extension of "infallibility" to the areas of biblical history and science. Yet Packer is careful not to claim infallibility for the ancient picture of the universe. He simply says that the writers were infallibly guided in their selection of the types of images that were capable of being understood at the time.

Both of these books are balanced and scholarly statements of particular points of view. These men acknowledge that this is a conversation within the circle of Christian faith. They both have a sound knowledge of the Bible, but it would seem that Hebert has a deeper grasp of the paradoxical nature of the Bible as being both the Word of God and the word of man. Hebert also maintains a healthy self-critical attitude which is sometimes difficult to detect in Packer. Packer admonishes the critics of fundamentalism to repent and subject their views to the judgment of God, but nowhere does he see a similar need on his own part.

One of the perplexing developments in this controversy is the seeming misuse of the term "evangelical." "Evangelical" appears to be linked by both Hebert and Packer with a particular approach to Scripture. The traditional meaning of "evangelical," it should be noted, is loyalty to the gospel of saving grace in Christ. In this sense Hebert is as "evangelical" as Packer. A reappraisal of the term is much needed today.

DONALD G. BLOESCH

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Jesus in the Gospel of John. By T. C. SMITH. Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1959. ix-198 pp. \$4.00.

The Life Beyond. By RAY SUMMERS. Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1959. x-233 pp. \$3.25.

1. T. C. Smith, who has recently come from the faculty of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago to a North Carolina pastorate, defends his thesis that the Fourth Gospel is the work of a Christian Jew and is directed to unbelieving Jews of the first century. He offers the layman a helpful résumé of the Dead Sea Scrolls and underlines his claim for the genuine Jewishness of the Gospel by suggesting that its writer and the pre-Christian Scrolls may draw on a common reservoir. The author agrees with Professor Rowley that the Scrolls illuminate New Testament study and that they cannot overthrow nor confirm a single Christian doctrine.

After the fall of Jerusalem, holds Mr. Smith, Jewish Christianity and Judaism could no longer coexist naturally as they had before A.D. 70. He sees the Gospel as a masterly presentation of the faith by one who may have had access to eyewitness traditions from John the Apostle. The writer speaks to the desperate condition of first-century Judaism.

The occasional bitter invective against Jews (written in seeming forgetfulness that the Christ was himself a Jew), which enabled Hitler's National Socialists to use the Gospel of John for their own purposes and which leads New Testament scholar John Knox to observe that it is in some ways the most anti-Semitic of the Scriptures, is—according to the author—directed against the Jewish leaders only. The objection that the Fourth Evangelist could not have been sufficiently acquainted with the Jewish community of his own time to distinguish the sects among them is met by the author's explanation that after A.D. 70 all real Jews were Pharisees and that the previous divisions no longer applied.

Mr. Smith questions that there is in the Gospel the evidence of the rivalry between Christ's followers and the disciples of the Baptizer that most interpreters find. It still seems to this reviewer that the emphasis in the Gospel on the Baptist's subordination can better be accounted for by a sensitivity of the young Christian movement to this competition than by Mr. Smith's theory that the relation between the two is simply being clarified for a Jewish public.

A helpful description of the Jewish festivals is included. Mr. Smith favors the Fourth Gospel's timing of the Crucifixion as occurring on the first day of the Passover feast. This reviewer doubts that a defense of Christianity for Roman officials, the coloring of the manner of presentation by Greek influences, the consciousness that there is a great Gnostic audience—yet heretical but potentially faithful members of the fellowship—can all be discounted as finally as does this interesting work. But that the Jewish influence is considerable and that Jews among other unbelievers were being addressed needs saying. No reader can come from Mr. Smith's study without a new acquaintance with the temper of the origin of the Gospel and without a new appreciation of its beauty and meaning.

2. From the Evanston Conference's choice of the Christian Hope for its theme to the growing number of books on the subject from all quarters, there is much evidence that modern man recognizes his need for the dimension of what Ray Summers calls "the life beyond." This part of the Christian faith even scientific man, maybe especially scientific man, cannot neglect.

There is in Mr. Summers' book too neat a certainty that New Testament teach-

ings can be done full justice in any one exposition of particular verses. He includes graphs of premillennial and postmillennial adventism which seem of questionable value. The Hebrew heritage as it pertains to the unity of the person as both physical and spiritual is dismissed too summarily.

The author shows a fine understanding of the fact that all of life is continually under judgment. His conclusion about the nature of the resurrection shows a fitting modesty. "The reality of it is too sublime to be grasped by finite minds. There the writers of the New Testament left it; there must we leave it." His book is a contribution, from a free-lance as well as a free-church approach, to the contemporary conversation about the eternity which participates in and gives perspective to the passing moment.

MAXINE GARNER

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Matthew, Apostle and Evangelist. By EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1959. ix-166 pp. \$3.50.

Through several decades Dr. Goodspeed was professor of New Testament in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, where hundreds of students, including the reviewer, learned from his lips the liberal approach to biblical problems. A prolific writer, he has produced more than fifty books dealing largely with critical issues.

Now long in retirement and at the age of eighty-seven he startles the world of biblical scholarship with this new volume in which he challenges the current critical view and presents ingenious and cumulative arguments in support of the traditional position that the first Gospel was written by none other than Matthew the publican.

The prevailing view has been that "the author was certainly not Matthew the Apostle." The publican, as Papias early related, wrote the Logia or Sayings of Jesus in Aramaic. Some later Greek writer, so it has been assumed, prepared our first Gospel on the basis of these Aramaic Sayings and other sources. Because of this connection men ascribed the work to Matthew. With this position practically all modern scholars, including Dr. Goodspeed, had agreed. Recent study and wide research, however, led him to espouse the conservative view.

In setting forth his case the author enumerates eight specific considerations pointing to the genuineness and authenticity of our first Gospel. He suggests that Jesus, following the examples of Isaiah and Jeremiah, who had amanuenses, laid plans for the perpetuation of his message by selecting a man uniquely qualified to record his teachings. Matthew was an alert bilingual tax collector who was tremendously interested in statistics, mathematical formulae, and monetary values, which are reflected in his work. He took copious notes on the discourses of Jesus and years later, following the successful issuance of Mark's Gospel and with it and other aids, worked them into what is now our first and best Gospel, from which we derive the Sermon on the Mount, the Beatitudes, the Lord's Prayer, the Great Commission, and choice parables.

In proper Greek practice, which named books not after sources but after authors, as in the cases of the Septuagint, Mark, and Luke, Matthew is definitely recognized as the writer of the Gospel which bears his name. From the beginning this book has borne no other name.

Probably never before has the conservative position concerning Matthew been

so ably defended. Never again will the critical view carry such cocksureness as formerly. Goodspeed's arguments are truly intriguing, if not altogether convincing.

ELMER E. FLACK

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Ancient Judaism and the New Testament. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. xvii-155 pp. \$3.50.

Professor Grant's book is a great and courageous thing. It is, without question, the most important book that has ever been written on Jewish and Christian relations. I say this with full awareness of the sweeping nature of the sentence.

In my own book, *A Jewish Understanding of the New Testament* (p. xvi), I spoke in praise of the liberal Protestant scholarship as "free, objective, and rigidly honest." A number of reviewers, both Protestant and Jewish, have quarreled with this statement of mine. No stronger support for my statement exists than this magnificent book by Dr. Grant. For a devoted Episcopal priest, after a long career as professor of New Testament at leading American seminaries, and a distinguished record of publications, to have written as he has, is a vindication of my affirmation about Protestant scholarship at its best.

Professor Grant seeks to set the record straight as to the nature of Ancient Judaism at the time when Christianity was born. He does not hesitate to give a bill of particulars of how previous generations of Christian scholars approached the Jewish literature with what he describes appropriately as prejudice. Calmly and systematically he assesses the nature of the prejudgment on Judaism and discusses the results of misinterpretation. Then he sets up the requirements for appropriate interpretation. Nowhere in this book, it should be noted, has Professor Grant lost one iota of his fidelity to Christianity.

This is a book which, at least ten years ago, I told myself that it was incumbent upon me to write. It is usual when a student or a scholar finds that someone else has written that which he intended to do, to find some basis for disparaging the effort. But the book I wanted to write on this subject does not need to be written. Professor Grant has done it with far greater skill than I could possibly do it. As a Jew, I cannot help but respond with affirmative emotion to what he has said. As someone who aims at objective scholarship, I am jealous of his achievement.

The manuscript was awarded, in 1958, the prize by the Christian Research Foundation. Does this not further support my contention on Protestant biblical scholarship?

SAMUEL SANDMEL

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City of Wrong: A Friday in Jerusalem. By KAMEL HUSSEIN. Translated from the Arabic with an Introduction by Kenneth Cragg. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1959. xxiii-225 pp. Dutch fl. 13:50.

In 1954, Dr. Kamel Hussein, a leading physician of Cairo and man of wide culture, member of the Arabic Academy and formerly Rector of Ibrahim University, published a philosophical novel in Arabic, under the title given above. It was by no means the first Arabic novel of its kind, for, as in other literatures, the novel form is often used to sugar the philosophical or didactic pill. But the setting was

original, and for a Muslim author bold to a degree; for the City of Wrong is Jerusalem, and the thread of narrative upon which the discussions are strung is no other than the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus.

In this episode, Dr. Kamel Hussein finds a theme in which there are displayed, though their attitudes to the problem raised by the events of this condemnation, all the varieties of human vanity and error, and the questions addressed by these events to the conscience of each. In the first section, the different Jewish characters illustrate the themes of ambition, the "plain businessman," the conflict between idealism and political realism (finely and sympathetically presented in the character of Caiaphas), the bestiality of the mob. In the second, called "With the Disciples," the problems are those which arise from errors of understanding and human reason within the community of revelation and belief. The third, "Among the Romans," takes up the more obviously challengeable aspects of power, authority, and discipline, together with the more refined errors of the Greek philosophical tradition (alongside which the author sets, as a parallel rather than a contrast, the ignorant superstitions of the villager).

The basic philosophy of the author appears to be somewhat as follows. There are three types of human activity, each with its own field of action, force, and good. These are vitality, reason, and conscience. Above all, it is conscience, "the gift of God," which distinguishes man from the animals, and is regarded with an entirely Hamiltonian emphasis, as supplying the criteria of right and wrong. There is a particularly valuable additional note supplied by the author for the English translation on this point (note 25, pp. 221-222).

It is natural that such a study on such a theme should attract the interest of Christian scholars, and equally natural that, while they admire the profundity, sensitiveness, and exquisite tact of the author, they should draw attention, with due expressions of regret, to the omission from the narrative of any of the Christian symbolism associated with it. This is, however, an obtrusion of theological views irrelevant to the purpose of the work (although possibly excused by the author's naïve and equally irrelevant excursion into Christian psychology). For the book is addressed to Muslims, and indeed it is pervaded by the substance of many traditional and modernist Muslim arguments, to a far greater extent than is indicated by Canon Cragg's notes. It is, in fact, not so much a direct study of the events of Good Friday as an ethical criticism of Muslim doctrines and attitudes in the relatively neutral framework of the story. While the careful reader will note that all the essential Islamic positions are explicitly reserved, it cannot be questioned that the outstanding quality of the book is the "penetrating honesty" of the author in regard to the temptations of religion, whether of Christianity or Islam.

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God in Us. By MILES LOWELL YATES. Ed. by W. N. Pittenger and W. H. Ralston, Jr. Greenwich, Connecticut: The Seabury Press, 1959. ix-206 pp. \$4.25.

If anyone had told me, before I read this book, that I could become much interested in a series of lectures on "ascetical theology" (which is what the author calls it), I should have been highly skeptical. "Ascetical" has such an un-Protestant

sound! What lies behind the strange term, however, turns out to be something of the deepest concern for everyone who takes the life of the spirit seriously. It has to do with the basic principles and the practice of Christian devotion.

The primary thrust of the book might be intimated more simply by saying that it wrestles with the meaning of sainthood in the modern world. Its chief concern is with the life of prayer—prayer in its widest sense, not simply as a vocal form but as habitual communion with God. The spirit of the book is strongly mystical, but mystical in the context of personal and social responsibility. For most readers the main value of the treatment will be found in the concrete suggestions for self-discipline in "our dedicated, all-round enterprise for furthering a unitive relationship with God."

In developing his viewpoint the author draws on a rich variety of ecumenical insights. He is fully at home with Ignatius Loyola and St. Bernard, with George Fox and Søren Kierkegaard, with Baron von Hügel and Simone Weil. More important, however, than any of the contributions which he gleans from many sources is his own rich Christian experience. For many years prior to his death in 1956 Dr. Yates was one of the most beloved teachers in the General Theological Seminary, New York. His personal influence on young men studying for the priesthood in the Episcopal Church was quiet but profound. What he says in his book has special weight because it is a reflection of his own life as a Christian.

SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT

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The Faith of a Methodist. By ERIC BAKER. Nashville, Tennessee: The Methodist Publishing House, 1959. 112 pp. \$2.00.

When Eric Baker spoke at a Boston Area Pastors' Assembly in 1954 he was known to us only as the Secretary of the Methodist Conference of Great Britain and a delegate to the World Council of Churches, meeting that year in Evanston. Yet, though preachers are a critical lot, I have never seen a man more enthusiastically accepted. Now all who heard him have an opportunity to renew their acquaintance with his mind through his latest book, *The Faith of a Methodist*, in which they will find expounded much which they heard from his lips. Based undoubtedly in deep study and long meditation, his writing has the rare quality of simplicity and profundity that makes his book clear to the humblest layman and profound enough to satisfy the theologian. In addition, he manages to say something fresh and important about Methodist Christianity.

Dr. Baker's concern is rooted in complete sympathy with the ecumenical movement. In the unity of the Christian Church, symbolized by the World Council, he sees the hope of the world. At the same time, it would be tragic and quite unnecessary if this unity should be purchased at the price of the distinctive values of the various denominations. It is the primary purpose of Dr. Baker in this book to expound that doctrine which he considers the peculiar emphasis of the Methodist movement, the doctrine of Christian perfection.

The divine forgiveness has been emphasized, he feels, at the expense of the corresponding doctrine of the transforming power of the love of God in Christ. The whole gospel, he claims, is suggested in the two lines of the familiar hymn, either line of which is only half a gospel:

He died that we might be forgiven,
He died to make us good.

The second line contains the Methodist emphasis and is the source of the Methodist joy.

Not the least of the values of Dr. Baker's book is his appraisal of the contribution to Methodism of Charles Wesley. John Wesley's intellectual power, organizing genius, and administrative energy gave the church its form, but the depth of feeling and religious joy which is associated with Methodism is a reflection of the hymns of Charles Wesley. Dr. Baker's frequent comments on these hymns are a valuable contribution to Methodist hymnody.

ROLAND STAHL

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The Midrash on Psalms. Translated by W. BRAUDE. Yale Judaica Series, XIII, 2 Vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. xxxvi-563 and 630 pp. \$15.00.

Rabbinic interpretation of the Old Testament is famous for its amazing devotional insights, for the wealth of Hebrew learning which it brings to bear on the text, and, unfortunately, for the difficulties which its own texts present to the modern reader. Therefore everyone concerned with devotional or with historical interpretation will have cause to be grateful to Rabbi Braude for his labor of love in translating the most important rabbinic commentary on the most important devotional book of the Bible—the Midrash on Psalms.

The translation does not merely translate word for word (which would produce an English text almost as difficult as the Hebrew), but fills out cryptic expressions, supplies connectives, explains in footnotes the obscurities, and thus constitutes what is perhaps the best English introduction to rabbinic methods of exegesis. Moreover, it is an important contribution to Hebrew studies, not only as a commentary on the text it translates, but also because it is based on a correction of the best available Hebrew text—which is none too good—by constant reference to early editions and manuscripts. Accordingly, it is a necessity for serious work on the Psalms.

MORTON SMITH

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Orlo Strunk, Jr., Dean of West Virginia Wesleyan College and associated with the Institute of Pastoral Care in Boston, has prepared a balanced collection of forty-nine Readings in the Psychology of Religion from standard and contemporary authorities of various schools. (Abingdon Press, \$4.50.) The readings are arranged under topics to facilitate study.

Chicago University Press has brought out the Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames, edited by Van Meter Ames, under the title *Beyond Theology* (\$5.00). "I believe that most readers will lay the book down after reading it . . . convinced that they have met what in India would be called a 'Great Soul.' The present generation needs to read what Ames wrote." (Harold Fey.) Ames was a pragmatist professor of philosophy at Chicago, and forty years the beloved minister of the University Church of Disciples of Christ.

Harper & Brothers sends us *The School of Faith*, an anthology of catechisms of the Reformed Churches, translated and edited by T. F. Torrance, who supplies an outstanding introductory essay (\$6.00). Invaluable for the study of historic Protestantism.

Vergilius Ferm has produced another encyclopedic volume, *Classics of Protestantism* (Philosophical Library, \$10.00), containing large slices of classical Protestant literature. He includes the *Theologia Germanica* as influential in Luther's time; Luther, Calvin, Samuel Clarke, Law, Wesley, Edwards, Channing, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Bushnell, Parker, Ritschl, Inge, Rauschenbusch, Barth, with biographical sketches of each. Some of these works are not easily available elsewhere.

Association Press has published the full text of Karl Barth's "Letter to a Pastor in the German Democratic Republic," with Johannes Hamel's reply and a significant essay by Hamel, all under the title, *How to Serve God in a Marxist Land* (\$2.50). Robert McAfee Brown in a penetrating introduction points out that English-speaking readers may learn important things here about the problems and purposes of heroic and prophetic Christian pastors behind the Iron Curtain. The same publisher sends us also *Adolescence and Discipline*, by Rudolph M. Wittenberg (\$4.95), subtitled "A Mental Hygiene Primer." An experienced and compassionate psychotherapist and worker with youth groups, Dr. Wittenberg presents a skillful guide to those who would help adolescents toward the inner discipline of maturity.

Two books on Pastor Niemöller have come out: *Pastor Niemöller*, by Dietmar Schmidt, a friend of the pastor whose work (originally in German) is considered the first authoritative biography (Doubleday, \$3.95); and *God's Man*, by Clarissa Stuart Davidson, a feature writer of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* who is also authorized, being personally acquainted with Niemöller (Ives Washburn, \$3.95). It should be illuminating to read together these German and American appraisals of this many-sided and courageous man.

Winburn Thomas, veteran missionary to Japan and authority on far-Eastern missions, has written a history, *Protestant Beginnings in Japan*, a valuable account of the years in the 1880's when Protestant Christianity (introduced in 1859) enjoyed such phenomenally rapid growth that some expected the conversion of the entire Japanese people. He also covers the reaction of resurgent nationalism in the 1890's, and shows that the earlier gains were not entirely lost. Published by Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, Vermont; \$3.00 paper, \$4.00 hardbound.

S. Paul Schilling of Boston University has written an incisive book, *Isaiah Speaks*, a laymen's guide to all three Isaiah's, bringing out the lively relevance both to their own times and to ours. "Isaiah is an amazingly contemporary book." Usable by preachers, individuals, study groups. Thomas Crowell, \$3.00.

E. H. L.





